OCCASIONAL ESSAYS

Conard

3 2769 00 759 602
NAZARETH COLLEGE OF ROCHESTER

260
Cha

13819

Chatard, Francis Silas, bp.
Occasional essays.

NAZARETH COLLEGE
LIBRARY

$ 1.2
nit

Av. Arquellá

Date Due

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/occasionalessays0000fran

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS

BY THE

RT. REV. FRANCIS SILAS CHATARD, D.D.

BISHOP OF VINCENNES.

DISCARDED

1894.

CATHOLIC PUBLICATION SOCIETY CO.

NEW YORK.

13819

Copyright, 1894,
FRANCIS SILAS CHATARD.

260
Cha

PREFACE

IT is now twenty-five years, since, encouraged by the kind words of Very Rev. Father Hecker, I first put pen to paper to write for the public. During that time, as circumstances permitted, I sent to the *Catholic World*, and to some other periodicals, articles on various subjects of current interest, with a view to keeping informed the young men of America, especially, of what it seemed to me important they should know. And, as the truth and the interests of the Church were what I sought to have them appreciate, I have judged it useful still to have the same things recalled to the mind of my former readers, and placed before the eyes of those who are now the young men of our country, as embodying a great deal which seems to me of the very first importance. With these few words of explanation, I publish this volume of occasional essays, submitting what I have written and myself, as I hope they will always in like manner do, to the judgment and correction, if need be, of Holy Mother Church.

✠ FRANCIS SILAS CHATARD,
Bishop of Vincennes.

INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA.
March, 1894.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS

CONTENTS

		PAGE
I.	The True Origin of Gallicanism, -	9
II.	The Vatican Council, - - -	41
III.	Letter from Rome. (Oct., 1870) - -	61
IV.	Letter from Rome. (Jan., 1871) -	75
V.	The Italian Guarantees and the Sovereign Pontiff, - - - -	87
VI.	Max Müller's Chips, - - -	98
VII.	St. Peter's Roman Pontificate, - -	116
VIII.	College Education, - - -	143
IX.	Catholic Societies, - - - -	166
X.	The Frequency of Suicide, - -	182
XI.	Darwin's Mistake, - - - -	194
XII.	Herbert Spencer's Enigma, - -	212
XIII.	The Encyclical "Immortale Dei," -	223
XIV.	Tenure of Land and Eminent Domain,	232
XV.	Temporal Power and the Papacy, -	255

		PAGE
XVI.	CAN THERE BE SUCH A THING AS A MIRACLE?	269
XVII.	THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE, -	283
XVIII.	ARE CATHOLICS RIGHT? (On the School Question), - - - - -	291
XIX.	HUMAN CERTITUDE AND DIVINE FAITH,	309
XX.	TOTAL ABSTINENCE, - - - -	323
XXI.	TOTAL ABSTINENCE, - - -	331
XXII.	TOTAL ABSTINENCE, - - -	338
XXIII.	THE BRUTE-SOUL, - - -	345
XXIV.	BRAHMANISM DOES NOT ANTEDATE THE MOSAIC WRITINGS, - - - -	354

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

I.

THE TRUE ORIGIN OF GALLICANISM.

(*The Catholic World, January*, 1870.)

A CURIOUS book* has lately appeared in France. It is not so much the production of the pen as the result of the judicious industry of M. Gérin, judge of the civil tribunal of Paris. In his introduction to the work he says that it is not his intention to write a book, but to put together materials for history and for the better understanding of a vital question, which has agitated the French world especially for three hundred years—the infallibility of the sovereign pontiff and his superiority to a general council of bishops. It would be difficult to exaggerate the speculative value as well as the practical importance of this doctrine. M. Gérin has rendered an inestimable service to historic truth and to the church by showing the origin of the so-called Gallican doctrine, which denied the infallibility of the pontiff, contrary to the practice and opinion that had prevailed among Christians for fifteen or sixteen hundred years. It is not our intention to prove

* *Recherches Historiques sur l'Assemblée du Clergé de France de* 1682. Par Charles Gérin, Juge au Tribunal Civil de la Seine. Paris: Lecoffre, 1869.

the possessive or prescriptive right of this doctrine. This has been amply done in our day in English by several authors, while the work of the brothers Ballerini, and Zaccharia's reply to Hontheim, the well-known Anti-Febronius, are open to the study of the learned. What we shall do will be to follow M. Gérin in showing the base origin of a teaching which no array of brilliant names can make legitimate.

At the outset we acknowledge the difficulty of the task. The work is so tersely and so logically compiled that one is at a loss how to break in upon so connected a recital, lest it should impair the effect of what he selects, by detaching it from its antecedents as well as from its consequents. But as all may not, at least for some time, have it in their power to read a translation of this interesting volume, we shall risk something for their information.

It has been commonly supposed that the Gallican doctrine was generally held by the French clergy during the reign of Louis XIV., and that in ordering it to be taught throughout his kingdom that sovereign only seconded the desire of his prelates and people. Never has a more unfounded idea been foisted upon credulity. No one ever heard of any such doctrine before the Chancellor Gerson at the Council of Constance hesitatingly broached it, in order to apply it, if possible, as a remedy and preventive of schism in the church. Like all opinions not well ventilated and examined, it found some who favored it, and at the schismatical assembly of Basle it acquired a number of followers. These, however, were soon obliged to yield; and in the Council of Florence a dogmatic decree was

drawn up and adopted by the fathers, and confirmed by the sovereign pontiff, which declared the latter to be possessed of the *full and supreme jurisdiction of Peter*, and the doctor or teacher of the universal church—a phrase that implied the infallibility of the pope; for a teacher is rightly so called only when he possesses the principles of his branch in such a way as to impart the degree of certainty peculiar to it. The church possesses the assistance of Christ, and is, therefore, infallible; and the organ or teacher of that church must have that same assistance which shall make him infallible. Otherwise we would have the, to say the least, strange consequence that ordinarily the church is liable to be misled; extraordinarily only—for councils must from their nature be unusual—is she to be regarded as free from error. It should be borne in mind that this definition of the œcumenical synod, A.D. 1439, was made after due consultation; for when Eugenius IV. had caused his rights and prerogatives to be discussed before him by the Greek and Latin theologians, the Greeks, on leaving the presence of the pontiff, went to the emperor of Constantinople, then in Florence, and renewed before him the examination of the question. The result was, that they did not oppose the teaching of the papal doctors, but merely required two rights for their party: one, that no council should be called without the emperor; and the other, that in case of appeal the patriarchs should not be obliged to present themselves for judgment, but that legates should be sent into the province in question to try the cause. Not a word was said against the doctrines. The pope refused to grant these requests, and the emperor broke off negotiations.

Still, through the mediation of influential prelates on both sides, they were resumed again immediately; and the Greek fathers acknowledged the Roman pontiff "locum gerentem et vicarium Christi, pastorem et doctorem omnium Christianorum, regentem et gubernantem Dei Ecclesiam"—to hold the place of Christ and to be his vicar, the pastor and doctor of all Christians, the ruler and head of the church. A few days afterward, the formal dogmatic definition was given by the united fathers of both churches, confirmed by the pope, and subscribed by him, by the cardinals, the emperor John Palæologus, and the Greek and Latin fathers of the council, with the exception of one, Mark, Bishop of Ephesus, whose bad faith in quoting the Greek manuscripts was accidentally made known to the whole council. His servant had erased the wrong passage, which fact the bishop did not discover until he was reading the code in public. The words of the definition are these:

"We define that the holy apostolic see and the Roman pontiff hold the primacy throughout the whole world; that the same Roman pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter, prince of the apostles, and the true vicar of Christ, the head of the whole church, and the father and doctor of all Christians; that to him, in blessed Peter, was given by our Lord Jesus Christ full power to feed, rule, and govern the universal church, as is contained, also, in the acts of œcumenical councils and in the sacred canons."

It was impossible for Gallican theologians to ignore the force of these words. To elude it they had recourse to the last phrase, "*as* is contained in the acts of œcumenical councils and in the sacred canons," and appealed to tradition to explain the meaning of

the fathers of Florence. Their meaning, however, is clear from what they determined on a few days before the decision. In their written declaration that phrase is not found. Moreover, the phrase itself is in corroboration of the decision; for in reality tradition bears out fully the doctrine it contains. The Greek text of Cardinal Bessarion has this phrase, *καθ' ὃν τρόπον*—"according to the manner"—and it is this that the Gallic doctors thought favored them. This wording does not, however, alter the sense we have given. With regard to the phrase itself, learned men, and among them the author of *Anti-Febronius*, state that in the original document such an appendage had no existence whatsoever.* With this decision before them, how did it happen that such teaching as at a later date obtained the ascendency in France, and in some other parts of Europe, could have met with favor? The work of M. Gérin answers this question clearly, and shows that intrigue and royal influence and power did the work.

The documents with which he opens his collection refer to the year 1663. They, for the most part, have hitherto been entirely unknown, and were found by M. Gérin among the MSS. of the time of Louis XIV. in the Bibliothèque Impériale—MSS. Colbert. At that time ill-humor existed between the French and Papal courts, growing out of a quarrel between the servants of the French ambassador at Rome and the Corsican guard. This was settled for the moment; but on the

* Text of Abram Candiotto. The original text, preserved at Florence, signed by the sovereign pontiff, by Palæologus, etc., and officially sealed, has *quemadmodum etiam*, etc.

appointment of the Duc de Créqui, the feuds were renewed, owing to the disposition of that ambassador, whose pride had been wounded by his having been obliged to pay the first visits to the relatives of the pope, who were in the first places of the government. The retainers of the duke, on the 12th of August, 1662, attacked and beat the Corsican guard in the service of the pope. The pope sent an envoy to visit the duke, who pretended that an attempt had been made on his life. Instead of receiving the messenger of the pontiff graciously, he threatened to throw him out of the window, and refused all apologies. This was a spark thrown into other inflammable matter that brought on an invasion of the papal territory, and other still worse disasters to the church. The king, as a consequence of his difficulties with the pope, became surrounded with evilly-disposed counsellors, whom, to do him justice, he sometimes curbed. It was during this political trouble that the enemies of Rome sought to deal her a blow fatal to her influence. The Jansenist opinions had received a severe condemnation in the decrees of the sovereign pontiff and through the action of Louis XIV. Those who professed them were obliged to sign a formula of submission to the church, and receive the doctrine of Rome. There were many who, while they did so, still held to the erroneous teachings of their sect. Among these there was an Abbé Bourseis, a man of some ability, but of more tact in courtly life. In 1661, on the 12th of December, a bachelor of theology defended the following thesis:

"We acknowledge Christ head of the church in such a manner that he, on ascending to heaven, intrusted the government of it first

to Peter, and afterward to his successors, and gave them the same infallibility he himself possessed, whenever they should speak authoritatively (*ex cathedra*). There is, therefore, in the Roman church, an infallible judge of controversy regarding faith, even apart from general councils, in questions both of right and of fact."

The Abbé Bourseis seized upon this opportunity and gained over the minister Colbert; while the son of the minister Letellier brought over his father. The thesis was represented as an attempt of the Jesuits against the government. About the same time, Drouet de Villeneuve, a bachelor of the College of Navarre, defended the same doctrine in substance. The advocate-general was instructed to proceed in the case. The parliament having been informed of what had occurred, issued a decree against the thesis, on the 22d of January, 1663, forbidding any one to write, hold, or teach such propositions under penalty of being proceeded against by the courts; and commanded this decree to be placed on the register of the said faculty of Paris. The parliament deputed two counsellors of the court, and Achille de Harlay, the substitute of the *procureur-général*, to have the decree registered. These persons repaired to the Sorbonne on the 31st January, 1663. "Despite the menaces addressed to the indocile doctors, by Talon, the advocate-general, and Harlay, the faculty refused to obey; and only agreed to take the matter into consideration."* M. de Mincé and M. de Breda, favorable to the government, said the faculty had not changed its sentiments and did not approve the

* There is, in a secret report made to Colbert, "Memoir regarding what passed in the faculty with respect to the thesis," a curious account, hitherto unknown, of these debates.—MSS. *Cinq Cents, Colbert*, vol. 155.

thesis. No conclusion was come to; the discussion was adjourned to the 1st. Nothing, however, was done on the 1st nor on the 5th of February. On the 9th, the Archbishops of Auch and of Paris were present. The first spoke against the decree and action of the parliament; the second said no opposition should be made to the decree, but that the faculty would be able to arrange things in a satisfactory manner if they discussed the matter amicably with the first president of the parliament. The Archbishop of Auch said that general councils were necessary only against schism; the rest, against heresy as well as schism, but for nothing else. No conclusion was reached. On the 15th of February, M. de Breda reported, and read the answer of the first president, and, hearing a great uproar, said he was astonished to see those present so excited against the parliament. M. Grandin, syndic of the faculty, to justify himself for having signed the thesis, spoke for a long time, and tried to give a good meaning to the thesis, and explained the third proposition, touching the need of general councils, in the same way as the Archbishop of Auch. M. de Mincé wished the decree registered. M. Morel thought it ought not to be registered before the thesis had been censured. He quoted some text of St. Gregory Nazianzen, adding that, if it were registered, the faculty would be like the statue of Memnon. He was followed in his opinion by M. Amiot. The Rev. P. Nicolai, MM. Bail, Joisel, Chamillard, and all the doctors of St. Sulpice, and of the house of Chardonnet, were of the same opinion, and declaimed strongly against the harangue of the substitute, Achille de Harlay. M. Lestocq, professor of the Sorbonne, wished to prove the

decree null both in matter and form. M. Chamillard the younger said the council of Constance was not received, and that its doctrine was only probable; but the greater part of the doctors having risen against him, he was obliged to say it had been received in part. M. Bossuet* here made a feint of bringing forward a new project; upon which Leblond, professor of the Sorbonne, Bonst, also professor, Joisel and Blanger, of the Sorbonne, following the advice of the Père Nicolai, left their places in an indignant manner, saying that the harangue of the substitute ought to be censured. All the professors of the Sorbonne, without exception, the fathers Louvet and Hermant, Bernardines and professors in their house, spoke bitterly against the parliament; and when the Père Hermant undertook to prove the infallibility of the pope and his superiority over a council, he was followed by nearly all the monks.

On the 15th, MM. Pignay, Bail, Nicolai, Chaillon, dean of Beauvais, Joisel, and all the professors of the Sorbonne without exception, as also MM. Magnay and Charton, opposed the registering.

The chief instructor of the bachelor Villeneuve, the Abbé de Tilloy, who had signed the thesis, and M. Joisel, wished the decree registered with the explanations of M. Grandin. M. Leblond, professor of the Sorbonne, and M. Lestocq concluded that it was agreed on that the registering should be accepted with these explanations. M. Guyard, of Navarre, said that to do so was to accuse the good faith of those who had drawn up the conclusion, which had passed by advice

* Afterward Bishop of Meaux.

of MM. de Mincé and de Breda. The Rev. Fathers de la Barmondière and Leblanc, of St. Sulpice, accused the faculty of mortal sin, and the latter said it was through cowardice and fear of the temporal power that the decree was registered. M. Cornet, the head professor of Navarre, was not present at these assemblies.

At the end of this memoir are the list of doctors who took part in the discussions, and confidential notes regarding each of the members of the faculty.

"List of doctors who have acted badly, or are suspected, on the subject of the decree of the parliament (that is, opposed the king).

MM.	MM.
Cornet,	Amiot,
Grandin, professor,	Rouillé,
De Lestocq, "	Alleaume de Tilloy,
Chamillard, "	Demure,
Leblond, "	Magnet,
Bonst, "	Quatrehommes,
Despérier, "	Bossuet,
Joisel,	De la Barmondière,
Chamillard, brother of the professor,	Leblanc,
	Dez de Fontaine,
Pignay,	Bail,
Morel,	Du Fournel,
Charton,	De Pinteville.
Gobinet,	

"Doctors who have acted well on this same occasion, and who particularly distinguished themselves (that is, favored the king).

MM.	MM.
De Mincé, curé de Gonesse —very well.	Vaillant,
	Faure,
De Breda, curé de St. André —admirably,	Fortin,
	Cocquelin,
Duzon,	Caspin."

"SKETCH OF THE DOCTORS WHO HAVE ACTED BADLY OR ARE SUSPECTED.

"Before making remarks on these gentlemen, I protest sincerely that I consider them all good men, full of true ecclesiastical zeal, but, to my mind, in this affair not bearing themselves according to knowledge.

"M. Cornet,* a fine mind, a very able man, of irreproachable life, with so great a reputation among those of his party that he is their head beyond dispute, and the soul of their deliberations. Those most attached to him are MM. Grandin, Chamillard, and Morel—the first two with more reserve and management, the last more openly and frankly.

"Nothing can be expected from the Carmelites, Augustinians, and Franciscans."

"COMMUNITIES TO BE FEARED ON THIS OCCASION.

"That of the Jesuits under the Père Bazot.

"That of St. Sulpice, where, to tell the truth, ecclesiastics are educated in a spirit of perfect regularity; but we are assured that every one there is extremely in favor of the papal authority.

"That of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet.

"That known as the Trente-Trois, at the Hôtel d'Albiac, near the College of Navarre, under M. Charton.

"That of M. Gilot.

"There are several *dévots* who aid these in a work which good Frenchmen and true subjects of the king strive to prevent. The principal are MM. Dalbon, De la Motte Fénélon, and M. d'Abély, named for the bishopric of Rodez."

The decree, says M. Gérin, was registered on the 4th of April; but on the same day a thesis similar to the one it condemned was maintained, with the approbation of the syndic of the faculty, in the college of the Bernardines, by the Frère Laurent Desplantes. On the 14th of April, in consequence of this being denounced

* Bossuet's master.

by royal agents, the parliament cited before it M. Grandin, the syndic, the professor presiding at the thesis, the disputant, and the superiors of the Bernardines. Talon, the advocate-general, spoke with great warmth. "Strange," he said in his prosecution,—"strange, that, with unexampled rashness, they have dared to renew these evil propositions on the very day the decree was registered in the faculty." Grandin held out against the storm, and the parliament suspended him from his duties. This rigor frightened the timid, and some days afterward the court received a number of equivocal propositions, subscribed by sixty-six doctors only. The whole number was over seven hundred. M. Deslions, of the Sorbonne, in his MS. journal,* lets us into the secret of the way in which these six propositions were gotten up. They are as follows:

"1. It is not the doctrine of the faculty that the sovereign pontiff has any authority over the temporal rights of the most Christian king; on the contrary, the faculty always opposed those who favored that authority, even understood as indirect only.

"2. It is the doctrine of the faculty that the most Christian king acknowledges and has no superior at all in temporal matters except God; and this is its ancient doctrine, from which it will never recede.

"3. It is the doctrine of the faculty that subjects owe fidelity and obedience to the most Christian king in such a way that they can be dispensed from them under no pretext.

"4. It is the doctrine of the faculty that they neither approve nor have approved any proposition, contrary to the authority of the most Christian king, or to the genuine (*germanis*) liberties of the Gallican Church and canons received in the realm, v. g., that the sovereign pontiff can depose bishops in despite of these canons.

* Bib. Imp.—MS. Sorbonne, 1258.

"5. It is not the doctrine of the faculty that the sovereign pontiff is above an œcumenical council.

"6. It is not the doctrine of the faculty that the sovereign pontiff is infallible if no consent of the church support him (*nullo accedente ecclesiæ consensu*)."

With regard to these propositions, M. Deslions writes:

"M. Bouthillier, doctor of the Sorbonne, and later member of the assembly of 1682, and Bishop of Troyes, told me that, in the conference held among the doctors deputed to draw up the six articles presented to the king on the part of the Sorbonne, in the first article, which concerns the deposition of kings, the phrase 'on no pretext' (*nullo prætextu*), was purposely inserted; and that thereupon some one objected the case of heresy. M. Morel then said that this would be a *reason*, and not a simple *pretext*, for deposing a king. He told me, also, that he had seen in the MS. of M. Grandin, at the sixth article, that the pope is not infallible *if some kind of consent* of the church do not support him. They resolved to put instead of this, *if no consent* support him; which is the same thing, and in some way less even. So true is it that these articles were drawn up in the most equivocal language the framers could suitably employ. M. Bouthillier learned this of M. Gobinet, one of the deputies."

In confirmation of this, M. Gérin quotes a comment on these articles made by Pinsson, advocate of the parliament, by order of Colbert. He qualifies all the propositions as equivocal or captious. He says:

"1. This first proposition is captious; it should have been general, affirmative, specific, etc.

"2. The king did not need the avowal of the faculty to prove that he knows no superior in temporal matters, this avowal being much more advantageous to the popes themselves, who have recognized it, as does Pope Innocent III., cap. *Per venerabilem*, in the decretals.

"3. This repetition too often made of the words 'most Christian

king' was unnecessary for Frenchmen, and it would have been less suspicious and more advantageous if, in speaking of the king, they had given to him no title, etc.

"4. This fourth is equivocal and suspicious, etc.

"5. The affectation of framing the fifth article in negative expressions cannot but be suspicious, etc.

"6. The last article should not have been conceived in negative terms, but in affirmative; to wit, that the pope of himself is not infallible without the consent of the universal church. And the phrase, 'If no consent of the church support him,' is too equivocal in this place," etc.

The offer, in the name of the faculty, of these propositions put a stop to the difficulty for the time, and the settlement of the question of redress so unjustifiably and tyrannically urged by Louis XIV. against the holy see brought with it an external appearance of peace, while it left a rankling wound that was to break out afresh in the contests concerning the *regale*, or so-styled "royal perquisite," seventeen years later.

"This question of the *regale*," says M. Gérin, "was of a date much anterior to the time of Louis XIV." It consisted in the vindication by the crown of a presumed title to the revenues of certain dioceses, and to the nomination of persons to hold benefices in the same, upon the death or removal of the bishop, and until the newly nominated bishop had taken the oath of fealty, and had registered it in the chancellor's chamber, this act being styled the closure of the royal right, or *regale*. The Council of Lyons had authorized this custom with regard to bishoprics in which it had been established as a conditon in their foundation, or had existed as an ancient practice; while it expressly

forbade its introduction with respect to those dioceses in which it had not been received.

"The parliaments undertook, however, to make the custom one of universal application, compelling the dioceses claiming exemption to prove their title to be free from it.

"Henry IV. by an edict of 1606, art. 27, declared, 'We do not intend to enjoy the right of royal perquisite (*regale*) save in the manner in which we and our predecessors have done, without extending it further to the prejudice of churches exempt from it.' This edict was registered in the parliament of Paris without modification: but on the 24th of August, 1608, the same parliament pronounced a decree conceived in these terms: 'The court declares the king to have a right to the royal perquisite from the church of Belley, as from every other in his kingdom;' and forbidding advocates to put forward any proposition to the contrary. The clergy complained to the king, who by letters of 1609 yielded the execution of the decree. Louis XIII. seemed favorable to the rights of the church; but after the accession of Louis XIV. these rights were menaced more than ever, and 'there was no assembly of the clergy,' particularly after the year 1638, in which a special commission was not named to attend to the subject of royal perquisite.'" *

That of 1670 presented a remonstrance to the king through the Archbishop of Embrun; but in 1673 and 1675, two royal declarations appeared to the effect that all the churches of the kingdom were subject to the right of royal perquisite; and that the archbishops and bishops who had not yet closed it by registering their oath should go through that formality within six months.

Caulet, Bishop of Pamiers, and Pavillon, Bishop of Alet, standing on their rights as secured by the custom of exemption, and by the canons of the general Council

* *Procès Verbaux du Clergé*, l. v., p. 377, sq.

of Lyons, refused to obey. The result was a contest between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, in which Rome of necessity became engaged. Unheard-of harshness, and cruelty even, were used against the clergymen who opposed the government. One vicar-general was condemned to death. Unhappily, there were many ecclesiastics, who had been provided with benefices by the government, who not only took sides with it, but, being interested, were active in keeping up a quarrel the resolution of which, in accordance with the views of Rome, would have proved ruinous to them. They sold Christ for a few pieces of money. The deputies of the clergy in 1680, in their regular quinquennial assembly, at the request of Louis XIV., wrote a flattering letter in favor of his claims and against the pope. This caused Madame de Sévigné to criticise them caustically. When speaking of the two prelates mentioned above, she says, after referring to the then Bishop of Alet, who had succeeded Pavillon, "But the shade of his saintly predecessor, and M. de Pamiers—have they signed that letter of flattery?"

But what were the means used to bring about the assembly of 1682, in which the four articles of which so much has been said were framed? That which we have recounted up to this was only the preparation of the soil; the seed was now to be sown, and fostered with all the care of royal interest. M. Gérin quotes from the *Procès Verbaux du Clergé*, t. v.

"The general agents or procurators of the clergy" (these agents resided permanently in Paris to protect the interests of the church in case of collision with the state, or in matters partly ecclesiastical and partly secular) "were counselled to present a memorial to

the king, and to pray his majesty to allow them to call together the prelates who were in Paris, on business connected with their churches, in order that through their singular prudence they might find means to restore peace and put everything in order. The king having permitted this assembly, it was held during the months of March and of May, 1681, in the archiepiscopal palace of Paris."

It is humiliating to a Catholic to have to make the avowal, but it is well known that royal patronage had well-nigh ruined the French Church, and that not a few bishops unworthy of the name occupied high and influential places. This assembly, known as "the Little Assembly" (*La Petite Assemblée*), met the day after the order was given. Fifty bishops, of whom the great majority ought to have been at their posts of duty, were basking in the sunshine of royal favor, and it was these Louis XIV. called on for advice. Racine has a sarcastic epigram on them, which M. Gérin quotes:

"Un ordre, hier venu de S. Germain,
Veut qu'on s'assemble; on s'assemble demain:
Notre archevêque et cinquante-deux autres,
Successeurs des apôtres,

S'y trouveront. Or, de savoir quel cas
S'y traitera, c'est encore un mystère.
C'est seulement chose très claire
Que nous avions cinquante-deux prélats
Qui ne résidaient pas."

The advice these prelates gave was what might have been expected from the state of things at the time.

They indorsed the action of the government on four points of discussion with the holy see:

1. The royal perquisite, which Fleury and Bossuet could not approve.

2. The book of the Abbé Gerbais, censured by Rome as schismatical, suspected of heresy, and injurious to the holy see; but which they found full of good doctrine and of deep learning.

3. In the affair of Charonne. This was a case of exemption from royal nomination in which the king had violated that right. The religious women of the convent of Charonne, near Paris, which belonged to the Augustinian rule, enjoyed the privilege, recognized by the civil power, of electing every three years their superior. Louis XIV., however, in 1676, named for their superior a Cistercian nun, whom the Archbishop of Paris, Harlay de Champvallon, acknowledged, and to whom he gave the position. The religious appealed to the sovereign pontiff, who, by a brief, dated August 7th, 1680, annulled the act of the archbishop, and ordered them to proceed to the triennial election, and take for their superior one of their own number.

4. In the affair of the diocese of Pamiers, of which we have spoken above.

"On the 2d of May the assembly resolved to ask the king to call a national council, or general assembly of the clergy, composed of two deputies of the first order and two of the second from each province, the latter to have a consulting voice only. The other details were to be arranged according to the advice of the commissaries." *

The action of this assembly was much criticised and was disapproved by the people, as can be seen, according to M. Gérin's statement, in the MSS. of St.

* MSS. 9517 fr. Bibl. Imp.

Sulpice, i. ii. iii.; Bibl. Mazarine, MSS. 2392, 2398 fr. From these he makes several long and interesting extracts.

In consequence of this resolution of the Little Assembly, "the king, on the 16th of July, 1681, addressed letters of convocation to the agents of the clergy, through whom the archbishops of the territory subject to his majesty were charged to hold provincial assemblies and cause to be chosen two deputies of the first order, and two of the second, for the general assembly assigned for the 1st of October, 1681."

Before entering upon a history of this body, M. Gérin gives a clear idea of the question at issue between the king and the pontiff, and shows that it was of the same nature as that which caused the struggle, in which the church was finally victorious, between Gregory VII. and the German emperor, Henry IV. The appointment of proper pastors for the flock was at stake. Rome sought likewise to put a stop to the abuse by which laymen were pensioned on dioceses, whose funds ought to have been devoted to supplying the spiritual wants of the people, and relieving the poor and orphans. The church was in imminent danger of servitude, spiritual and temporal, as Fleury himself states. So far had the usurpation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction gone that, when Louis XIV., at Strasburg, gave audience to the bishop of that place, the act of the king in putting his hand on the crozier of the prelate as he leant forward to hear him was interpreted as a resumption of investiture by the ring and crozier. Pelisson, however, the intimate friend of the king, tells us this was not the case, as he heard him say afterward that such an idea had not occurred to him; but as the prelate

spoke in a rather low tone, he bent toward him and leaned for support on the crozier.

The government of Louis had wished this assembly for its own ends; it was therefore determined that nothing should be left undone to secure a favorable result. The temper of all the members of the French hierarchy was known: there were some who were feared—these were to be passed by; some who were doubted—these were to be allured to compliance; others there were whose worldly spirit and indebtedness to the crown left no uncertainty as to their course—these were to be put forward, honored, and made the leaders in the movement against Rome. Colbert, ably seconded by the worldly Harlay de Champvallon, Archbishop of Paris, set about the work. His master was all-powerful; everything but true virtue was to bend before him. Canonical forms were to be superseded if found to be trammels, and persons who contradicted were to be made to feel the weight of royal displeasure. The legislative bodies even had been reduced to a state of passive instrumentality, so that, in 1672, a conscientious bishop of Languedoc complained to Colbert that votes were given without discussion, and protested that explanations should be made in regard to the advantages or the necessity of the expenses the states were called on to vote. In this state of things the Little Assembly had been convened and had acted the part we have seen. Before closing its sessions it named a commission under the presidency of Harlay, without whose bidding it was to do nothing. This commission drew up the project of procuration, and, by order of the king, no mention was made of the part he had had in it. On the 16th of June, 1681, Colbert writes to the archbishop:

"SIR: You will find accompanying this a copy of the letter of the king, as approved by his majesty, for the convocation of the general assembly of the clergy, in which you will remark that no mention is made of the plan of procuration, placed by you in my hands. His majesty has thought that nothing should appear as coming from him that might determine the matters to be acted on in the said assemblage; but he has resolved to give orders on this subject *by word of mouth* to the general agents of the clergy, and to direct that this project or plan of procuration be sent to the archbishops, with the explanation that it has been drawn up by commissioners named at the late assembly, for the purpose of being sent to all parts; to make known what ought to be treated of in the said assembly, and to bring about uniformity of powers; and in order to cause the provincial assemblies to give powers of procuration to the deputies of the general assembly, conformably to the project, his majesty will direct that the intendants of provinces be written to, to command them to impart to the archbishops his intentions on the subject of the procuration."

M. Gérin gives us here the text of this plan of procuration; it is from a MS. annotated by the *procureur général* De Harlay, brother of the archbishop. The deputies are

"To repair to the said city of Paris, according to the letters of the king and of the said agents, and there deliberate, in the manner contained in the resolution of the said assemblies of March and May, (the Little Assembly,) on the means of reconciling the variances respecting the royal right of perquisite (*regale*) between the pope, on the one side, and the king on the other; to determine on all the acts which they shall deem necessary to put an end to these variances, with the deputies of other provinces, the same to sign the clauses and conditions that the assembly shall judge fitting; they are likewise charged and expressly commanded to employ all proper means to repair the infractions committed by the court of Rome in the decrees of the concordat *de causis et de frivolis appellationibus* in the affairs of Charonne, of Pamiers, of Toulouse, and others which may have or shall have transpired; to preserve the jurisdiction of the ordinaries of the realm, and the various degrees of it in the form sanctioned by the concordat; to cause the pope, in case of appeal to

Rome, to depute commissaries in France to judge it: to procure by all sorts of due and proper means, the preservation of the maxims and liberties of the Gallican Church; to pass the resolutions by a plurality of votes, and, for the reasons explained above, to frame all acts that shall be required, even though there be any thing demanding a more special commission than is contained in these presents, promise being given that all that shall have been granted and signed by them shall be agreed to and observed inviolably in every particular, according to its form and tenor."

The government foresaw that the second order of the clergy, the simple priests, would make an attempt to vindicate their right to a voice. For this reason it determined to have a precedent by which to act. The Archbishop of Rheims, who was in the interest of the government, convoked his provincial assembly at Senlis; the second order protested; its voice was stifled, and the plan of procuration accepted. An account of the proceedings was made out and sent to the king, by whose command copies were immediately transmitted to the intendants of the kingdom with orders to instruct the archbishops to do the same in like cases.* As for the choice of deputies, that was to be made without any appearance or direct proof of royal intervention. But the names of the deputies show the pressure that must have been brought to bear by the court. M. Gérin quotes here a number of documents in which the royal interference is manifest. Thus Colbert writes to the Archbishop of Rouen:

FONTAINEBLEAU, Sept. 21, 1681.

"The king, being persuaded that the Bishop of Lisieux can be of more use in the next assembly than any other of your suffragans, his majesty has ordered me to write you that you will please have him chosen," etc.

* P. 128. The letter conveying the orders is given in full.

From page 115 to 153 M. Gérin demonstrates this pressure unanswerably; and from page 153 to page 261 he shows from the character of the persons chosen, the nature of the assembly, and its obsequiousness to the sovereign. On page 260 he asks:

"Why were not seen there Mascaron, Fléchier, Bourdaloue, Fénélon, Huet, Mabillon, Thomassin, Rancé, Tronson, Brisacier, Tiberge, La Salle, La Chétardie, and so many others, still more glorious in the sight of God than in that of men? . . . . Cease then from saying that the assembly of 1682 was the *élite* of the clergy of the day!"

One of the most interesting features connected with the history of the assembly is the new phase put upon the part acted in it by the famous Bishop of Meaux—Bossuet. His position here contradicts what we have seen him do in the year 1663. But from all the documents M. Gérin brings forward, it is evident that he was drawn in against his will. In one place he writes:

"The assembly is about to be held; and they desire not only that I should be present, but that I should preach the introductory sermon." (Letter to the Abbé de Rancé.)

Fleury in his notes says:

"It was the will of the king that the Bishop of Meaux should be present."

It is true that the articles were drawn up by him; but it was because he saw that extreme opinions were about to prevail, to prevent which he took the propositions into his hands, and did the best he could under the circumstances. This, however, does not excuse him entirely; for there are times in which we should be ready to suffer for the cause of truth, and if necessary even to give our

lives. The fault of Bossuet was, that he was weak, and could not resolve to forfeit royal favor for the glory of suffering in a just cause. After a careful and thorough perusal of the chapter on Bossuet and the assembly, it is impossible to come to any milder conclusion than this. The articles were drawn up and passed by the assembly. It is not our purpose to go into an examination of these articles. It will suffice to state that their aim was to limit that fulness of power belonging to the sovereign pontiff which we have seen implied in the definition of the Council of Florence, without seeming to do or say anything that could be noted as heretical or schismatical; and in the third article there is an indorsement of the decrees of the fourth and fifth sessions of the Council of Constance, which it is well known were never approved by the sovereign pontiff, and have therefore no authority. These decrees proclaim the superiority of a general council of bishops over the pope, and strike a direct blow at his infallibility and supremacy. They were the very decrees that caused the decision of the Council of Florence, though the occasion of the definition was the union of the Greek and Latin churches. How were these articles received? On the 19th of March they were adopted by the assembly. On the 11th of April, Innocent XI. censured them in his brief. Louis XIV. was so much impressed by this act of the pope that he prevented the bishops of the assembly from sending a circular to the prelates of the kingdom, by way of protest. On the 9th of May, he suspended the sessions of the assembly; and on the 29th of June, he sent orders for its immediate dissolution, without allowing it to go through with the rest of its programme. Count de Maistre says of him,

"He broke up the assembly unceremoniously, with so much wisdom and fitness, that one almost pardons him for having called it together."* He did not even allow the minutes of the sessions to be put in the archives of the clergy.† M. Gérin tells us that the people were opposed to this assembly from the outset; and when the members were about to depart, the following epigram sped them on their way:

"Prélats, abbés, séparez-vous;
Laissez un peu Rome et l'Eglise!
Un chacun se moque de vous,
Et toute la cour vous méprise.
Ma foi! l'on vous ferait, avant qu'il fût un an,
Signer à l'Alcoran."

The ministers of the king were very much irritated; they dared not then, as they did in 1688, appeal to a general council, because this would bring upon them the censures of the bull *Execrabilis* of Pius II. It was determined, therefore, by the king to permit the *procureur-général* to make a protest privately, in the hands of the *greffier* or keeper of the archives of the parliament, without the knowledge even of the first president. In the meanwhile the clergy, far from acquiescing in the decrees of a body which had falsely assumed to represent them, were giving evidence in a marked manner of their disapprobation. Like all those who try to compromise between right and wrong, between the service of God and the good-will of the world, the framers of the four articles had become unacceptable to both.

"A Dio spiacenti ed ai nemici sui."

* *De l'Eglise Gallicane*, t. ii., c. 11.
† *Procès Verbaux*, t. v.

The parliament protested because the prelates had not gone far enough; the *procureur-général*, De Harlay, put in a formal declaration on this subject, and it was registered by permission of the king. But these men were not the clergy, not the people. M. Gérin gives us witnesses who testify to what these thought and said. The first is one above suspicion, a man favorable to the court, the Abbé Le Gendre; he says:

"At first the declaration of the clergy was by no means applauded. Far from doing so, many attributed it to cowardice, saying that it was the effect of the servile obedience of the bishops to the will of the court. Others thought it was neither prudent nor honorable to rise with levity against the pretensions of the pope, at a moment when he was risking everything to sustain theirs. This movement of opposition, which was almost general, gave birth to spicy writing, in which Mgr. De Harlay was the most ill-used, as he was regarded as the first inciter, and almost as the only author of all that was done in the assembly."

The edict of the 30th of March ordered that the four articles should be registered in all the universities, and be taught by all the professors. If this doctrine, remarks M. Gérin, had been but generally received, it would have been hailed with rejoicing. What happened? It was opposed by the most numerous, the most learned, and the most pious portion of the clergy. The faculty of Paris was composed of seven hundred and fifty-three members, as appears from the MSS. Colbert, Mél. t. vii. Of these, one hundred and sixty-nine belonged to the Sorbonne. The "*Plan for Reforming the Faculty*," in 1683, (Pap. Harlay,) says,

"The house of Sorbonne, with the exception of six or seven, have been educated in sentiments contrary to the declaration. The

professors, the syndic excepted, are so opposed to it that those even who are paid by the king have not been willing to teach any of the propositions presented to his majesty in 1663, etc. . . . . The principal of the College of Plessis, and those whom he employs and protects, in his college and out of it, are absolutely one with those of Sorbonne."

As to the College of Navarre, the MSS. Colbert, t. 155, tell us that its principal, Professor Guyard, was entirely devoted to Rome, etc., and others prominent, Saussay, Ligny, Vinot, were of like opinion. In 1682, none of the professors except Doctor Lefèvre taught the maxims of the kingdom.*

Of St. Sulpice, St. Nicolas de Chardonnet, and the Missions Etrangères, we read:

"Those of St. Sulpice, of St. Nicolas de Chardonnet, and of the Missions Etrangères, who have given their opinion in this affair, (of the four articles,) hold the same views as those of Sorbonne."

Of the religious orders and communities, it was written in 1663:

"Nothing can be hoped for of the Carmelites, Augustinians, and Franciscans, who make profession of favoring his holiness in everything," etc.

The parliament, therefore, and the grand council had, by an abuse of power, decided that *each one* of the mendicant orders should have but *two votes* in the faculty, so that thirty-four Franciscans, thirty-eight Dominicans, thirty-three Augustinians, and nineteen Carmelites had only eight votes in the faculty.

"Forty-three Cistercians and six canons regular, who are all for Rome, are to be treated as the above friars."

* *Projet du Réforme*, Pap. De Harlay.

That, besides being the most numerous, the opponents of the articles were the most learned, is evident from the details we have given; all the professors of Sorbonne, with the exception of Pirot, all the professors of Navarre, except one, Lefèvre, taught the ultramontane opinions. The MSS. Colbert prove this also beyond the possibility of doubt.

That the opponents of the declaration were also men most remarkable for their piety, is acknowledged by those who were engaged in giving information to Colbert.

To show the exactness of the facts given us here, M. Gérin quotes the words of a famous anonymous book, *La Tradition des Faits*, that appeared in 1760, by the Gallican Abbé Chauvelin, clerical counsellor to the parliament of Paris. The abbé writes:

"When it was resolved to oblige the ecclesiastics to profess the maxims of France, what difficulties stood in the way? It was necessary to extort from many of them their consent. Others opposed obstacles which all the authority of the parliament could only with difficulty remove. It became necessary to use all the zeal and light of several prelates, and of several doctors, who were favorable to the true teaching, to bring back the great number of ultramontanes in the French clergy. . . . The ecclesiastics did not cease from resistance until the parliament used its authority to restrain them. . . . The university and the faculty of law submitted without difficulty, *but they were obliged to proceed by way of authority to make the faculty of theology obey.*"

The facts given above, the testimony of witnesses above suspicion, of those whose interest it would have been to conceal what they say, the action of the parliament, and the petty ways adopted to coerce the professors, v. g., withholding their pay,* all evince that the

* P. 376, from MS. letters 10,265 fr. Bibl. Imp.

maxims known as Gallican were forced upon the clergy and people of France. But not only is this the case, but so fully were the king and the bishops themselves convinced of their falsity that they retracted them. Before showing this, we will add a curious and precious document from the hands of the wily Achille de Harlay, *procureur-général*, addressed to Colbert, on the 2d of June, 1682. After saying that the proposed visit of the parliament to the faculty would have been unfortunate, because it would have revealed to Rome the divergence between the latter and the government, he goes on to add that "of the assembly of the clergy, the greater part would change to-morrow, and willingly, if they were allowed to do so."*

The act of the assembly, as we have seen, drew from the sovereign pontiff an authoritative censure. This was not all; the pope refused the bulls of consecration for those who had taken part in it, unless they made their formal submission to his decision. The king, who at heart was a sincere Catholic, opened his eyes to the danger of the church. As we have said, he withheld the minutes of the proceedings in the first instance, although he allowed a private protest to be made. Later he revoked his decree ordering the doctrine of the four articles to be taught in the French schools. Page 454 has a letter of Louis to the sovereign pontiff, in which he informs his holiness of this, September 14th, 1693. A posthumous work of Daguesseau† says:

* Bibl. Imp. MSS. Harlay, 367, vol. v., p. 145

† Vol. xiii., p. 423.

"This letter of Louis XIV. to Pope Innocent was the seal put upon the accommodation between the court of Rome and the clergy of France; and conformably to the engagement it contained, his majesty did not any longer enforce the observation of the edict of March, 1682, which obliged all who wished to obtain degrees to sustain the declaration of the clergy made that year with regard to ecclesiastical authority; ceasing thus to impose, on this point, the obligation existing, while the edict was in force, and leaving for the future, as before the edict, full liberty to sustain the doctrine."

L'Abbé de Pradt, in his work, *Les Quatre Concordats*, speaks of the letter of Louis XIV., and says that Pius VII. had it with him—"an old scrap of paper," as Napoleon expressed it—and wished the emperor to sign it. This, however, Napoleon declined to do, until he could consult his theologians. On their advice he refused to sign it. He did more. The abbé says:

"When the archives of Rome were brought to Paris, Napoleon went one day to the Hôtel de Soubise, in which they were kept. There he obtained the letter of Louis XIV. He took it with him, and, on his return to the Tuileries, threw it into the fire, saying, 'We sha'n't be troubled hereafter with these ashes.'"

Montholon tells us, in his *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de France*, that Napoleon dictated to him these words concerning the book of the Abbé de Pradt:

"'This work is not a libel; if it contains some erroneous ideas, it contains a great number which are sound and worthy of meditation.' He afterwards dictated six notes upon different points contained in the work; he takes notice in them of all that appeared to him deserving of censure; but he has not a single word to say against the story of the destruction by himself of the letter of Louis XIV."*

* Montholon, *Mémoires*, vol. i., p. 113. Paris, 1823.

With regard to the bishops who had taken part in the declaration, they had the good sense and virtue to submit to him whom Christ has named his vicar and the pastor of pastors. On the 14th of September, each one of them wrote to Innocent XII. in the following terms :

"Prostrate at the feet of your holiness, we profess and declare that we grieve deeply from our heart, and beyond what we can express, on account of what has been done in the assembly, so greatly offensive to your holiness and your predecessors ; and, therefore, whatever may have been deemed (*censeri potuit*) decreed against ecclesiastical power and pontifical authority, we hold and declare that all should hold it as not decreed. Moreover, we hold as not determined on whatever may have been deemed (*censeri potuit*) determined on in prejudice of the rights of churches; for our intention was not to decree anything nor to do anything prejudicial to the said churches."

The following passages from MSS. and works of the day add confirmation to this letter.

A memoir on the liberties of the Gallican Church, composed by order of "Monseigneur Louis, Dauphin de France, Duc de Bourgoyne, mort en 1710," says :

"This court (Rome) continues always what it has begun, and often obliges us to retract or alter what we have judiciously and necessarily done against her. Nothing proves this better than the history of the assembly of 1682."

Adrien Baillet, writing his *Démêlé de Philippe le Bel avec Boniface VIII.*, tells us :

"In the first variance (between Philip and Boniface), it was the court of Rome that gave satisfaction to that of France ; in the second (of the assembly), it is the court of France that has just rendered satisfaction to that of Rome."

Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, art. "Braunbom," writes :

"France was so far from having broken with the pope, from the

year 1690 to the year 1701, that she became, on the contrary, more papist. It is known, moreover, that Innocent XII. gained the day, in having things put again on their old footing in 1693."

We have tried to give the substance of M. Gérin's work. We feel that we have given but a meagre idea of it. Still, this much is evident, from what we have written, that the doctrine known as Gallican was not the doctrine of the French clergy. That it afterward became so, in great part was owing undoubtedly to the influence of the assembly of 1682, and of those who in high positions lent their aid to its propagation among the rising generation of students. They, early imbued with these maxims, were far less to blame than the men who first broached such principles. Let us hope that the comparatively few who hold to these opinions, seeing the origin of what they profess, will understand the worthlessness of them, and unite with the universal church in professing belief in the infallibility of the See of Peter.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

II.

THE FIRST ŒCUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE VATICAN.

(*The Catholic World, September,* 1870.)

THE proceedings of the Vatican Council have reached a stage that allows us to witness again its external splendor and imposing presence. Grand and most august as it certainly is, still every thing that strikes the eye fades away as one thinks of its sublime office, of its important, unlimited influence and effect. The nature of the subject it has just treated will necessarily make that influence overshadow all ages to come, and that effect cease to be felt only with the last shock of a world passing away.

The question that for more than a year has agitated all circles of society, that for the past three months has been a subject of exciting debate among the fathers of the council, could not have been of greater weight. It is one of those truths essential to the existence of the church, and had it not been practically acknowledged among the faithful throughout the world, Christianity, unless otherwise sustained by its Author, would have been an impossibility. The vital point examined was the essence of the union of the church, of the union of faith, to determine dogmatically in what it consists, who or what is the person or

body that can so hold and teach the faith as to leave no doubt of any kind whatsoever regarding its absolute divine certainty.

Up to the present day the infallibility of an œcumenical council, or of the whole church dispersed throughout the world, has been recognized as the ultimate rule by all who lay claim to orthodoxy; but with that council, or with that church dispersed throughout the world, as a requisite—*sine qua non*—was the communion and consent of the sovereign pontiff. Where he was with the bishops, there was the faith; no matter how many bishops might meet together and decree, if Peter was not with them, there was no certainty of belief, no infallible guidance. Nay, their decrees were received only in so far as approved by him. *Ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia*, was the formula recognized by tradition. In a word, where Peter was, there was to be found infallible teaching; where Peter was not, there neither was the teaching infallible. None in the church ever thought of gainsaying this. But there came a time when the element all agreed hitherto to look on as essential began to be a subject of doubt and of discussion. Writers went so far as to say that the pope could be judged by the other body of teachers, the bishops; and this followed naturally from a mistrust in the unfailing orthodoxy of the sovereign pontiff. The greater phases of this movement are well known. The Council of Constance had hardly closed when the Council of Basle put in practice the principles broached by its predecessor, and deposed the reigning head of the church, putting in his stead Amadeus of Savoy with the title of Felix V. In the midst of this confusion, Eugenius IV. held the Council

of Florence, in which the remarkable decree was published that declared the pope the vicar of Christ, the ruler of the flock, and the doctor of the universal church. Those of the French clergy who clung with tenacity to the principles of Basle, refused to receive this decree, under pretense of the uncœcumenical character of the Council of Florence. The Jansenists availed themselves of the advantage this pretext gave them. Although eighty-five French bishops wrote in the year 1652 to Innocent X., according, they say, to the custom of the church, in order to obtain the condemnation of these heretics, the latter still held their ground, and were able to accuse the French assembly of 1682 of inconsistency, in attempting to force on them a decision of the pope, whom the assembly itself declared fallible. The celebrated Arnauld taught that the refusal of its approbation to a papal decision on the part of one individual church was enough to make the truth of such a decision doubtful.

We shall try to give some idea of the importance of the question of papal infallibility by a parallel development of two opposite teachings, in a rapid sketch.

The cardinal principle of Gallicanism is the denial of the inerrancy of the sovereign pontiff in his solemn ruling in matters of faith and morals when teaching the whole church. Any one who attentively looks at the question must see the close connection of the primacy with the claim to unerring certainty in teaching. The domain of the church is in faith, in spirituals; temporals being secondary, and the subject of legislation only in so far as necessarily bound up with the former. The only reason why a teacher can lay claim to obedience is because he teaches

the truth, and this is especially the case where faith and conscience are concerned. If the sovereign pontiff have not this faculty of teaching the truth without danger of error, then he cannot demand implicit submission. The church dispersed throughout the world, being infallible, cannot be taught by one who is capable of falling into error. The ordinances therefore and decrees of the pontiff, being intimately connected with faith, and issued on account of it, must follow the nature of the submission to his teaching. But as this latter, in the Gallican view, is not obligatory unless recognized as just by the whole church, so neither are the ordinances and decrees to be looked on as binding except under a like reservation. It follows from this, clearly and logically, that the supremacy of the pope can be called supreme only by an abuse of terms; consequently, 1st, the texts of canon law and of the fathers that teach a perfect supremacy are erroneous or false, and have no foundation in tradition, which is the truth always, everywhere, and by every one held in the same way; 2d, the texts of Scripture that refer to Peter are to be restricted to him personally, or, when seeming to regard his successors, are to be interpreted in a sense not favorable to the idea of a perfect supremacy. The pope thus becomes amenable to the church; he is a divinely constituted centre, nothing more; the official representative of the bishops of the whole church dispersed throughout the world, which alone is the ultimate criterion of truth. He can, therefore, be judged by the bishops, be corrected by them, deposed by them, and his asserted right to reserve powers to himself to the prejudice of ordinaries, or to legislate for dioceses other than his own, is to

be set aside. A species of radicalism is thus introduced into the church. The bishops themselves are not to be looked on as infallible judges of the faith of their flocks even, and the faithful themselves, or the people, become the ultimate judges of what is to be held as of faith. Instead of being taught, they teach; instead of being a *locus theologicus*, they become the *ecclesia docens;* and the teachers and rulers become the ruled and taught. As the people themselves are liable to be swayed by the influence and teaching of artful men, we have in consequence a weak and uncertain rule to go by; weak, because of the moral impossibility of knowing the sense of the whole church, for even the members of an œcumenical council might not exactly represent the faith of their individual churches; uncertain, because of the facility with which in past time the people of many individual churches have been led astray.

As we write, it seems as if we heard some indignant protest against what we have just said. We reply that we do not refer to individual opinions; many Gallicans refused to go the length of their principles; a sense of danger alarmed their piety and put them on their guard. For our part, we treat of the principles themselves, and deem perfectly consequent what we have asserted. It would be an easy matter to illustrate it with facts of the present as of the past; but it would be beyond our scope just now. Any student of history will have no difficulty in recalling the manner in which defections from the church have been brought about, and the errors of those who once seemed columns of the temple. The inadequacy of the

Gallican rule is still further shown by its practical inconvenience. It is fortunate that in the early church it had no place whatsoever. Peter being then recognized as the head and teacher of the church, all controversies were referred to him, and by him they were settled. *Petrus per os Leonis, per os Agathonis locutus est;* so spoke the fathers of Chalcedon and of the Sixth Council. Suppose for a moment it had been otherwise; suppose, when the Pelagian heresy arose, it had been necessary to hear the voice of the whole church scattered over the earth—this being the rule—the whole church, not any one part, was to give the doctrine from which it was not lawful to depart. Zosimus was but one bishop; so, too, was Innocent I.; Augustine was only one learned man, and Prosper of Aquitaine, a Christian poet and polished scholar, but only one other father after all. Those who wrote with them bore witness each for his own particular church. What had become of the churches of Scythia, of Lybia, of Ethiopia, of Arabia? Who had penetrated into the Indies, or set sail for the islands of the sea, or reached the far-off coasts of the Sinenses? Who was to explain with accuracy to those distant Christians the cunning dealing of Celestius and Pelagius, that had deceived the vigilance of the eastern fathers, and lay bare the hypocritical professions that had misled even Zosimus? Who was to bring back the opinion or belief of these isolated churches without danger of misunderstanding or misinterpretation? Those were not days when communication was easy. Weeks and months amid all kinds of dangers and uncertainty were required to reach even those places that lay near the shores of

the Mediterranean. It was physically impossible to ascertain with unerring sureness the belief or condemnation of those far-off Christians; and as long as their assent was not given, there was no adequate rule of faith. Consequently, there was no prompt or efficacious means of correcting error; the means at hand were of probable worth, therefore not sufficient to use against heresy, that could always appeal to the universal church dispersed throughout the world, and when condemned by those near, fly to the probable protection of those at a distance, without the least possibility of ever knowing the belief of those to whom they appealed. In the meanwhile, heresy crept into the flock, established itself there; for there was none to cast it forth; and the fold became tainted. Thus from age to age Christianity would have been a mass of error, the truth being obscured or suffocated by the weight of falsity from the want of a prompt practical means by which heresy could be detected and crushed at its birth. Happily no such state of things existed; the chair of Peter was the abode of truth; it was set up against error, and the quick ear and intuitive eye of Christ's vicar heard and saw the evil, and met it at the outset.

The doctrine which teaches the opposite of what we have been describing, and which is now of faith, clears up all difficulties, and comes to us in all the beauty and consistency that adorns truth. Jesus Christ has made Peter and his successors the foundation of the church. He has given to him, and to each of those who succeed him, of his own firmness, and strengthened his faith that it fail not, that he may confirm his brethren. In this office of confirming his brethren,

Peter holds the place of Christ, and acts in his name. The gift he possesses, however, is not one of inspiration; but he is assisted and kept from erring in his judgment of what is contained in the revelation made by Christ to man. To arrive at a knowledge of what that revelation is, he seeks in his own church, and, according to the need, in the churches everywhere that he may know their traditions. The judgment he makes is infallible, and in promulgating it he lays down the tenets of faith for the whole church. Hence he becomes the immovable rock upon which the faithful are builded, he is the centre around which they revolve, the orb from which they receive the light of faith. Hence he has subject to him the minds of all, and the character of his primacy becomes more clear and fully evident. It is no longer a mere point of visible communion, but an active power placed by God to rule, with unfailing guidance in faith, and with a consequent spiritual intuitiveness, that makes him discern what is for the good of the church at large throughout the world. Hence all are bound to obey him in what regards the faith and teachings of Christ; who is with him, is with Christ; whosoever is against him, is against his Master. Hence, too, by a direct consequence, there can be no power set up against his; all the bishops of the church depend on him, receive their jurisdiction from him, and can exercise it only at his word. What a sublime picture of unity, of order, and of strength! As an army in array the church advances to do battle against the foes of Christ, never more successful, never more glorious, than when her children, recognizing their dependence, and, harkening to her

voice, with one mind and with one heart follow the leadership of Peter. No wonder this spectacle struck the unbelieving mind with astonishment, or made the gifted writer of England burst forth into the glowing description so familiar to all!

The difference of opinion that existed among the bishops on the subject of the infallibility is known throughout the four quarters of the globe. What was the cause of it? If any one imagines that all who joined in opposing a definition from the outset were actuated by the same motives, he would certainly be wide of the mark. While the main point of the controversy was held by the *ultramontanes* without exception, and there was but the one question as to the formula to be used, the opposition, as they were generally called, taken all together, had no fixed principle of accord, save an agreement to disagree with the defining the doctrine as of faith. To analyze the constituent parts of this body we shall class them according to ideas.

First in conviction, in determination, and in influence were the Gallicans, properly so called, who held and taught the very opposite of the proposed dogma. They were mostly men who had been bred in this teaching, and who deeply reverenced the memories of those who held and taught it in past times. This class was not very numerous, though it grew larger in the course of the council by the accession of those whose examination of the question convinced them of the claim of Gallicanism to their adherence.

The second class comprised those who, believing the doctrine themselves, or at least, favoring it speculatively, did not think it capable of definition, not deeming the tradition of the church clear enough on this point.

A third class, the most numerous, regarded the definition as possible, but practically fraught with peril to the church, as impeding conversions, as exasperating to governments. For the sake of peace, and for the good of souls, they would not see it proclaimed as of faith.

All of these dissident prelates, we are bound to say, acted with conscientious conviction of the justice of the cause they defended. They were bound in conscience to declare their opinions, and to make them prevail by all lawful influence. If on one side or the other of this most important and vital question any went beyond the limits of moderation, or used means not dictated by prudence or charity, it is nothing more than might have been expected in so large a number of persons, of such varied character and education. Instead of being shocked at the little occurrences of this nature, we should rather be struck with admiration at the self restraint and affability which were shown, despite the intensity of feeling and strength of conviction. In a word, that the Council of the Vatican did not break up months ago in disorder and irreconcilable enmity, is because it was God's work, and not man's; it was because charity ruled in it, in spite of defects, and not the passions that govern the political debates of men. The earnest desire all had of a mutual good understanding was evinced on occasion of the speech of a well-known cardinal, which, though not approved of by all, gave evidence of a sincere desire for conciliation and agreement. The effect was remarkable; a thrill of pleasure went through the assembly, for the moment each one seemed to breathe freely, and to hail his words as harbingers of peace in the midst of excitement and anxiety.

It was shortly after this incident that the closure of the general discussion on the four chapters of the present constitution took place. The regulations provide for this contingency, making it lawful for ten prelates to petition for the closing of a discussion, the proposal being then put to the vote of all the fathers, and the majority deciding. In this case, a desire not to interfere with remarks which bishops, for conscientious reasons, proposed to make, kept this regulation in abeyance, and it was only after fifty-five speeches had been listened to, that one hundred and fifty bishops sent in a petition for closing, believing there would be ample time and opportunity for everyone to speak and present amendments when the *schema* would be examined in detail. An overwhelming majority voted the closure. It seems difficult to understand how this could be found fault with. Had there been no further chance to speak, there would have been reason undoubtedly to claim hearing, or complain of not having been heard. But, as has been seen since, there have been discussions on each part of the *schema;* and on the last chapter, regarding the doctrine of infallibility, one hundred and nine names were inscribed for speaking, of which number sixty-five spoke, the remainder by mutual consent abstaining from speaking; thus of their own accord putting a stop to a discussion in which it was morally impossible to say anything new. It seems surely to be a strange assertion to say there has been any real infringement of the liberty of speech in the council, when there appears to have been so much of it that the members themselves grew weary of it.

While we are on this subject, we wish to speak a little more fully, as the freedom of the council has been

13819

publicly impugned in two works, published in Paris, against which the presidents and the fathers have thought proper formally to protest.

The grounds of the accusation are chiefly three:

1st. The appointment of the congregation, the members of which were named by the sovereign pontiff, and received or rejected the postulata, or propositions to be presented to the council for discussion.

2d. The dogmatic deputation having been composed of those in favor of the definition, and the members having been put on it by management; moreover, this deputation exercised a controlling influence in the council.

3d. The interruption of those who were giving expressions to their opinions, in the exercise of their right to speak.

We preface our brief reply to these objections by two quotations. One is from the letter of an apostate priest, A. Pichler, at present director of the imperial library at St. Petersburg, which was written by him in Rome last winter, and was published in the *Presse* of Vienna. In it he says, "It seems to us no council has ever been freer or more independent." The second quotation is from one of the two works referred to above—*Ce qui se passe au Concile.* At page 131 we read:

"In truth, if the pope alone is infallible, it is not only his right, but a duty, and a strict duty, to guide the bishops, united in council, or dispersed throughout the world, to encourage them if they be in the right way, to reprove them if they go out of it, to take an active part in the work of the assembly, to inspire its deliberations, and dictate its decrees."

Apart from the spirit that animates the writer of the above, there is much in what he says, and we take him at

his word. The Œcumenical Council of the Vatican has pronounced its irrevocable and infallible decree, declaring infallibility to be and to have been a prerogative of the sovereign pontiff, and that his decisions *ex cathedra* are irreformable of themselves, and not by virtue of the consent of the episcopacy. We therefore draw our deduction and justify the sovereign pontiff by these very words, in nominating the members of the congregation, and in conferring on it the ample powers it has. Secondly, we give him the praise of moderation, because he did not make a full use of the rights accorded him by the author of the citation we have given. Were we to follow this writer, we should have to accuse the pope of having in part neglected a grave duty toward the council, for he did not *dictate* its decrees. In the very beginning, he told the bishops he gave them the *schemata*, unapproved by him, to be studied, altered, or amended as they saw fit; and, in fact, when the decrees prepared previously by theologians were proposed by the congregation, they were recast and amended time and again, and were finally decided by a vote of the fathers, and approved by the pontiff without alteration. This is surely not dictation; dictation does not admit of reply or refusal, it takes away all liberty whatsoever. The sovereign pontiff then did not *dictate* the decrees.

Let us return to our triple objection. First, with regard to the congregation. In the early numbers of *The Catholic World* for the current year, an account of the composition of this body is given, as well as the reasons for its appointment. We refer our readers to the March number, in which it may be seen that, although possessed of sovereign powers over the church, defined as belonging to him, by the Council of Florence among

NAZARETH COLLEGE
LIBRARY

others, there was no disposition to exercise coercion on the part of the pope, who, in controlling the action of the council in this way, was only making use of a right the whole church acknowledged. Moreover, the composition of this body was itself a guarantee of justice and zeal for the general welfare. That there were not named for it those who were known to be hostile to what has just been declared of faith, was nothing more than natural. Moreover, when these high ecclesiastics had admitted postulata, their work was over; the propositions passed into the control of the fathers, and were decided by vote.

The answer to the second objection is easier even. This deputation was elected by the fathers themselves; and as the large majority favored the teachings of Rome, they elected none who was opposed to them. As for the accusation of management, we must say that persons who understood well the tendencies of the prominent men of all parties, naturally, as happens in all such large bodies, directed the choice of candidates, and the final vote of the fathers settled the matter. It is hard to see how the rights of any were violated. This deputation, from the merit of those that composed it, could not be without great weight in the council; and when we consider that it was the choice of the large majority, and was in harmony with the views of the majority, it is not wonderful that it controlled to a great extent the votes of those composing the council.

The third objection is one that must be treated with great delicacy, for two reasons—because of the impossibility of knowing all the circumstances, and because those who are accused are in a position that prevents them from justifying themselves. The presidents were named

to act for the sovereign pontiff, to preserve due order, to see that the discussion was limited to the matter in hand, and to prevent anything that might tend to disturb good order, or diminish respect for the authority and person of him they represented. If, in the discharge of their duty, they displeased those they addressed, this was to have been expected; if also they in any way did not observe the due mean, so hard to reach in everything human, one should excuse, if needful, the defect, when especially the great merits, the distinguished services, the known virtue and high position of these cardinals are taken into consideration.

And while we are on this subject of objections made against the council we may notice two others that especially regard the decree of the infallibility: they are, 1st. This decision destroys the constitution of the church, doing away with the apostolic college of bishops, and changing the order established by Christ. 2d. This decree is a theological conclusion; but theological conclusions are not of faith, and cannot be so declared.

These objections are formidable only in appearance. No one contends that each bishop when consecrated succeeds to all the privileges and powers of one of the apostles. The bishops, then, not having them in the beginning when consecrated by the apostles, were distinct from the apostles, the apostolic college remaining. When one apostle died, his death did not affect the powers of the church, which remained the same, the other apostles sufficing; so when two, three, or more died, still one remained. He had the same full powers given to each, with subordination to Peter as head of the church. Thus with one apostle and the episcopate

the essence of ecclesiastical rule is preserved. When St. Peter died, he left a successor, being the only one of the twelve who did; for he was the only one who had a see. His successor received all his rights, the power of binding and loosing, of teaching and legislating. He was thus the one apostle living still in the world, and each successive pontiff has the same character—the *sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum* is his—as it was Paul's, John's, and Peter's. The essence of the hierarchy is in this way preserved; the apostolic and episcopal elements are there, and the phraseology of Christianity keeps ever before us this idea; for the see of Peter is always known as the *Sedes Apostolica*. St. Peter Chrysologus speaks of St. Peter living and ruling in his successor—*Beatus Petrus qui in successore suo et vivit et præsidet et præstat inquirentibus eam fidei veritatem*. So far, then, from this definition destroying the character of the hierarchy, it asserts and vindicates it by declaring that the one apostle in the church has never lost his apostolic privilege of inerrancy, and that he is truly possessed of the full powers without diminution that belonged to the prince of the apostles.

To the second objection, regarding the nature of the definition, as being a theological conclusion, we reply, firstly, that what the scripture, according to the received and now authentic interpretation of the church, taught, and what the practical acknowledgment of the faithful in all ages implied, cannot be called a theological conclusion; but must be regarded as being what it is—a directly revealed truth; secondly, a theological conclusion, though not of faith in itself, as being the deduction of reason, by the *superadded*

authoritative decision of the church can become of faith, as often as the denial of such conclusion affects the truth of that dogma from which it has been deduced.* Such questions are fairly within the range of the church's arbitration; and when there is a doubt concerning the character of a conclusion, it is her province to decide whether it be or be not hurtful or beneficial to the truth of which she alone is the divinely constituted guardian. Examples in the past history of the councils of the church are not wanting; for our purpose, take the Sixth Council. The question of the two wills was a theological conclusion; no one ever spoke of the two wills before that epoch; the phrase does not occur in all previous theology or ecclesiastical history. We first hear of it in the east, where metaphysical studies flourished, and where intellectual pride had already brought about the Arian, Nestorian, and Eutychian heresies.

We have mentioned the fact of the closure of the discussion on the fourth chapter, by mutual consent of those whose names were inscribed to speak. This was immediately followed by voting. The first three chapters were soon gotten over; the fourth is the one that contains the doctrine on the infallibility, and it met with more opposition.

On Saturday, July 11th, was held the general congregation in which the details of this portion of the *schema*

* Since writing the above, on reading Franzelin, *De Deo Uno*, we find, page 25, an even stronger assertion than the above, regarding *theological conclusions;* he adduces the very example we have given of the *two wills*. "The proposition evident *by reason* is assumed to demonstrate that the conclusion is contained in the premiss evident *by faith*." Page 26.

were up for approval or rejection. On this occasion the voting was by rising simply, and against the definition there were forty-seven votes.

On the 13th, another general congregation was called to vote, according to the regulations, on the whole *schema*, by name, with *placet*, or *placet juxta modum*, or *non placet*. The register, it appears, stands as follows: 451 *placets*, 62 *placets juxta modum*, and 88 *non placets*. Some of these *placets juxta modum* recommended the insertion of words that would make the decree clearer and stronger. The *schema* was accordingly altered, and the amendments were retained in the general congregation held Saturday, July 16th.

On Sunday morning was distributed a *monitum*, by which the fathers were notified that the fourth public session would be held on Monday, July 18th, at nine o'clock.

The 18th July will henceforth be a memorable day in the history of the church. It did not dawn, however, with the brilliancy usual at this season, or almost habitual with the grand *fêtes* of Pius IX. It rained much during the preceding night, and up to the time of the meeting of the session wayfarers were liable any time to be caught by fitful showers. The thought that, although a great and most beneficial act was to be done, still there were not a few of the fathers who thought otherwise than the majority in a matter about to be made binding on the conscience of all, was not calculated to heighten the external manifestation of cheerfulness, whatever feeling of thankfulness to Providence for the event was in the heart. As the interest was intense, there were not many who deemed they could come, who were not present. At nine

o'clock precisely, his eminence Cardinal Barili began a low mass, without chant. At the end of it, the small throne for the gospels was placed on the altar, and upon it the copy of the sacred Scriptures. In a few moments the sovereign pontiff entered, preceded by the senate and by the officers of his court, and, after kneeling a few moments at the prie-dieu, went to his throne in the apsis of the aula. The customary prayers were recited by him; the litany of the saints was chanted, and the "Veni Creator Spiritus" intoned, the people present taking part; after which the Bishop of Fabriano ascended the pulpit and read the *schema* to be voted on, and finished with asking the fathers whether it pleased them. Monsignor Jacobini next, from the pulpit, called the name of each prelate assisting at the council. Five hundred and thirty-five answered *placet*, two replied *non placet*, and one hundred and six were absent, some because sick, the far greater number not wishing to vote favorably. As soon as the result was made known officially to Pius IX., who awaited it in silence, but with calmness, he arose and in a clear, distinct and firm voice announced the fact of all, with the exception of two, having given a favorable vote; "wherefore," he continued, "by virtue of our apostolic authority, with the approval of the sacred council, we define, confirm, and approve the decrees and canons just read." Immediately there arose murmurs of approbation inside and outside the hall, the doors of which were surrounded by a large crowd, and, increasing from the impossibility those present experienced of repressing their feeling, it swelled into a burst of congratulation, and a *Viva Pio Nono Papa infallibile.* We shall not say anything regarding the

propriety of such proceedings in a church; but there are times when feeling is so powerful as to break through all ideas of conventionality. As soon as all were quiet, with unfaltering voice and excellent intonation the pope began the Te Deum. It was taken up alternately by the Sistine choir and those present. By an accident, at the Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus, the people got out, and took up the part of the Sistine choir, and kept it to the end, alternately with the bishops, and with a volume of sound that completely drowned the delicate notes of the papal singers, and which, if not as musical as their chant, was far more impressive. The session ended with the apostolic benediction from the holy father, accompanied by an indulgence for all assisting, in accordance with the custom of the church. Thus passed one of the most momentous and remarkable occasions the world has ever witnessed, a day henceforth memorable in the annals of the church and of mankind, the results of which the human mind is scarce capable of grasping.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

III.

LETTER FROM ROME.

(*The Catholic World, November*, 1870.)

ROME, Oct. 15th, 1870.

IN times of great excitement, people are apt to give their fancies or apprehensions for facts, and it becomes extremely difficult to arrive at the exact truth. This has been evidenced in the occurrences that have lately taken place in the Papal States. It is simply with a view of giving a correct account of these events that now, three weeks after the Italian occupation of Rome, we take up our pen for the purpose of writing only what we know ourselves or have had from creditable eye-witnesses, or have gleaned from the confessions of the conquerors themselves.

The mission of Count Ponza di San Martino, the letter of Victor Emmanuel, the reply of the sovereign pontiff, and the subsequent invasion of the pontifical territory by Generals Cadorna, Angioletti, and Bixio, we pass over as too well known and authenticated. The order had been given to the troops to fall back on Rome, and wherever feasible it was carried out. Col. La Charette, in command at Viterbo, succeeded, by strenuous efforts and

forced marches across the country, in reaching Civita Vecchia, and Colonel Azzanesi, whose character for fidelity malignant persons had tried to asperse, brought all his men from Velletri safely to Rome. Communication with Civita Vecchia was kept up until the 15th of September, when the railway was cut, and that place, threatened by a large army under General Bixio, and by a strong fleet of seven ironclads, capitulated, unfortunately, without firing a gun.

On the evening of the 14th of September, the advanced guards of General Cadorna came near enough to Rome to have a skirmish with some of the Zouaves and dragoons out on the Flaminian Way. One of the officers of the Italian lancers, the Conte Crotti, was taken prisoner; while on the side of the Papal troops, one, Sergeant Shea, was seriously wounded, and several were captured. During this and the next three days, troops poured into the Campagna, and took up positions around the city, some crossing the Tiber by a pontoon-bridge and transferring large siege-guns that were to be used for making the breach. These guns were of large calibre, and did their work effectually. In the meanwhile, the Papal troops completed their barricades at the gates and the bastions in front of them, and on the 17th, 18th and 19th of September there were occasional skirmishing and cannonading. The points fortified were the Porta Pancrazio, the Porta San Lorenzo, Porta San Giovanni, the entrance of the railway, the Porta Pia, the Porta Salara, and the Porto del Popolo. After a great deal of unproductive parley, the besiegers, finding they could gain nothing by it, gave notice on the 19th that they would attack the next day at five o'clock. The intimation had no effect on

the Papal commanders, the pope having already, in a letter bearing date of this day, thanked the army for their devotion, and signified the course he wished pursued.

The Papal army, the whole army, both native troops and foreign, did not belie the good opinion of their sovereign. The devotion and courage of all, especially of the natives, subject to a pressure to which the foreign element were strangers, and which it required all the force of religious principle to resist, have seldom been surpassed. In the fighting that followed, the artillery, principally native, suffered most in proportion; while the faithful discharge of their duty by the native gens d'armes and their auxiliaries, natives of the provinces formerly enlisted under the name of *squadriglieri* to suppress brigandage, was such as to gain them the distinction of the hatred and violence of the mob. We make one remark here: it is that, when one sees such fidelity in the troops, it is a sign that the real feeling of the majority and of good is with the authority the troops support. Let us go on with our narrative.

With praiseworthy punctuality, on the morning of the 20th of September, the first gun of the attack was fired against the city, and in a few moments the cannonading became general. The points assailed were the Pincio and Porta Pinciana, the Porta Salara, the wall between this and Porta Pia also fiercely battered, Porta San Giovanni, and the three arches of the railway entrance. The bombardment from outside the Porta San Pancrazio, fortunately, did not begin until shortly after eight o'clock, it is said through failure of General Bixio to come up to time. The attack was very determined and uninterrupted along the whole line, and was replied to with a vigor and spirit

that did honor to the little park of guns of the pontifical army, and which their enemies appreciated and applauded. For five hours and a half the roar and din of cannon and musketry was kept up, the shots averaging at times thirty a minute. Shortly after eight o'clock the firing began at the Janiculum. Here General Bixio, famous for his raging declarations against Rome and the cardinals—whom he would throw into the Tiber—commanded a division, and apparently angry with the Romans because they would not rise against the pope, began throwing shells without number into the city. The shells passed clear over the fortifications and came down into the parts of Rome that lie on the left bank of the Tiber. There is no help for it—either General Bixio's artillery was the most unskillful in the world, or he absolutely intended to shell the city. The Porto Pancrazio, as every one knows, is more than a quarter of a mile from the river; and yet not only the houses on the same side of the Tiber with it were struck, but the Piazza Farnese, the vicinity of San Andrea della Valle, the Ghetto, and even the Piazza of the Pantheon suffered. One shell narrowly escaped striking the entablature of the famous temple of Agrippa, and carried destruction to a house standing on the side of the square next the Corso. Altogether, the projectiles that fell in the town were numerous; we know positively ourselves of some eighty or ninety spots struck by shells, and we counted on the facade of St. John Lateran and the adjoining palace the traces of fifty. While all this was doing, the real work of the day was going on at the wall between the Porta Pia and the Porta Salara. The heavy siege-guns told against the old wall of Aurelian, certainly never built to resist the

cannon of the nineteenth century. The masonry trembled under the terrific strokes, and at last gave way; by ten o'clock a large, wide breach laid the city of the popes open to the army of the house of Savoy. Six battalions of *bersaglieri* with other troops had been drawn up in a copse near by awaiting the order to advance. It was given; they moved up near the wall, for a short time crouched in the field, and then with a loud cry, "Savoia," rushed forward to their easy victory. They had not time to do much; already General Zappi, in accordance with the wishes of Pius IX., who had hoisted the white flag on the cupola of St. Peters, had arrived at the Porta Pia, and given orders that it should be hoisted there too. The firing ceased, and those whose duty it was to treat with General Cadorna repaired to the Villa Albani, outside the Porta Salara, where he had his headquarters. At this time occurred a flagrant violation of the rules of warfare. Both sides should have remained resting on their arms, without advancing. The Italians, instead, availed themselves of this cessation of hostilities to scale the last barricade. They were ordered back, and refused; and thereupon the foremost Zouaves fired, killing a major and wounding others, though they themselves were immediately shot down. Now began the scenes of disorder and violence that were to know no cessation for three days. With the troops poured into the city upwards of four thousand "emigrati," or political exiles, and many women. To these men, and especially to the women who accompanied them, nothing was so delightful as to insult and ill-treat the foreign troops in the service of the Holy Father. They surrounded those who were isolated, tore off their medals, their accoutrements, spat in their faces,

and, in many instances, beat them so unmercifully that they fell lifeless, to all appearance. We know positively of four treated in this manner; and so numerous are the recitals of similar outrages with fatal consequences that we should not be at all surprised if not a few were butchered or thrown into the Tiber.* For this, however, we do not answer, as we are giving only details of which we are certain. In the meantime, the capitulation was negotiating, and, when signed and approved, was executed at once, though the city was already, to a great extent, in the hands of the invading forces and their horde of returned outlaws. These latter got well down into the city in time to take part in and direct the demonstration in favor of the former. The cheering began in the Piazza della Pitota, when some officials, sent to present the act of capitulation, reached the office of the commander-in-chief, and on the Quirinal, as the troops advanced Up to this time good order had been kept by the gens d'armes and *squadriglieri*. Now the people in detached bodies began to set on soldiers separated from their corps, and to attack the posts held by the police. In several instances they met with stout resistance, and the capitol held out against them until the royal troops came up and made known to the Papal troops the news of the surrender. It is well for the foreign soldiers and the police, with their auxiliaries, that they kept together with their arms, or were, if unarmed, escorted by the regular soldiers of the Italian army; otherwise the loss of life would have been fearful. Gradually the prisoners of war were gathered into the Città Leonina, and there remained until the

* No life was lost in this way.

morning of the 22d, when they marched out with the honors of war. Here good order prevailed. In the remainder of the city, the masses, relieved of the presence of the police, and not interfered with by the conquerors, who were anxious to propitiate the people and have the demonstration in their favor unalloyed by any act of rigor on their part, gave themselves up to all kinds of excesses. Every one who has been in Italy knows what a vendetta means, and we will not dwell on those said to have occurred, but which are to be classed as private assassinations, and therefore have only an occasional relation to the political events of which we are speaking. The acts of violence were principally directed against the Papal troops, who were generally protected by the Italian soldiers individually when their prestige was sufficient to sustain their voluntary interference. This, however, was not always the case, as Zouaves were taken from the hands of their protectors and brutally beaten. The religious institutions next excited the wrath of the populace, who had now among them criminals who had escaped from prison when the doors were thrown open to free the political prisoners. In some instances perquisitions were made by soldiers, led on by officers, or by civilians representing themselves as authorized to search for concealed Papal Zouaves. In this way, or for the purpose of violence and rapine, were visited Trinità di Monté, Villa Lanti, the novitiate of the Sacred Heart, a monastery in Trasterere, the Irish College, the Roman Seminary, and the Gesù.

The first of these houses is an academy of religious ladies of the Sacred Heart for young girls. The circumstances were very aggravating. The persons conducting

the search were unauthorized civilians, who had with them a squad of soldiers. They came at night, hunted everywhere, to the terror of the good ladies and their young charges, not shrinking from violating the sanctity of their apartments. The fact that nearly all the sisters in this house are ladies of position—not a few ladies of rank—while the pupils belong to the best families, will enable men of gentlemanly feeling to appreciate to some extent the gravity of the insult.

At the Gesù, a major of the *bersaglieri* insolently entered the house, made all the fathers leave their rooms and assemble in the corridors, and listen to his incoherent and insulting remarks.

At the Roman Seminary, at one o'clock A.M., under pretense that Papal soldiers were concealed in the house, a captain, with a force of some dozen men, presented themselves at the door, knocking furiously for admittance. One of the superiors came down and opened to them, when he was forthwith seized, and, having a pistol placed at each ear, was told to give up the concealed men. He was self-possessed enough to act with the proper prudence. The captain asked for lights, and the men dispersed through the seminary, following out the orders given. When they retired, some silver spoons and forks and a watch were missing, while a quantity of the fish for which Newfoundland waters are famed, owing to its tell-tale odor, was left upon the stairway.

This state of things began to be so intolerable that the new authorities determined that a stop must be put to it. But they were in a difficulty; they had come to preserve the order that the Papal government, they said, could not maintain. Here, at the outset, they found themselves

with a city full of rioters—their auxiliaries in tearing down and trampling on the armorial bearings of the pontiff, the symbol of his authority, and in rendering helpless the former police force. How should they know the bad characters abroad in the town, and the authors of the misdeeds against which they were receiving hourly complaints? There was nothing else to do but turn to the former police employés. They were sought out in their hiding-places, and promised protection. It was a wise and timely thought, as well as a compliment to the Papal government, and a *de facto* apology for the calumnies heaped on it. By the aid of the knowledge of the Papal police, the *chevaliers d'industrie*, as well as their bolder *confrères*, were safely lodged in proper quarters, within forty-eight hours, to the number of four hundred. It is said that subsequently the number swelled to fifteen hundred.

At the same time, telegrams were sent to Florence, and the detachments of the *guardie di pubblica sicurezza* began to pour into the town. Peaceful citizens began to breathe freely and to leave their houses. To do the troops justice, they have as a rule behaved well.

We have allowed this topic to carry us away from other points that deserve mention. We have said a demonstration was made on the entry of the Italian troops into Rome. The first impression of any stranger who saw it was that there was universal rejoicing at the occupation of the city. Success with many in this world is everything, and material interests have so powerful an influence that only men of principle and strong character stand up for a lost cause. Nevertheless, the fear of personal violence and the threats of the mob had an effect on

many who otherwise would not have given the least sign of approval. We are personally acquainted with several persons of this description; and things went to such a stage, and so great was the alarm, that those most devoted to the sovereign pontiff advised the use both of banners and illumination to escape from violence or broken windows. We could mention some particulars on the subject that are most convincing from the character of the persons concerned, but we omit doing so through motives of delicacy. So universal became the use of the tricolor cockade that, in a manner, it lost its significance.

As to the large vote given for annexation to the kingdom of Italy—any one who saw the numbers of strangers that poured into the city could understand how easy it would be to poll a large vote. We in the United States know how these things have been managed in past times. A friend of ours traveling from Foligno came to Rome in a train full of Garibaldians provided with free passes only two days before the plébiscite. It is undoubtedly true that the city was full of strangers, principally men. Another feature of the plébiscite is this—money was distributed with a liberal hand. A fact known to us is worth telling. The day before the vote, a man presented himself to an inhabitant of the Città Leonina, and at once asked, "How many men are there in this house?" "Six," said the Roman. "Well," said his interrogator, "here are six tickets, each for one pound of meat, and six for two pounds of bread each—and here are six SI." The tickets were all taken, though those for the bread and meat were the only ones used. A writer in the *Unità Cattolica* says he saw a large band of persons marching to the capitol

with a banner at their head marked "*Città Leonina.*" He bethought him of taking a stroll in the Città Leonina, and to his astonishment found it as populous as ever. The voting in great part was done by corporations—the tailors, shoemakers, smiths, carpenters, etc., forming separate bodies. Thus each man was known, and as the vote had to be given publicly it required courage to say *no.* We saw ourselves one of these processions passing in the street, and it certainly seemed a little ridiculous; one would have thought it a funeral procession were it not for the flag ahead, and an occasional *evviva*—uttered by one of the *choregi*, and taken up by the others in a way to give the impression of anything but spontaneous action. In conclusion we may say of this plébiscite that it was a farce. Here is a city taken after five and a half hours' bombardment, and the people are asked to vote according to the wish of the victor, to choose possibly between the anarchy of the red republic or the government of King Victor Emmanuel. Modern politics are full of farces, but none was ever more completely such than this Roman plébiscite of 1870.

The absorbing feature in the revolution that has just taken place is the condition of the sovereign pontiff. Whatever may be said to the contrary, the pope is a prisoner. On the evening of the 22d of September, "Morte al Papa!" was shouted in the Piazza di V. Pietro; this was immediately followed by an attack on the entrances to the palace of the Vatican, which was repulsed by the fire of the Papal gens d'armes with a loss of two killed and several wounded on the part of the people. The result was the entrance of the Italian troops into the Città Leonnia, and the placing of a guard at the gate of the Vatican.

The letter which Pius IX. has addressed to the cardinals sufficiently shows the state of things to make it superfluous for us to dwell on the vexations and espionage to which he must henceforth be subjected. This is the liberty guaranteed to him who is divinely appointed to rule all men irrespective of nationality, to receive reports from those who go forth to act in his name and with his authority, to receive appeals in case of erroneous judgments, and to give decrees in matters of more weight than life or death! Is it possible that the Catholic world is going to allow this? Is it possible that we who have set apart a portion of our own territory, and devoted it to governmental purposes at the expense of its elective franchise, for the benefit of the whole country, are going to grudge the Church Catholic the reservation of a trifling portion of the earth, in all essential points hitherto much better governed than the United States? Are we to permit the interest of all the nations of the earth to be subjected to the caprice of any single nation?

We should assuredly feel as a personal insult, and as such resent it, if any one were to undertake to revile with indecent caricatures the chief-magistrate of our country. We all know how to distinguish between raillery and insult, between what is done to amuse and what is done for quite another purpose. We bear the one; the other we stigmatize as it merits, and put down by legitimate means. The person of the sovereign pontiff is sacred in the discharge of his duty; he speaks with the authority of Christ; and because he does so the streets of Rome at this moment teem with representations and designs, the nature of which will not

bear description, and in which the august person of the Vicar of our Lord is made the jest and sport of the profane and blasphemous!

The faith, too, of the Roman people is assailed. Infidel works of all kinds are scattered among the people, and political doctrines are taught by means of parodies on the catechism, in which the sacred formulas of the sublimest truths are degraded as being the vehicle of ideas false and foolish, not to say blasphemous. We believe that the Romans will not lose their faith as a people. They have been subjected to severe tests before this, without such a result. But there is great danger for individuals, and that the education of a religious and highly cultivated people will be vitiated. On this ground, also, there is a claim on the interference of every Catholic in behalf of the Church of Rome, so justly termed *mater et caput omnium ecclesiarum*—the mother and head of all churches.

But what interference are we Catholics of America capable of? The condition of our country, the neutrality as regards all religious bodies obligatory on the government by the terms of the constitution, besides other weighty reasons, render active interference impossible. This is true. But there is another kind of interference that will be of avail at the proper time—the intervention of prayer. We must pray for the sovereign pontiff more than we have hitherto done. Our common father is surrounded by trials; we must ask God to give him light and strength to do what in the designs of Providence will tend to the good of religion. We can come to the aid of the pontiff also by our contributions, now more needed than ever. The

subscriptions to the Peter's Pence should be larger than heretofore, and show the usurping government that our head is not a pensioner on their bounty. Finally, we can interfere by our sympathy, that will show the reprobation in which we hold the act of those who have despoiled the church of her legitimate possessions, and reduced to bondage him whom Pepin and Charlemagne and the voice of Christendom had constituted free of all earthly control, that he might without trammel attend to the interests of Jesus Christ on earth.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

IV.

LETTER FROM ROME.

(*The Catholic World, April,* 1871.)

ROME, Jan. 21, 1871.

FOUR months have gone by since the Italian troops entered Rome through the breach made by the cannon of Cadorna, four months since a new light dawned upon the Eternal City, and its regenerators set about the accomplishment of their aspirations. What has been the development of this third life of Rome —*la terza vita*, as Terenzio Mamiani has been pleased to style it—in this its primal stage? The child is father to the man—the seed produces the tree and its fruit. So, too, do the beginnings of a political state give an index of its future, fix the causes that are to produce the results of the future. The history of these four months, then, must be looked on with interest, and pondered with care.

The present century is universally considered an age of progress, and it was in the name of progress that the forces of Victor Emmanuel entered the capital of Christianity. Progress implies motion from one state or condition to another more perfect: the simplicity of this statement cannot be gainsaid, and we shall assume it as uncontested.

The party of progress took possession of Rome in the interest of progress. Has Rome progressed during these months since the 20th of September? Has she gone from her past state to one more perfect? Facts must speak; and facts we give. One thing at a time.

Abundance and cheapness of food are the first essentials in the well-being of a state, and necessarily connected with this is the facility of obtaining it. We cannot say that food is scarce in Rome; but the absolute and relative cheapness have undergone a decided change, to the disadvantage of the poorer as well as the wealthier classes, since the 20th of September. The *mocinato*, or so-called grist-tax, extending even to the grinding of dried vegetables, chestnuts, and acorns, has sent up the price of bread. Salt has risen at least a cent per pound. The further application of the system of heavy taxation is not likely to make other articles of prime necessity cheaper. And while this state of things exists, the facility of obtaining food has become much less for the poorer classes. The causes of this are to be sought in the want of employers. It is the universal complaint that there is no work. Before the coming of the present rulers, the army of the pope, composed in great part of young men of some means, spent a great deal among the people. This source of gain ceased with the disbandment of the Papal troops, for it is notorious *lippis et tonsoribus*, that the men of the present contingent have barely enough daily allowance to keep body and soul together. Besides this, ecclesiastics spent their revenues, fixed by law and sure, with a liberal hand. Now, when they find difficulty in getting even what they cannot be deprived of; now that confiscation hangs over their heads with menacing aspect; now

that religious orders are called on to make immense outlays to send their young men to places of safety—in one case to the extent of six thousand dollars—it would be foolish to expect them to sacrifice what is necessary for themselves; though, to do them justice, they are always willing to share their little with the poor. Dearth of foreign ecclesiastics, and of foreigners in general, is another source of distress, and this is directly a consequence of the invasion. The result of all this is that there is more misery in the city of Rome than has been seen for many a day—beggars are more numerous in the streets, and needy families, ashamed to beg, suffer in silence or pour their tale of woe into the ear of the clergy, who are always honored with the confidence of the poor and afflicted. Surely this state of things is not an improvement on the plenty which characterized the rule of the pontiffs. We cannot say Rome in this respect has moved into a better sphere—that she has progressed.

Security of person and property is another essential object of the attention of every state. No state that cannot guarantee this is deserving of the name of having a good government. Under the Papal rule, it is well known that not only in Rome did good order prevail, as the immense multitude present at the Œcumenical Council can attest, but that also on the frontiers of the territories governed by the pope, after the withdrawal of the French troops from Veroli and Anagni, the energy displayed by the Roman delegate was such as to liberate completely the provinces from the bands sprung from the civil strifes of southern Italy. The city of Rome itself was a model of good order and of personal safety. Now things are changed. Only a few days ago, a "guardia di pubblica

sicurrezza" was stopped in the streets and robbed of his watch and revolver. There is not a day that has not in the daily papers its record of thefts and acts of personal violence. Only a few days ago, there was a sacrilegious robbery in the Church of St. Andrea della Valle. On the 8th of December there was rioting with bloodshed in Rome. A band of young students, under the charge of a religious, were stoned on Sunday, January 15. On the 16th, the Very Rev. Rector of the "Ospizio degli Orfanelli" was struck with a stone. It would be easy to multiply examples, but those we have given are quite enough to show that progress in security of person and property has not been attained since the 20th of September, 1870.

Then public morality in the centre of Christianity could not fail to be at a far higher standard, now that the regeneration of the city of Rome has been accomplished. What bitter illusions fortune delights in dispensing to those that trust her! Before the entrance of Italian statesmen into Rome, vice and immorality did not dare raise their heads—they could not flaunt themselves on the public ways. Now there is a change, and the moral order of Italy has entered through the breach at the Porta Pia. We say no more; the subject is a delicate one, and we therefore refrain from penning facts notorious in Rome. Surely, none who has received even an elementary training in virtue will deem this state of things progress—an elevation to a higher and more perfect state.

But the king of Italy came to Rome to protect the independence of the sovereign pontiff, to save him from the bondage of foreign hordes. Now, as the pope is

principally a spiritual sovereign, it is his spiritual power that most needs protection; consequently, the king of Italy and his faithful servants have been most zealous in preventing acts or publications that would tend to diminish the respect due to the Holy Father.

Incomprehensible, but true—the very opposite has taken place! We have at hand the satirical paper, the *Don Pirlone Figlio*, of January 19. On its first page is a ridiculous adaptation of the heading used by the cardinal vicar in his official notifications to the faithful. The same page has an article grossly disrespectful to the sovereign pontiff, and insulting to the Belgian deputation, who have just come on to present the protest of their countrymen, and their contributions. The Holy Father is styled Giovanni Mastai detto Colui exdisponibile anche lui; the members of the deputation are given ridiculous names; and the contributors of Peter's Pence are blackbirds caught in a cage; finally, a ridiculous discourse is put in the mouth of the pope, concluding with a benediction. The illustration represents Pius IX. with a boot in his hand, in the act of giving it to the emperor of Germany, who figures as a cobbler. Such are the illustrations and articles one sees exposed to the public day by day. When we who have seen Rome under far different circumstances witness these things, is it at all strange that we refuse to see "the general respect shown to ecclesiastics in the exercise of their sacred functions," even though on the faith of Lamarmora it be asserted to exist? Can we be blamed for thinking that anything but progress in veneration of religion has been the result of the taking of Rome?

After this, any of the advantages arising from the occupation of Rome can have no weight sufficient to warrant much attention—for they must be, as they are, material and of a low order—chiefly regarding facility of communication and despatch in business matters, things desirable in themselves, but it would seem, purchased at a fearful sacrifice.

Is this state of things to continue? Is the Italian kingdom on such a permanent basis that the Papacy has no hope of a change that may give it back its possessions? Or can the kingdom of Italy be brought to make restitution of what it has seized, without itself undergoing destruction? A word in reply to each of these queries. And, first, is this state of things to continue?

When we consider who the sovereign pontiff is, and consult the opinions of men famed for their foresight and statesmanship, it is difficult to deny that the restoration of the pontiff to his rights is very possible. Napoleon Bonaparte, although he afterwards made Pius VII. his prisoner, left recorded his opinion that it was impossible that the Pope should be the subject of any one sovereign, and that it was providential the head of the church had been given the possession of a small state to secure his independence. M. Thiers, in commendation of whom we need say nothing, as his reputation is world-wide, has clearly and forcibly proclaimed this very opinion. In the debates on the temporal power, in the French Senate in 1867, his voice was heard calling on France to protect Rome, and it was his energy forced from the hypocritical government of his country the famous word, uttered by Rouher, that struck terror into Italy—"*Jamais.*" One would imagine that now Rome has fallen and France is

reduced to the verge of desperation, no man of "liberal" political views would be foolhardy enough to risk his reputation by reiterating an opinion like this. Yet, strange to say, there is one who has been willing to run the risk, and that in the very Chamber of Deputies at Florence. Only a few weeks ago, the Deputy Toscanelli, a liberal, and, we learn, a free-thinker, with a courage, a strength of argument, a flow of wit that gained the respect and attention of the house, almost in the words of M. Thiers gave the same opinion. "In the days of the last of the Medici," said the distinguished deputy, "there was a court-jester riding a spirited horse down the Via Calzaioli, in Florence. The horse got the better of his rider, and started off at full speed. 'Ho! Sor Fagioli,' cried out one of the crowd, 'where are you going to fall?' 'No one knows or can know,' was the jester's answer, as he held on with both hands. Just so is it with the government; it has mounted a policy that is running away with it, and neither it nor any one else knows where it is going to fall. The government has gone to Rome, and in Rome it cannot stay; it cannot hold its own face to face with the Pope. I give you, then, this advice: leave Rome, declare it a free city under the protection of the kingdom of Italy." So much for the opinions of political men of eminence; we will examine the question for a moment on its intrinsic merits.

We know the sovereign pontiff in his official capacity of teacher of the whole church is infallible in declarations regarding faith or morals. But in other matters of policy, of fact, he has no guarantee against error beyond what is afforded him by the use of the means which he has at hand, the information of his advisers, and

especially of the Sacred College of Cardinals. Suppose, for a moment, this means of information is done away with, or made a vehicle of untrue statements. Suppose unworthy men are artfully intruded on the pope, and act in accordance with instructions received from the rulers of Italy. Imagine Italy at war or on bad terms with the United States or England. A crafty statesman sees an opportunity of putting in a position to aid him in one or the other country an able man, through the influence of some high ecclesiastic, whose good opinion will have great weight with men of standing or with the people. The whole matter is artfully carried out. There is an understanding between the Italian statesman and his American or English friend; both act cautiously and avoid alarming susceptibilities. The affair works well. Persons around the pope are made to drop a word incidentally in praise of the virtue and ability of the one whom it is intended to raise to power. The pope in his relations with the bishops of foreign countries, speaking of the prospects of the church in good faith, speaks also to the ecclesiastic of whom we have made mention, and in favorable terms of the person in question. Who that knows human nature can fail to see the thorough nature of the influence thus used? The crafty originators are the ones to blame, and the harm done is effected in perfect good faith by the unconscious instruments of their design. To show we are not building on our fancy, we turn to the pages of a man whose name all revere—Cardinal Wiseman. In his *Recollections of the Last Four Popes*, he speaks of the character of Pius VII.:

"When no longer a monarch, but a captive—when bereft of all advice and sympathy, but pressed on close by those who, themselves probably deceived, thoroughly deceived him, he committed the one error of his life and pontificate, in 1813. For there came to him men 'of the seed of Aaron,' who could not be expected to mislead him, themselves free and moving in the busiest of the world, who showed him, through the loopholes of his prison, that world from which he was shut out, as though agitated on its surface, and to its lowest depths, through his unbendingness; the church torn to schism, and religion weakened to destruction, from what they termed his obstinacy. He who had but prayed and bent his neck to suffering was made to appear in his own eyes a harsh and cruel master, who would rather see all perish than loose his grasp on unrelenting but impotent jurisdiction.

"He yielded for a moment to conscientious alarm; he consented, though conditionally, under false but virtuous impressions, to the terms proposed to him for a new concordat. But no sooner had his upright mind discovered the error, than it nobly and successfully repaired it." (Chap. IV.)

Such are the words of a man writing after years of intercourse with the first men of Europe. They are instructive words—for human nature is ever the same. There are men still in Italy who follow out closely the principles of Macchiavelli—to whom everything sacred or profane, no matter what veneration may have surrounded it, is but the means to self-aggrandizement and the satisfaction of ambition. It is for the nations of the world to say whether they are willing to allow the existence of the permanent danger to themselves, arising from the subjection of the spiritual head of the church to any crowned head or even republic whatsoever. Perhaps of the two, the latter would be the more to be dreaded. The Roman mobs that drove Eugenius IV. from Rome, and pelted him as he went down the Tiber, or made many another pope seek safety in flight, could be easily

gotten together again, as the present residents of the Eternal City know only too well.

We answer, then, our first query, and say that this state of things cannot last. Time, the great remedy of human ills, will solve this question, and establish the See of Peter on a perfectly independent basis—independent of all sovereign control, even if this be not done shortly through the armed interference of European powers.

It is hardly necessary to inquire whether the Italian kingdom is so firmly constituted that no hope of restoration of the pope is to be seen. For ourselves, we think there are indications that point to a speedy dissolution of this state on the first breaking out of a war between Italy and any great power. Her policy is to avoid entangling alliances, and this she is following out, striving to propitiate the emperor of Germany for her leaning towards France. The first army that will enter the peninsula to aid the Pope will shiver Italy to fragments. The southern provinces have too lively a recollection of the days of plenty under their kings, and too painful an impression of heavy taxation and pro-consular domination of the Piedmontese race, to hesitate between submission to them and the regaining their own autonomy, which will make Naples again one of the queenly capitals of the world.

One index of the general discontent or indifference is the small number of those who vote at the elections in proportion to those who are inscribed on the electoral lists. The motto proposed by the *Unità Cattolica*, the foremost Catholic journal of Italy—"*Neither elected nor electors*"—has been adopted and acted upon by very many throughout the country. We feel no difficulty in

saying that the majority of the Italians are not with the House of Savoy, nor are they in favor of United Italy. The ruling power has the government and the command of the army, a fact that quite accounts for the existing state of things.

Our third question, whether the kingdom of Italy can be brought to make restitution of the territories it has seized, without itself undergoing destruction, remains to be answered. We believe it cannot, unless half-measures—always more or less dangerous—be adopted. The late spoliation is not more criminal than the first, and no amount of *plébiscite* can make it legitimate, any more than —to use the words of the able editor of the *Unità Cattolica*—the popular approbation of the condemnation of Jesus Christ legitimized the crucifixion. The claim, then, to restitution extends to the whole of the former provinces, justly held by the popes to supply them with the revenue needed to make them independent of the precarious contributions of the Peter's Pence, and which was none too large for that purpose.

Whatever may come, we know the future of the church is in the hands of One in whose holding are the hearts of princes and peoples. What we have to do is to pray earnestly for our spiritual head, aid him by our means, console him with our sympathy, and give him whatever support, moral or other, it be in our power to offer. And while we do so, it is a joy to us to know we have lessened the grief of his hardships by what we have done hitherto, even gladdened the hours of his captivity. A few days ago, speaking to the Belgian deputation, Pius IX. said: "Belgium gives me very often proofs of her fidelity. Continue in the way in which you are walking; do not

allow your courage to fail. What is happening to-day is only a trial, and the church came into existence in the midst of trials, lived always amid them, and amid them she will end her earthly career. It is our duty to battle and stand firm in the face of danger. . . . We have an Italian proverb which says: 'It is one thing to talk of dying; quite another to die.' People speak very resignedly of persecutions, but sometimes it is hard to bear them. The world offers to-day a very sad spectacle, and particularly this our city of Rome, in which we see things to which our eyes have not been accustomed. Let us all pray together that God may soon deliver his church, and re-establish public order, so deeply shaken. Your efforts, your prayers, your pious pilgrimages, all tend to this end, and I therefore bless them with all my heart." May the words of the Holy Father find an echo in our hearts; let us not lose courage, but keep up our efforts, so happily begun, and never rest till wrong be righted, until we see the most sublime dignity and power on earth freed from the surroundings that would seek to make it as little as themselves.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

V.

THE ITALIAN GUARANTEES AND THE SOVEREIGN PONTIFF.

(*The Catholic World*, *July*, 1871.)

AFTER having been proposed by the government of Italy, recast by the Chamber of Deputies, amended by the Senate, adopted by the Chamber as amended, and approved and signed by the king and his ministers, the project of the guarantees for the sovereign pontiff's independence has become a part of the law of the land. We are perfectly willing to believe that his majesty, regarding this scheme as promising the fullest amount of freedom it was possible to obtain from his parliament for the Head of the Church, signed it with a feeling of relief; for if we are to credit the rumors, more or less well founded, one hears in Florence and in Rome, broken tables and furniture overturned bore witness to the unwillingness of the supreme authority in the state to permit the violation of the Papal territory or to accept the plébiscite of the so-called people of Rome. Not so, however, was it with the legislators of the kingdom. To them the Papacy has been and is a huge incubus, that disturbs their rest, frightens them in their dreams, and which can be got rid of in truth only by their waking

up to a sense of what their real duty is. Their aim has been, in dealing with it, to yield up as little as possible of their ill-gotten power over the successor of St. Peter, and to secure themselves as effectually as possible against the only power they ever feared—his spiritual weapons. This is the criterion by which we should study these guarantees; by the light of it we propose to examine them, and to discuss their pretended advantages.

When the Italian government, hurried on by the spirit of revolution, seized upon Rome during the complications of last autumn that insured impunity for the moment to the act, they found themselves face to face with the spiritual ruler of the whole Catholic world, and with the fixed convictions or invincible prejudices of two hundred millions of men, who regarded the position in which the sovereign pontiff had been placed as not only against all law, but also hurtful to their best interests. How were they to deal with so delicate a question? The situation of Europe might for a time delay the solution, but eventually there must be an account given and satisfaction rendered to the Catholic world. The cabinet hit on the only means it could hope to use with any appearance of success, and the promises of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sig. Visconti Venosta, served as a decent pretext to liberal governments not to interfere actively in the accommodation of things in Italy. These promises are contained in the despatches sent to different governments, during last winter, and published in the diplomatic documents laid before the various legislative bodies of Europe during the past six months. To do the minister justice, he has stood out successfully against the extreme radical party in parliament, that opposed most violently

any idea of concessions such as he had designed for the independence of the sovereign pontiff, and his appeal to the loyalty of Italy brought down the applause of the house, and effectually destroyed the influence of his opponents. Still, even if we attribute to any other feeling than fear of foreign intervention the measures adopted, they are not for that reason intrinsically enhanced in value, nor are they anything more than the most the Italian government is capable or willing to do to protect the power of the pope.

That power, be it well understood, is in the eyes of the rulers of Italy merely a spiritual power, for the temporal, they consider, was annihilated by the cannon that beat down the walls on the 20th of September, 1870, and by the *plébiscite* of the 2d of October following. How does this law of guarantees confirm the exercise of that power? We shall see by referring to several of the articles, not quoting the law at length, as it has already appeared in the public journals.

Article II. says, in the last clause: "The discussion of religious questions is entirely free."

Article III. says that the sovereign pontiff may have his guards, "without prejudice to the obligations and duties resulting from such guards, from the existing laws of the kingdom of Italy."

Article IV. contemplates the possibility of the government taking upon themselves the expenses of the museums and library of the pontifical palaces.

Article V. says these museums, library, collections of art and of archæology, are "*inalienable.*"

Article VIII. forbids sequestration of papers *merely* spiritual in their character.

Article XIII. declares that the ecclesiastical seminaries of Rome, and of the six suburban sees presided over by cardinals, are to continue subject to the Holy See, without any interference on the part of the *scholastic* authorities of the kingdom.

Article XVI. says: "The dispositions of the civil laws with regard to the creation and the manner of existence of ecclesiastical institutions, and the alienation of their property, remain in force."

Article XVII. The recognition of the juridical effects of the spiritual and disciplinary acts, as well as of any other act of the ecclesiastical authority, belongs to the civil jurisdiction. Such acts, however, are void of effect if contrary to the law of the state or to public order or hurtful to the rights of private persons, and are subject to the penal laws if they constitute a crime.

Let us take a cursory glance at these cullings from the "guarantees," and see if they conflict at all with the spiritual power of the pontiff. Before the twentieth of September, 1870, the whole of the city of Rome and the dependent provinces were presided over in spirituals by the pope, and all of the inhabitants were Catholics, except a few Jews, treated with charity, though not allowed to make proselytes. By this decree the door is thrown open to every sect that chooses to come and try to proselytize the Roman people. They must see as clearly as we do that the last clause of Article II. deals the most powerful and insidious blow at the spiritual power of the pope in spiritual matters, encouraging his people to spiritual defection, or at least lessening him in their esteem as a spiritual teacher. This is too evident to need further dwelling on, and we pass to the next indictment.

The pope's guards are to protect him and execute his orders, but inasmuch as they are not on this account freed from the obligations of Italian citizens by the tenor of Article III., it is quite easy to understand how in the course of time elements of discord may arise; and, therefore, in the use of his guards, the pope must conform to the civil code of the kingdom of Italy, or take the consequences referred to further on.

Articles IV. and V. regard the library and museums of the Vatican and of other palaces. The original draught of the project declared these collections the property of the state. The criticism it excited on this account brought about the modifications we have here, which substitute *inalienability* for the asserted right of property, without adverting to the fact that such a modification implies dominion in the one making it, while there is contemplated a possible taking on themselves by the government of the expenses of these museums that certainly points to the same idea.

The VIIIth Article forbids the sequestration of papers and documents of the ecclesiastical authorities *merely* spiritual in their nature. The inference is that any documents not merely spiritual may be sequestrated; and, as doubts may arise, who is to decide? Certainly not the church or the pope, for he is the accused; there is no umpire; and a strong police force is at the beck of the Italian government, and the question will be solved readily.

The XIIIth Article, regarding the ecclesiastical seminaries and colleges, exempts them from the control of the *scholastic* authorities, but, with regard to their temporal concerns, we are told in the XVIth Article they must be

subject to the civil jurisdiction. We leave it to our practical men of America to say whether or not the man who holds the purse-strings and manages the funds has any influence on the people he pays or who are paid through him. In the case before us the Italian civil authorities are those who pay, having in many cases the full administration of the funds. We feel tempted to refer to the case of the Roman College, the funds of which have been withheld since the first of January, 1871.

The first draught of Article XVII. was too strong. It said openly: In case of conflict between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, the supreme civil tribunal of the kingdom was to decide. This was toned down to suit better rather tender susceptibilities. The result we have in the clause quoted above, which says the same thing in other words, and in stronger terms, if we look to the penal sanction referred to. Here is the whole pith of the matter. "As long as it is possible for us to get on without dispute," says the government, "all well; but the moment a question arises, *we* must solve it." Moreover, as the legislative authorities have made the law, they can amend or alter it if they think proper, and there is and can be no guarantee that they will not.

Such are the disadvantages created by the vexed project, which, from the amount of discussion it has caused, deserves the title of the *Pons Asinorum* of the Italian parliament.

There are several points in this law which have some title to be looked on as advantages, relatively to the condition in which the sovereign pontiff has been placed since the overthrow of his temporal sovereignty. These are the inviolability of the person of the sovereign pontiff, the

payment of the monthly sum of fifty thousand dollars, the protection of the Conclave as well as of the pontiff in the discharge of duty, the immunity of ecclesiastics employed by him, the postal and telegraphic arrangements, and the abolition of the royal "placet" and "exequatur." But it is to be remarked that, in the first place, with regard to some, the dignity of the Head of the Church will not permit him to avail himself of them; then, with reference to others, they are imperatively wrung from the Italian government by the public opinion of foreign nations; while, lastly, respecting others, the government will always have it in their power to exercise a surveillance that renders the concessions more or less nugatory, and in nowise satisfactory to the people of Catholic and non-Catholic nations.

But independent of all the above reasons, there are intrinsic motives that make any code of guarantees worth little more than the paper on which they are indited. All are agreed that the Head of the Church must be independent; the Italian government acknowledges it, and Catholics and non-Catholics proclaim it throughout the world. In what does this necessary independence consist? It consists essentially in being free of undue influence from any source whatsoever. Now, such freedom can be obtained only by restoring the pope to the condition in which he was prior to the year 1860. For we can imagine the several other conditions in which the pope might be placed.

He may continue as he is at the present moment.

He may be the privileged citizen of a Roman republic.

He may be the sovereign ruler of the city of Rome, under the protection of the Italian government, together with other governments throughout the world.

None of these conditions is a guarantee of his freedom.

In the first place, we suppose him to be in the condition in which he is at the present moment. The reasons we have given above, the practical experience had of the protection given to the pope and those attached to him, the seizure of the encyclical, and other acts of which his eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State has complained publicly, the subjection a salary paid by the Italian government would bring with it, and the general suspicion to which his acts are liable, from the influence of the powerful government under which he lives—all make it impossible that this state of things should continue.

Nor is it possible that the sovereign pontiff should be the privileged and protected member of a Roman republic. To tell the truth, the present state of things is preferable to that. Republics, and particularly a Roman republic, are too liable to commotion; a mob is too easily excited to violence, a demagogue is too likely to gain great influence over this city, to make it at all advisable that the pontiff should have republicans for his neighbors. A prince has duties to his people, to his dynasty, and to other nations that check him, and make him keep order in his realm; whereas the common people are restrained by no such consideration, and a clamorous hostile demonstration, with a stoppage of supplies, would very probably be the answer to any act of the sovereign pontiff that did not meet with their approbation.

The vicissitudes of the days of Cola di Rienzi are there to show how incompatible with the mobile masses of a republic is the necessarily unbending firmness of a moral ruler. Not much happier than the foregoing is the idea proposed by the able deputy of the Italian parliament, Signor Toscanelli, who would have Rome a free city under the sovereign control of the sovereign pontiff and protected by the Italian government. It would, practically speaking, be impossible to eliminate all influence on the part of the government protecting and closely in material contact with the Roman Curia. Even supposing that the maintenance of the pope and his dependents did not come from that government, it would not be advisable or satisfactory. In this case, the money for the support of the ecclesiastical authorities would have to come from foreign nations. Although this would save the sovereign pontiff from much of his subjection to the rulers of Italy, it would still leave him subject to influence of another kind very undesirable. The point is a delicate one, but we will treat it with all due consideration for those concerned. In legislating for mankind, you have no right to expect heroic actions, and this more particularly if those actions pertain to the supernatural order. This rule is to be applied to the sovereign pontiffs as to everyone else. To their great honor, the sovereign pontiffs have stood nobly firm in the exercise of the duties of their exalted state; many a one has shed his blood for the faith, many a one has languished in chains for the good of his flock, many a one has braved the fury of crowned tyrants for the safety and well-being of the church of Christ. But above all praise as their conduct has often been, you have no right to put them

in a position that requires the exercise of such heroic firmness. Now, what is the condition of a pope dependent on the precarious contributions of foreign nations for his support? It is one in which an external influence is continually at work to check him in the free and impartial discharge of his duty; it is one in which he is continually forced to lay aside all human considerations of prudence and throw himself with fullness of faith on Divine Providence. The position is a sublime one, but for that very reason no man or body of men have any right to place him in it. If he sees fit to condemn some cherished opinion in a nation, the people cool in their devotion to him, and as the contributions of which we speak are voluntary, the disinclination to receive his decisions brings with it a disinclination to give spontaneously what had been so given before, and the direct consequence of every pontifical act unacceptable is very likely to be a diminution in the funds that come in for the support of the pontiff; in fact, if we may be allowed the expression, these contributions may be looked on as a kind of spiritual thermometer, that by their rise or fall indicate the warmth or the coolness of feeling towards the pope. In point of fact, it is well known that not a few prophesied, during the discussion of the question of the infallibility in the past year, that the passing of the decree would bring about a decided falling off in the Peter's Pence. Notwithstanding this, the sovereign pontiff threw himself upon Providence, and his hope was not deceived. To the honor of Catholics throughout the world be it said, the contributions of the Peter's Pence of to-day exceed those of all other epochs, and enable the Holy Father to administer to the most pressing wants of the

flock over which he personally and directly presides. The hand of Providence is certainly here. Such manifestations of Providence, however, as we have said, no one has a right in legislating to look forward to, and therefore it is absolutely necessary that the Head of the Church should be the sovereign of a small state, large enough to save him from the necessity of tutelage, and yielding a yearly revenue sufficient to maintain him and those he must have around him with the decorum due to his condition. To this it may be objected, that his subjects will be deprived of many advantages enjoyed by free nations. We are very sceptical about these advantages. The progress of Rome under Pius IX. had been solid and satisfactory; and, on the other hand, the Roman subjects of the pontiff will have many advantages to which other nations are often strangers: the advantage of light taxation, the advantage of laws repressing immorality, the advantage of peace with its delightful arts, the advantage of an enlightened protection of science and of the fine arts, and then the great material advantage of seeing their city the resort of the cultivated and wealthy classes of all nations, who flock to Rome to see the successor of St. Peter, and to enjoy the gorgeous and imposing ceremonial of the church. For far less advantages than these we deprived the citizens of a portion of our country of the great privilege of their political franchise; of all nations we should be the last to find fault with the infliction of a similar disqualification, of much more apparent harm than real, and which is compensated for an hundred-fold. And this we say all the more earnestly because, in the case of Rome, it is not the welfare of a collection of states that is provided for, but the peace and good order of all nations of the earth.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

VI.

MAX MÜLLER'S "CHIPS."*

(*The Catholic World, July,* 1872.)

MR. MAX MÜLLER, the learned German professor, and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, wrote, and in 1868 published, a collection of essays on the science of religion which he calls *Chips from a German Workshop.* He tells us this title was given him by the late Chevalier Bunsen, who, on advising him to undertake the translation of the Sacred Book of the Brahmins, the *Rig-Veda,* bade him give, from time to time, to the public, some chips from his workshop. The intensely absorbing and delightful nature of his studies is to be seen very clearly by these specimens. They embrace two of the most important and most attractive branches of human science—that of the varied forms of human thought in its relations to God; and that of the multifold languages of the earth, and their mutual relations. Prof. Müller's philological investigations are confined chiefly to the Indo-Germanic family, and confirm beyond possibility of cavil the intimate connection between the many branches of that family—the Sanskrit, the Brahmanic language in use at present, the Persian, the Greek,

* *Chips from a German Workshop.* By Max Müller. New York: Scribner & Co.

the Latin with its offshoots, the Italian, the French and the Spanish, the Celtic and the English. In exemplifying what he says on this subject, he speaks of the meaning of the word *Veda*. Rig-Veda, he tells us, means praise of knowledge or wisdom—*Rig* or *Rich* signifying *praise* or *hymn*, and *Veda*, *knowledge* or *wisdom*. He calls our attention to this word *Veda* in support of the theory of the connection of the Aryan or Indo-Germanic group of languages. The root of it, or the word deprived of its final vowel—*Ved*—is to be seen by substituting the interchanging consonants in the English words *wit*, *wot*, the German *weiss*, Gothic *vait*, Anglo-Saxon *wat*, Greek *οἶδα*, to which may be added the Latin word *video*, *to see*, evidently closely connected with this Sanskrit word signifying to know, for knowledge is intellectual vision.

What impresses us most, at first sight, is the practical conclusion to be drawn from the advanced state of philological studies. We have here a striking proof of the unity of the race of man. Max Müller speaks of this proof in favor of the unity of the Aryan races as beyond gainsaying; words are there to establish the truth. Now, if we see such differently constituted peoples—such as the English and the Hindoo, the French and the Persian, the Celt and the Italian—all members of one family, can any one be so rash as to wish to exclude from fellowship with that family the tawny Arab, the swarthy Malay, or the dark son of Africa, simply because they are to be classed under the heads of Semitic and Turanian? It is well known among physiologists that the differences of facial angles and cranial thickness constitute nothing essential; while the investigations of national thought and customs, hitherto veiled by unintelligible languages, tend

continually to demonstrate and confirm the unity of man, to show that all men are of one common stock, of one man and of one woman, all made after the one type—that which exists, as the Bible tells us, in God. So far, in fact, is real science from doing harm to revelation, that when it attains its perfection it confirms the truths that have been revealed.

Whence we may draw this conclusion, that men who are wise will take care to have revelation for their guide, even in science; they will, it is clear, be saved from going astray, since their ultimate examinations confirm its truth. It is not unfrequently the case that the eager scientific man, by a logical process, draws his conclusion without the slightest suspicion of error in his premises. It is no wonder he is tenacious of his conclusion; but how often are his ideas overthrown by "chance," that strange discoverer of more than one great treasure of the human race! And how often sober, thoughtful men, meeting to determine the basis on which they stand, have to say, as did the Geological Congress of Paris in 1867: "*The state of the science is not such as to enable us to make deductions wholly free from danger of error!*" or, certainly it is most just that we should love science and follow it faithfully, but always with an eye to that old and familiar adage,—"It is human to err." There is really nothing after all that saves a man from mistakes and confusion so much as a proper estimate of his own conclusions, and a readiness to have them corrected by others. It is a habit of mind that distinguishes really great men, like the sounder portion of the Prehistorical Congress of Bologna, in the autumn of 1871: "There is nothing in prehistorical discoveries that is in contradic-

tion with revelation." Bacon has bid us all put aside the *idola*, and thus free our minds from prejudice. We should begin by banishing the idol of *self*, the reliance on our own judgment, so as to be ready at once to abandon cherished ideas, and to look on the principles of science as more or less liable to be one day, by further investigation, shown to be other than we think them. This is all the more important because *false* principles always do practical harm, and, if nothing else, they retard the attainment of what we are searching for, in putting us on the wrong path. We do not wish to be thought to condemn all scientific principles as one day liable to be proven false. There are some, the essential agreement of whose subject and predicate absolutely excludes all danger of error, others which the constant experience of the human race has shown to be true, such as, for instance, the mathematical, and many of those that form the basis of natural science. These do not contradict revelation, and will never be proven false. The history of the past, however, is too full of the *débris* of systems of every kind that any one of solid information should not take warning from them, and be on his guard against looking on any proposition in natural science as irrefragable which the concordant testimony of men since the enunciation of it has not shown to be so. The Ptolemaic system, after an undisputed sway, yielded before the assaults of Copernicus and Galileo, and its solid spheres, whose music filled the poet's mind with delight, and charmed the privileged spirits to whom it was given to hear it, came down in awful ruin, and their sounds were hushed for ever. Then those whose years did not begin with the century can recall how eagerly they drank

in the doctrine of the imponderable principles; and lo! what has become of them? The progress of the age has substituted for it the teaching of the unity of forces, and motion answers for them all. The solidity of the sun and its dark spots, under the telescope and the combined investigations of astronomers, have disappeared, and gaseous substance and interruption in its continuity have taken the place of both. And in the recent brilliant discoveries in regard to the constituent gases of the sun, who is to make us sure that the lines in the spectrum, by which we profess to know the existence in the sun of certain determinate objects, may not be produced by other causes of which we know nothing? All these theories, we grant, have great probability in their favor, and we do not cite them with any intent to discredit the labors of the gifted men who have formed them; but it is wise not to look on them as the end of all investigation and beyond all controversy. As we think of these vicissitudes of science, there occur to us, though not in a spirit of disregard for true science, the words written long ago: "I have seen the trouble which God hath given the sons of men to be exercised in it. He hath made all things good in their time, and hath delivered the world to their consideration, so that man cannot find out the work which God hath made from the beginning to the end." (Eccles. iii. 10, 11.) This, however, is a digression; let us return to our *Chips*.

By far the most important topic treated of by Prof. Müller is the knowledge of God existing among the varied nations of men. He gives great weight, and deservedly, to the result of his observation in this respect, and we can readily understand why he should lay so

much stress on the importance of the study of the "science of religion," or the comparative study of the different religions of the earth. As a matter of erudition, it must always be a subject of the greatest interest, not only in itself, but also because it serves to illustrate the words of the Apostle to the Romans, ch. i. 18–20: "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men that detain the truth of God in injustice: because that which is capable of being known* of God is manifest in them: for God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity, so that they are inexcusable." We shall have occasion to return to these words. Here we may remark that this knowledge of God that transpires in all the citations the learned Orientalist has laid before us, is nothing more than what as Christians we expected to hear. But in this connection we have to say that the contrary effect is produced to that intended by Prof. Müller. This corroboration of the words of St. Paul, uttered more than eighteen centuries ago, and proclaimed long before by the author of the Book of Wisdom, ch. xiii., proves that, so far from the religions of the earth meriting praise for their reference to a Supreme Being, they deserve to be censured because they detained the truth in darkness—in injustice. The words of the professor are: "We shall learn [from this com-

* See Kühner's *Gr. Grammar*, translated by Messrs. Edwards and Taylor, London and New York, 1859, § 234 (i.), with regard to the force of the verbal adjective. The word in the Greek text of Tischendorf, *Ed. Sept.*, is γνωστὸν.

parative study] that there is hardly one religion which does not contain some important truth; truth sufficient to enable those who seek the Lord, and feel after him, to find him in the hour of their need." The first portion of this assertion is true; the second is incorrect in its expression, and dangerous in its tendency. It is incorrect in its expression, inasmuch as it attributes to these religions, as such, the possession of truth—not all, to be sure, but some truth. We say, on the contrary, that the truth contained in these various religious systems is the common inheritance of the human mind.

The light of Almighty God's countenance shines on us all, no matter who we are. The Psalmist asks: "*Quis ostendet nobis bona?*" and he answers: "*Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine!*" It is wrong, therefore, to give credit to a false system for the truth it has enveloped in darkness. And the reason of this is palpable. If we turn to the words of the apostle, as given above, do we find him giving credit to the false religions of mankind for the truth they contain? Anything but this. He says: "The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity, so that they are inexcusable. Because, when they knew God, they did not glorify him as God. . . . And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds and four-footed beasts, and of creeping things." Here we have a sentence pronounced against these very religions our author speaks of as containing sufficient truth to enable those who seek the Lord and feel after him, to find him in the hour of their need. The apostle con-

demns them because "they detained the truth of God in injustice."

This is to be said of these false religions even at their best. But what is to be said of them, when we take into consideration the immense majority of those among the heathen who do not attain to any refined spirituality, but are engrossed in the material, sensual forms of idolatry, like the conservative Parsees, so graphically described in the book before us? We must therefore conclude that, granting Prof. Müller intended to refer to man's natural knowledge or his reason as a means of knowing God, to which the apostle bears witness, he has used an incorrect form of speech in attributing to these religions efficacy in finding God. It would have been in every way better to write that, in spite of the errors of these various systems, there was still light enough left to man, through his reason, to lead him to God—a truth not only substantiated by the teaching of theologians, but, as we have seen, expressly laid down in Holy Writ.

We have said the assertion of our author is not only incorrect in its form, but dangerous in its tendency. That tendency, with all respect to Prof. Müller's expressed opinions, is latitudinarian; it would lead one to think that, after all, the heathen and all professing a false religion are in a comparatively safe state. If this be so, why do we find the apostle assaulting those systems so uncompromisingly, and asserting that the heathen are inexcusable? And how do we reconcile with this theory the words of the Gospel, "Unless ye be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven?" True, there is the *baptisma flaminis*, the resource of those who have not the blessing of the actual sacrament; but

even this requires a rejection, absolute or implied, of the false system, and the act of faith in the true God, accompanied by a firm will of doing whatever it may be known he asks of a sincere soul. The language of the great theologians is certainly not in any way favorable to the safety of those who follow a false religion. They tell us that those who among the pagans of old were saved, were justified by their faith in a true God and in the Redeemer to come. The doctor of grace, the great St. Augustine, whose intellect was one of the most remarkable of any age, says in *Serm.* 3 *on the 36th Ps.*, "All who were just, from the beginning of the world, have Christ as their head. For they believed he was to come, whom we believe to have come already; by faith in him they were saved, as we are." Then in the *Comm. on the 128th Ps.*, he writes: "Has the church only existed now? The church is of old; from the time the saints were called the church is on earth. Once it existed only in Abel, and was warred against by a wicked and perfidious brother, Cain. Once the church was only in Enoch, and he was taken away from the wicked. Once the church was only in Noah's house, and it suffered from all those who perished by the flood, and only the ark floated on the waters and escaped to the dry land. Once the church was only in Abraham, and we know how much he suffered from the wicked. The church existed only in Lot, and in his house in Sodom, and he bore with the iniquity and perversity of the Sodomites, until the Lord freed him from them. The church began to exist in the people of Israel, and it suffered at the hands of Pharaoh and the Egyptians.

And in the very church itself, amid the people of Israel, there began to flourish a number of holy souls: Moses and other saints suffered from the wicked Jews. We come at last to our Lord Jesus Christ; the Gospel has been preached, and he has said in the Psalms: 'I have brought the tidings, and I have spoken, and they are multiplied beyond number.'" (See also the writings of the same father against the Donatists.) The same idea of the necessity of faith in Christ is found constantly in the teaching of the church and in the writings of the fathers.

We ask after this, who deserve most credit as exponents of the essential requisites of salvation—the early fathers of the church, who explain the words of the apostle, "Without faith it is impossible to please God," in the sense we have here in St. Augustine, and which, too, is had in the ancient Athanasian Creed; or gentlemen like our author, whose ideas of Christianity, even when they express them clearly, differ so widely from what was once held as revealed truth, and who, moreover, cannot come to an understanding among themselves as to what the truth of Christ is? And if we must give the preference to the former, what are we to say of an *opinion* that serves to lull people into a false security regarding that which is, of all things, the most vital in its importance and consequences?

Professor Müller rightly says that the knowledge of the false religions of the world makes us appreciate more the Christian religion. Had he taken the view we have given, he would have had a vastly greater appreciation of it. He would not have put it in com-

parison with other religions, as differing from them by a superior degree of excellence, but would have shown that they differed essentially, as right differs from wrong, as truth from error, and therefore he would, while speaking charitably of individuals and leaving them to the judgment of God, infinitely just, have condemned and rejected these false systems of worship as the curse of the unhappy race of Adam. As we have said before, we are not inclined to charge Prof. Müller with the full consequences of his assertions, since in several places of his work he gives his unqualified acknowledgment of the claims of Christianity. Still we cannot but look on his loose assertions as the result of the rationalistic spirit that has begun so rapidly to pervade the most conservative of English universities. Only a few years ago, when called to give his testimony before the Board of Inquiry of the House of Lords regarding the state of the universities, Canon Liddon said that this tendency to rationalism had come in with the change in the system of studies and the introduction of the higher philosophical branches, and that it was making headway among the students in a marked manner. Nor, when we see those at the head of the university decide, as they did lately, that the Thirty-nine Articles are not to be insisted on for examination except in case of those who are candidates for the honorary degrees, and when we hear in our own country a board of Anglican bishops declare that the word "regeneration" in the formula of infant baptism does not imply any moral change in the one baptized—it does not seem to us that we are doing Prof. Müller injustice in thinking that he, a lay

professor in the university directed by the Anglican Church, has, it may be unconsciously, taken in not a little of the leaven of rationalism.

To this may be referred his translation of the text of St. Justin, *Ap.* i., § 46, when he makes this Christian philosopher say, "Christ is the first begotten of God, and we have already proved him to be the very Logos (or *universal Reason*) of which mankind are all partakers." In the Edit. of the Congr. of St. Maurus of the *Works of St. Justin*, this word *universal* does not occur; the Greek text has simply the accusative "Logon," and the Latin simply "Rationem." Certainly all Catholic theologians hold this doctrine of St. Justin, and teach that the *Logos* or *Verbum* or *Ratio* is the infinite wisdom of the Godhead, by which God understands himself and all things in himself, and that all created wisdom or reason is but a participation of that infinite Reason or Word. But in these days, when the locutions, *universal soul*, *universal intellect*, *universal being*, are used so much in a pantheistical sense, we think an author can hardly find fault with those who very probably misunderstand him when he uses expressions so liable to be misinterpreted, and charge him with some tendency which he seems in other places to disclaim. It seems to us the learned professor should have taken all the greater care in his translation, as St. Justin (in his *Ap.* ii. § 7) disclaims expressly all pantheistic teaching, which he declares to be "foreign to all sound thought, reason, and mind."

To show we do not wish to be unfair to this distinguished scholar, we will do him the justice to cite his condemnation of the pantheistic spirit of the times. He

is speaking of Barthélemy St. Hilaire's *History of Buddhism*, and he quotes the words of the preface of that writer:

"This book may offer one other advantage, and I regret to say that at present it may seem to come opportunely. It is the misfortune of our times that the same doctrines which form the foundation of Buddhism meet at the hands of some of our philosophers with a favor which they ill deserve. For some years we have seen systems arising in which metempsychosis and transmigration are highly spoken of, and attempts are made to explain the world and man without either a God or a Providence, exactly as Buddha did. A future life is refused to the yearnings of mankind, and the immortality of the soul is replaced by the immortality of works. God is dethroned, and in his place they substitute man, the only being, we are told, in which the Infinite becomes conscious of itself. These theories are recommended to us sometimes in the name of science, or of history or philology, or even of metaphysics; and though they are neither new nor very original, yet they can do much injury to feeble hearts.

And a few lines further on:

"It would be useful, however, if the authors of these modern systems would just cast a glance at the theories and destinies of Buddhism. It is not philosophy in the sense in which we understand this great name, nor is it religion in the sense of ancient paganism, of Christianity, or of Mohammedanism; but it contains elements of all worked up into a perfectly independent doctrine; acknowledges nothing in the universe but man, and obstinately refuses to recognize anything else, though confounding man with nature in the midst of which he lives. Hence all those aberrations of Buddhism, which ought to be a warning to others." (P. 203, vol. i.)

We have one other charge against the learned professor for what, though savoring a little of rationalism, more particularly regards the Catholic Church. He says that "as the Oriental creeds degenerated into grosser forms, so Christianity degenerates into Jesuitism

and Mormonism" (p. 185). We grant that the author is striving to be fair to the pagans, and shows an unwillingness to condemn them as a whole on account of the corrupt practices of a portion of them. But in doing so he has shown himself most unjust to a distinguished Order in the Catholic Church, whose piety, virtue, and learning claim for them everywhere from Christians a tribute of respect and gratitude, and nowhere more so than in our own free land. It is really lamentable to see what we must call a total want of knowledge in a person of such extensive information and real ability as Prof. Müller. 'Tis strange that it did not occur to him that there was a great incongruity in coupling the Society of Jesus with the corrupt and sensual community of the Mormons, and it is only another lesson to put us on our guard against prejudice, which has so wonderful a power in perverting the judgments of men so worthy of respect for their zeal in the cause of truth.

This undeserved condemnation of the Jesuit Fathers is not the only error into which Prof. Müller's dislike of Catholicity has betrayed him. On page 190 he speaks of the Buddhist ceremonies, and in a foot-note refers to the work of the Abbé Huc, in which he describes his travels in China and Thibet, and remarks the curious coincidence between the rites of the religion of the Grand Lama and the forms of Catholic worship. Our author tells us that the Abbé Huc pointed out the similarities between the Buddhist and Roman Catholic ceremonials with such *naïveté* that, to his surprise, he found his delightful *Travels in Thibet* placed on the *Index*. We confess our surprise at this

information. We never heard of the abbé's work having been signed with "the black mark of Peter," but we have heard the book very highly praised by persons who would hardly have praised it had there been anything in it to merit the censures of the church. We have, too, at hand a copy of the *Index* coming down to six years after the publication of the *Travels in Thibet*, but after a careful search have not been able to find in it the name either of Abbé Huc or of this work. Moreover, it strikes us as very unlikely that this writer should have suffered for what has been stated pointedly by authors of the church from the first ages down to our time. Had Prof. Müller turned his attention to Tertullian's book, *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, he would have found at § 40 the following passage:

"Who is to interpret the sense of what may further heresy? The devil, forsooth, whose office it is to distort the truth; who rivals by the mysteries of the idols the very actions of the divine sacraments. He, too, baptizes some as believers and faithful; he promises the putting off of sin by the laver; and, if I remember aright, Mithras there signs his soldiers on the forehead, celebrates the offering of bread, and uses the image of the resurrection, and gains the crown through the sword (martyrdom). What shall I say more? that he destines his high-priest for the nuptials of but one (wife)? that he has his virgins? that he has his celibates? But if we consider the superstitions of Numa Pompilius, if the priestly duties, emblems, and privileges, the sacrificial service and instruments, and the vessels of sacrifice, and the strangeness of their expiations and votive gifts, has not the devil manifestly imitated the observances of the Jewish law?"

In the seventeenth century Natalis Alexander, in his *Ecclesiastical History** (vol. ii. diss. iii. art. 3, § 3. No.

* See, also, St. Justin, Ap. 1, § 66, ad finem, de Cultu Mithræ.

vii.) replying to the objections of Spencer, in his Dissertation No. 3 on the *Ritual Laws of the Hebrews*, says: "It is far more probable that the devil, the rival of God, inspired the heathen to use in the rites of their divinities, or to carry about with solemn pomp, arks or mystic vases containing something hidden (arcanum)," than that the Israelites took their idea from them; and further on: "Who does not see that the conclusion can be drawn by just and better right? Therefore, the beaten vases had their origin in the rivalry of the evil spirit seizing on all that was splendid in the worship of God, and turning it to his own worship." There are besides several rites well known to have existed among the heathen after the coming of Christ that bear so close a resemblance to Christian and Jewish forms, that we are warranted in following those archæologists who attribute them to imitation of the usages of revealed religion. Take, for instance the taurobolium or criobolium, or baptism by the blood of a bull or goat. In this ceremony the person undergoing it was placed in a pit with a kind of sieve over his head, through which the fresh blood of the animal was made to fall upon his whole body. What is this but the corruption of baptism, the idea of redemption through blood, and of the sprinkling with blood that took place by divine command in the old law? It stands to reason that as the Christian religion gained influence, paganism would, by seizing on what was marked in it and perverting it to its own uses, strive to regain its credit by an imitation which in some way would deceive the ignorant. Prof. Müller can see from this that Catholics are not unaccustomed to making

such contrasts, and that they are far from fearing them. And as for the case in point, history tells us that St. Thomas evangelized India and very probably the countries adjacent to it, while we know that St. Francis Xavier, as narrated in his life, found decided traces of Christianity among some of the Indians, though they had not the priesthood. This being the case, we can readily comprehend how the followers of Buddha should have adopted many of the forms in use among Christians, even the recitation of psalms, which we know from the New Testament to have been in use among the apostles, who, we are told, "went out from the supper-room after reciting a hymn with their Master."

Such are the remarks we have thought well to make in the interest of truth in regard to these volumes of Prof. Müller, which, aside from these objectionable features, are full of learning and of interesting information, imparted in an easy and elegant style. They will be of value to the scholar, especially to those whose occupations do not allow them to consecrate much time to researches such as those in which the professor is engaged. They will have the effect of confirming the believer in the truth of Christianity, and of making him thankful for the gift of a faith that has saved him from such fearful enthrallment of mind and body as he beholds his fellow-men condemned to in the many forms of Eastern paganism. It is true those who are not favorable to positive religious teaching will wrest not a little of what is said to their own damage—a danger we have tried to point out. Still the learned author will, after all, be

justified in remarking that, if such be the case, it is but another exemplification of the fact that the serpent draws poison from the same plant from which the bee sips its honey.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

VII.

ST. PETER'S ROMAN PONTIFICATE.

(*The Catholic World, December*, 1872.)

THE history of mankind presents us innumerable facts that strike the reader with astonishment, and tax his ingenuity to its utmost to explain. The sudden fall of nations from the height of prosperity to misery and subjection, the invasion of hordes of barbarians to substitute their uncouthness and ferocity for the polish and civilization of centuries, the apparent vocation of some one nation, at different epochs, to assume a preponderance over all others in the government of the world, the appearance of some one great mind that shone like a sun amid the galaxy of intellect, revolutionizing his time, and then setting, without leaving any one to continue his work; all these facts confuse the mind, and, when man has lost the light that was sent into this world to guide him, seemed to him but the bitter irony of destiny. Not so, however, are they viewed by him to whom revelation has imparted its illumining rays. He sees Providence everywhere, and, knowing some wise end has been intended by the Creator whose power conserves and directs the evolutions of the planets and the vicissitudes of human life, he is encouraged to inquire into the

end for which such wonderful events have been brought about. 'Twas by this light the great Bishop of Hippo saw the providential disposition of the changes that took place in the world; looked on all history but as the preparation and continuation of the master-work of God—his church. 'Twas by this light that, following in the footsteps of St. Augustine, Bossuet understood the relations of such different facts, and showed their connection in his *Universal History*. These men, and those who, like them, have studied the history of the nations of the earth, had no difficulty in realizing the relation of all these facts, and in looking on them as so many confirmations of the truth of Christianity; but those who are without faith stand aghast at the inexplicable phenomena they see before them, and of all none so sets at naught their judgment and defies their explanation as the greatest, the most persistent, the most important of all historical facts—the existence of the Catholic Church. They see it everywhere; modifying everything; setting at defiance all calculation; and when, according to human judgment, it should cease to exist, coming forth from the ordeal purer, stronger, more brilliant and powerful than before. Yet, they are not willing to learn by experience, but look forward to a day when an expedient or a means will be discovered to destroy in its turn this gigantic fabric that appears to scorn the ravages of time and the fury of tempests, just as the Jews look forward to the Messiah who is to deliver them from captivity among the nations. In their useless hope, they leave nothing untried, and often scruple not at what in their private capacity they might scorn—distortion of

history and downright calumny. No human institution could ever have withstood the array of powerful enemies the church of Christ has had since she first went forth from Mount Sion. No age has ever seen her without them ; sometimes fierce persecutors, sometimes insidious plotters, sometimes open impugners of her dogmas ; at other times dangerous foes, cloaking their hostility under the garb of devotion that they might better strike deep into her bosom the poison with which, in their foolish hate, they fancied they were to deprive her of life. But the spouse of Christ has always cast them from her, and walked majestically over the ruins they themselves had brought about, and this she will ever do. And why ? Because she does not lean on a broken reed nor put her trust in an arm of flesh. She bears about her a charm that defies all attack—the protection of the Most High—and presents to all the proof of her holy character, those motives of credibility, which, as they were intended for all time, so now as on the day of Pentecost, accompany her wherever she goes, invincibly proving to the mind of man her own divine origin and her claim to his obedience. As she was one in the union of all her children in one faith and in one baptism ; as she was holy in the lives of those that obeyed her ; as she was catholic and universal, embracing peoples of all climes and of all ages ; as she was apostolic in her origin and in the succession of her ministry, so is she now, one, holy, catholic, and apostolic in the succession of her priesthood and in the infallibility of her head. As she was able to point to the wonders wrought by the apostle in the name of

her divine founder, so now can she point to the miracles of her chosen servants: an Alphonsus de Liguori, a Paul of the Cross, a Ven. Pallotta, a Maria Taigi, a Maria Moerl, and a host of others, down to the martyred victims of communistic fury. She can show in the nineteenth century, as she did in the first, a host of martyrs; old men and youths, matrons and tender virgins, who, when arraigned for their faith before the Chinese mandarin, fulfilled the promise of Christ, and gave inspired answers, as did the glorious children of the early church, and sealed, too, with their blood the belief they held dearer than life.

We can understand, then, how the church can look fearlessly at the storms that ever and anon burst upon her, because, built on the solidity of her belief, she knows the waves can but break harmless at her feet. She has no need of human means to secure her existence, for that has a promise of perennial duration. The condition, too, of her being is one of struggle and warfare, and, when it comes upon her, her only act is to oppose the shield of faith and the sword of the word of God—her only arms the truth. And as it is written that truth will prevail, so in every battle in which she has been engaged she has come forth at last with victory inscribed on her banner—victory through the truth.

We have said that the condition of her being is struggle and warfare. This, therefore, is never wanting; as all the world knows, she is called on to defend herself just now against the fiercest attacks she has perhaps ever suffered—perhaps even beyond what she underwent in that fearful persecution, in which her

enemies directed against her every engine of destruction, and in their mad rejoicing recorded the inscription, *Christiano nomine deleto.* To-day the openly declared foes of her faith are seated in triumph in her stronghold, and strain every nerve to uproot from the mind and heart of her children the faith of their fathers. Not content with attacking the dogmas she teaches, they assail every fact which in any way may favor her, no matter how clearly the history of past ages may proclaim its truth. An instance of this we have had but recently, but a few months ago, when an attempt was made to prove that the fact upon which the whole jurisdiction of the church is grounded never occurred—that St. Peter forsooth never came to Rome, and never founded the church there! With what success the champions of this assertion advocated their cause is known; and it may still further be judged of from the fact that a person who came to the discussion, doubting of the fact of St. Peter's having been in Rome, left the hall after hearing the Catholic speakers, convinced that such an historical personage as St. Peter had lived and been in Rome, and he recorded his belief in one of the leading journals of Italy not favorable to the Catholic cause.

It may be said to be a strange phenomenon that a fact of history so notorious, and for which so great an amount of proof exists, which has at its command every fount of human certitude, as that of the coming of St. Peter to Rome, ever should have been called in question. But what will not party spirit attempt? It is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that partisans will seek to rid themselves of troublesome facts

by downright denial of them. This spirit, however, is a dangerous one, and especially unbecoming the sincere student of history. We know what Bacon has said about the *idola*, and it is incumbent on every one who is searching after historic truth to lay aside prejudice or even the desire that facts may favor him. He must look at them merely as they are, take them on their proof, without striving to lessen them or give them other proportions than are inherent in them. If the scope of all research is to find out the truth, it is our duty to seek it only, and not mar its beauty by adding to or detracting from it. In the present case the remark is highly applicable. Catholics have nothing to fear in examining the historic proofs on which the coming of St. Peter to Rome rests; while those who differ from them, in so far as they love truth, should be equally glad to look well into the claims to truth which this same fact puts forward. We propose to go briefly over the ground. We say briefly, because it seems almost presumptuous, since so many able pens have dedicated themselves to this task, that we should undertake it anew. There seems to us, however, a want to be supplied on this subject, something succinct and not too learned or too lengthy for the ordinary reader, engrossed in pursuits that do not allow time for more extended studies. This must be our excuse as well as our reason for the present undertaking.

In the discussion that took place in Rome on the 9th and 10th February, 1872, the chief speaker on the negative side ended his discourse by saying that, no matter what weight of testimony could be brought to

sustain St. Peter's coming to Rome, the silence of Scripture was for him an unanswerable argument; the Scripture should have spoken of the fact had it existed; it said nothing about it, therefore it had never existed. Were it not that the subject is too serious for such quotations, we should say with Gratiano, "We thank thee for teaching us that word!" This was the feeling that came over us as we heard the expression from the lips of the speaker, and now, after so much has been written, we have it still. It is needless to say that such an expression betrays anxiety with regard to positive argument, if not a suspicion of weakness in one's own cause. We shall endeavor to show that there was reason both for this suspicion and this anxiety.

And, first, the opinion which is least probable concerning the death of St. Peter satisfactorily accounts for the silence of the Acts and of the Epistle to the Romans, the portions of Scripture on which our adversaries lay most stress in this matter. According to this opinion, St. Peter was martyred in Rome, *Nerone et Vetere Consulibus, i. e.*, according to the Bucherian Catalogue, in the second year of Nero, the year 54 of the Christian era, this leaving St. Peter twenty-five years of pontificate, from the year 29 to the year 54. St. Linus succeeded him, and ruled the church twelve years, dying after St. Paul, who was put to death before Nero went into Greece. St. Peter was therefore, according to this chronology, dead before St. Paul reached Rome. It is not strange, then, the Acts does not speak of his being there. As for the Epistle to the Romans, if it was written in the year 53, or two

years before St. Paul came to Rome according to Eusebius, the reasons we adduce further on will explain the silence with regard to St. Peter. If, as the ordinary opinion has it, the Epistle was written from Corinth, in the year 58, St. Peter being already four years dead, the omission of his name is easily accounted for.

We say, secondly, that in the belief that St. Peter and St. Paul died at the same time in Rome, sufficient reason can be found for the silence both of the Acts and of the Epistle to the Romans.

We beg particular attention to what we are going to say. Those portions of Scripture do not prove by their silence that St. Peter *never* came to Rome, first, because the Acts and the Epistle to the Romans are not adequate witnesses in the case; secondly, because neither the Acts nor the Epistle to the Romans was called on by circumstances to allude to St. Peter's being in Rome.

And, first, the Acts and Epistle to the Romans are not adequate witnesses that St. Peter *never* came to Rome. We call attention to the fact that the Epistle to the Romans was written two years before St. Paul came to Rome. What therefore we are going to say under this first head regarding the Acts applies with greater force to the Epistle to the Romans. We shall then confine our remarks wholly to the Acts in this connection. We say, then, that, in order that the Acts should be received as an adequate witness, it should cover the whole period from the time St. Peter first left Judæa to that of his death as fixed by received historical data, for we cannot arbitrarily determine the

period of his death. Now, it is well known that history indicates the date of St. Peter's death as that of St. Paul's. They are represented as dying on the same day and in the same year, one by the sword, the other on the cross; such are the words of the Roman Martyrology. This being so, we call attention to the fact that the chief disputant on the negative side of the question fixed on the year 61, from the *Fasti Consulares—atti consolari*, as that in which St. Paul came to Rome, this being the year in which Portius Festus went to take possession of his province.* The Acts tells us that after St. Paul came to Rome he dwelt for two years in his own hired house. Here the narration ceases, leaving Paul alive and in the year 63 of the Christian era. From that time to his death, according to historical data, occurs a period, according to different computations, of from two to four years. About this period of time no mention is made in the Acts for the simple reason that it is not embraced there; the narrative breaks off just as it begins. What was to prevent St. Peter's coming to Rome during this period of from two to four years? If he had, the Acts could have said nothing about it, nor could it if he had not. The conclusion is simple, the Acts, and, *a fortiori*, the Epistle to the Romans, written prior to it, are no competent or adequate witnesses to prove St. Peter never came to Rome, nor died there.

*How such information could have been had from the *Fasti Consulares* is difficult to say; the suppression was probably a *lapsus memoriæ* for Josephus Flavius. The date of St. Paul's coming to Rome is too uncertain to be fixed at 61, yet we accept this year on the authority of those who put it forward in the discussion.

We come to the second head: neither the Acts nor the Epistle to the Romans was called on to mention the fact of St. Peter's being in Rome. With regard to the Acts, any one who will carefully read it will see that St. Luke narrates the acts of St. Paul. It was necessary to begin with some account of the commencement of the church to show St. Paul's connection with it. This St. Luke does, speaking of the descent of the Holy Ghost, of the instantaneous and marvelous results of the preaching of St. Peter, of his admission of the Gentiles after the vision of the cloth containing all manner of animals, and then passes on to speak of St. Paul, of his persecution of the church, of the martyrdom of St. Stephen, of the wonderful conversion of St. Paul. Here St. Paul is brought into contact with St. Peter; but after the Council of Jerusalem, when St. Paul sets out to evangelize the heathen, St. Peter is no more heard of, not even when St. Paul returns to Jerusalem, as narrated in chapter xxi. Was he dead? Had this been so ere St. Paul left Judæa, from his intimate contact with St. Peter, it is probable St. Luke would have mentioned a fact so important as the death of the first of the apostles. He was not dead. He and the other apostles no longer appear in the narration of St. Luke, if we except St. James, Bishop of Jerusalem, whom St. Paul saw (chapter xxi.), because St. Luke did not propose to give a complete history of the church at that time, or of the apostles, but only of St. Paul and his acts. The Acts are contained in twenty-eight chapters. In chapter vii., v. 57, Saul the persecutor is spoken of for the first time; in the next four chapters he is frequently mentioned. In

the xv., St. Peter is mentioned for the last time; and from this to the xxviii. St. Paul is the theme of the inspired writer. In the 15th verse of chapter xxviii. the Christians go out to meet Paul at Forum Appii, and in verse 16 he is in Rome a prisoner; verse 7 shows him to us calling together not the Christians, but the chief men of the Jews, to explain that he has not appealed to Cæsar because he had anything against his people. After these words, at verse 21, the Jews reply to him, and he instructs or upbraids them as far as verse 29, which represents the Jews going away incredulous. Verse 30 says: "He remained two years in his own hired house, and received all who came unto him; 31, Preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching with all confidence, and without prohibition, the things that are of the Lord Jesus Christ." Here the Acts ends. Does there seem to the reader any place in these two verses for a mention of Peter? Ought the inspired writer to have added more to his account? It seems to us not, for the end he had in view was gained. He had been a companion of St. Paul, he had told those who knew it not what had happened in their travels, and now St. Paul was in Rome, and dwelling there, in the centre of the world, he did not deem it needful to say any more, otherwise he would have told us some of the actions of St. Paul, for wonders and conversions he certainly wrought in those two years. But as St. Luke says nothing about these, nor about the flourishing Church of Rome to which St. Paul two years before had addressed his Epistle from Corinth, it is not strange he says nothing about St. Peter.

The silence of St. Paul in regard to St. Peter in his Epistle to the Romans, is not only of no avail to our adversaries, but the Epistle itself contains matter for strong argument that St. Peter was permanently in Rome, and in fact founded the church there.

First, with respect to the silence of St. Paul in regard to St. Peter. It is a received canon of criticism that the silence of authors does not affect the existence of a fact, when that fact is proven from documents of weight; and this all the more when no valid reason can be put forward to show the author or authors should have mentioned the fact in question. Now, this is precisely the case with regard to St. Paul's silence about St. Peter. We have documentary and monumental evidence, as we shall see hereafter, that St. Peter did come to Rome, while there was no practical reason why St. Paul should mention St. Peter:—not for the sake of commending him, for that was neither becoming, as St. Peter was head of the apostolic college, nor necessary, as St. Peter's works bore the stamp of divine sanction; not for the purpose of asking permission to labor in Rome, as the apostles were equal in the ministry, and united in a bond of perfect harmony and mutual understanding, though with subjection to the centre of unity, St. Peter, without, however, the distinctions of the various rights and duties afterwards introduced by ecclesiastical custom; not for the purpose of salutation, for he could not address St. Peter as head of the church in a tone of authoritative teaching; and salutations, if, contrary to what is generally held, Peter were in Rome at the time the letter was written, could be made privately by the messenger who carried the letter,

and thus the duty of urbanity or charity, the only one that could require express notice of St. Peter, may have been fulfilled. In fact, propriety itself required this latter mode of salutation, lest it should be said that St. Paul, instead of having directly addressed St. Peter, had saluted him publicly through those to whom he wrote—the Christians of Rome, the spiritual subjects of St. Peter. The silence, then, of St. Paul is of no weight to prove St. Peter never was in Rome.

The argument of silence therefore falls to the ground.

We said the Epistle to the Romans contains matter to show St. Peter was in Rome, and founded the church there.

Let us bear in mind who St. Paul was—the Apostle of the Gentiles. Why was it he did not go at once to the centre of the Gentile world? Could any more potent means have been adopted to spread Christianity? There centred the civilization of the known world; there the Ethiopian met the Scythian, the swarthy men from the banks of the Ganges were face to face with those who first saw light by the waters of the Tagus, and the Numidian horseman and the German warrior strolled through the Forum, admiring the temples of the gods of Rome. Nowhere was there more certainty of success in spreading abroad novelty of any kind than in this Babylon, receiving into its vast enclosure men of all the nations over which it ruled, and sending them forth again filled with wonder at what they saw, and eager to impart to their less fortunate countrymen what they had learned in their sojourn in the great city. Thither, however, St. Paul did not go, and why? Because some one was there

already—some one of power and authority; some one whose labors had been crowned with success, and who had built up a church, the faith of which at the time this epistle was written was known throughout the whole world. St. Paul tells us himself he desired to go to the Romans to impart to them something of spiritual grace to strengthen them, that is, to be comforted in them "by that which is mutual—your faith and mine." The mode of expression of St. Paul in this place, vv. 11 and 12, is worthy of notice. He says to the Romans he longs to see them to *strengthen them*, and, as if he might be misunderstood, he adds immediately, "*that is to say*, that I may be comforted together in you." Evidently he speaks here as one who is careful lest he seem to usurp the place of another, or assume a right of teaching with authority which belonged to another. He would not have the Romans think he considers that the one who rules them is inferior to himself or stands in need of his support. In verse 18 he says: "I do not wish you to be ignorant, brethren, that I have often proposed to come unto you (and I have been prevented hitherto) that I may have some fruit among you as among other peoples." It is manifest here that St. Paul's duties with the Greeks kept him from going to Rome, and this, as we said before, because, the Romans being already provided with one who could teach them, there was not the pressing need of him that would make him leave those who had none to preach to them.

What we have said with regard to the tone of the first chapter of the Epistle is confirmed by the words of the apostle in chapter xv. 19–26. Here St. Paul

says why he had not gone to Rome—because he was preaching to those *who had no one to preach to them.* Had the Romans had no apostle preaching to them, this would not have been a reason to put forward, because the superiority of an apostle over any other preacher of the word was such as to do away with the necessity of any comparison, and to make all desirous in an eminent degree of seeing and hearing the chosen man, the sound of whose voice was to be heard throughout the whole world. St. Paul then continues: "When I shall begin to take my journey into Spain, I hope *that as I pass*, I shall see you, and be brought on my way thither by you, if first, in part, I shall have enjoyed you." From this it results, first, that St. Paul had no intention of remaining in Rome; and, secondly, that what he desired was to enjoy, in meeting the Romans, the consolation of seeing their faith, and of sharing with them the spiritual gifts he himself had received, which should serve to make them yet more steadfast in their fidelity to the Gospel, precisely as, to use an example, the preaching of the same doctrine they have heard from their own bishop, by a bishop who is his guest, strengthens the faithful in their religious belief.

The fact, then, stands that a flourishing church existed in Rome at the time St. Paul wrote his Epistle, and this is still further shown by the salutations in the last chapter. Who founded it? History is silent regarding any one but St. Peter. As Alexandria claims St. Peter and St. Mark; as Ephesus, St. John; as innumerable other cities and countries their respective apostles, so does Rome claim St. Peter as its first

evangelizer. It would be absurd to say that all these other cities and nations could retain the memory of him who first preached to them the word of God, and Rome—the greatest of all, where so notorious a fact as the preaching of Jesus Christ could not pass by unnoticed, especially when its effects were so luminously conspicuous as St. Paul tells us they were—this Rome should alone be ungratefully forgetful of her best benefactor. The thing is absurd on the face of it. But history is silent about any other founder except St. Peter; therefore we are justified in concluding that St. Peter, and St. Peter alone, was the original founder of the Church of Rome, and that Rome is right in holding her tradition that such was the fact.

This tradition of St. Peter's having been in Rome, having founded the church there, and having died there, gives strength to the conclusion which Scripture has aided us to form. To any one who is at all conversant with Rome, it must always have appeared a very remarkable fact that the discoveries made by the zeal of her archæologists have, as a rule, confirmed the traditions existing among the people both with regard to localities and facts. It would seem as if Providence, in these days of widespread scepticism, were unearthing the long-hid monuments of the past to put to confusion those who would fain treat the history of early ages as a myth. The monuments stare them in the face, while their value is understood by men of sound practical sense. This is the reason of the reaction that is taking place against the sceptical style of writing history which Niebühr and Dr. Arnold adopted, and made to a certain extent fashionable. The words of a

well-informed writer, whose works have been deservedly well received—Mr. Dyer—are an excellent reply to authors of that stamp, based, as they are, on sound sense and the experience of mankind—the safest guides we can possibly follow; for it is folly to think that those who have gone before us blindly received everything that was told them. Whatever may have happened with regard to individuals, such certainly never was the case with regard to all. As well might we say that, because some writers of to-day speak in a spirit of scepticism, all writers adopt the same style. Men in general never were sceptical, and never will be; they will use their senses and their intellect, and judge of things on their merits, and not according to the extravagant ideas of any one, however brilliant he be. Mr. Dyer, though speaking of ancient Roman history, makes remarks that are applicable in our case. He says, in the Introduction to the *History of the City of Rome*, p. xvi.: "It would, of course, be impossible to discuss in the compass of this Introduction the general question of the credibility of early Roman history. We can only state the reasons which have led us to doubt a few of the conclusions of modern critics about some of the more prominent facts of that history, and about the existence or the value of the sources on which it professes to be founded. If it can be shown that the attempts to eliminate or to depreciate some of these sources can hardly be regarded as successful, and that the general spirit of modern criticism has been unreasonably sceptical and unduly captious with respect to the principal Roman historian, then the author will at least have established what, at all events, may serve

as an apology for the course he has pursued." And at page lxii.: "There is little motive to falsify the origin and dates of public buildings; and, indeed, their falsification would be much more difficult than that of events transmitted by oral tradition, or even recorded in writing. In fact, we consider the remains of some of the monuments of the Regal and Republican periods to be the best proofs of the fundamental truth of early Roman history." If this author could justly speak in this manner of a period regarding which there is certainly not a little obscurity, what are we to say when we are speaking of so well-known an epoch as that of the Roman Empire under Claudius and Nero, and of a fact so luminous as that of the foundation of Christianity in the capital of the world? The certainty of the traditions concerning this fact undoubtedly acquires a strength proportionally greater, and this all the more because we have the monuments around which these traditions centre, and the existence of these monuments in the second century is attested by the Roman priest Caius writing against Proclus, apud Eusebium, *Hist. Eccl.*, c. xxv.: "I can," he writes, "show you the trophies (tropæa) of the apostles. For, whether you go to the Vatican or to the Ostian Way, the trophies of those who founded the church will present themselves to your view." These monuments are the place of imprisonment of St. Peter, the place of his crucifixion, that of the martyrdom of St. Paul, the place of their burial, that in which their remains were deposited for a time, and their final resting-place, over which the grandest temple of the earth rises in its majesty—a witness of the belief of all ages

The tradition of St. Peter having founded the church in

Rome receives additional force from the fact that but a short period elapsed before writers whose genuine works have come down to us recorded them, and thus transmitted them to us. Not to speak of St. Clement of Rome, of St. Ignatius of Antioch, of Papias, we take the words of St. Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, who was martyred in the year 202 of the Christian era. We omit speaking of the other fathers, not because we consider their testimony without great value, for it is impossible, in our judgment, for any one who takes up their works with an unprejudiced mind, and reads them in connection with later and more precise writers on this subject, not to feel that they refer to a matter so universally and thoroughly known as not to need any further dwelling on than would a fact well known to a correspondent, demand details from the person who writes him the letter. St. Irenæus, we said, died in the year 202. He had been for a long time Bishop of Lyons, whence he wrote to St. Victor, pope, on the subject of the controversy regarding the celebration of Easter, dissuading him from harsh measures with respect to the Christians of the East. St. Victor was pope from the year 193 to 202, and succeeded Eleutherius, who became pope in the year 177. To this latter Irenæus was sent by the clergy of Lyons in the case of the Montanist heresy, he having been received and ordained priest of the diocese of Lyons by the Bishop Photinus, and it was during the pontificate of the same pope that he wrote his celebrated work against heresies. He was at this time not a young man, and we shall not be wide of the mark if we put his birth some years before the middle of the second century, and this all the more because he himself in the above-mentioned

book speaks of his early studies as gone by. According to the best authorities, St. John the Apostle was ninety years old when he was thrown into the caldron of boiling oil, under Domitian, in Rome. He lived several years longer at Patmos, and at Ephesus, where he died in the year 101, during the reign of Trajan. We have thus a period of from thirty to forty years between the death of St. John—the witness of what SS. Peter and Paul did, and who was fully acquainted with all that had occurred at Rome—and Irenæus. Independent of the means of information this proximity to the apostles gave him, both because in his youth he must have known many who had in their own youth seen and heard St. Peter, and because he had himself visited Rome, the interval between him and St. John is filled up by the link that unites them in an unbroken tradition, by the celebrated martyr and Bishop of Smyrna, St. Polycarp, the disciple of St. John and the master of St. Irenæus. We ask the reader to say, in all candor, whether this link be not all that can be desired to secure belief in the testimony handed down through it, from the apostles, especially with regard to such a thing as the chief theatre of the life, labors, and death of the head of the apostolic college. Anticipating a favorable answer, we proceed to give the words of St. Irenæus—of undoubted authenticity. In his work, *Contra Hæreses*, l. iii. c. i., he writes: "Matthew among the Hebrews composed his Gospel in their tongue, while Peter and Paul were evangelizing at Rome and founding the church. After their decease, Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, committed to writing what had been preached by Peter." In the same book, c. iii. § 3, St. Irenæus says: "But since it is too long to enumerate in

a volume of this kind the successions of all the churches, pointing to the tradition of the greatest, most ancient and universally known, founded and constituted at Rome, by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, to that which it has from the apostles, and to the faith announced to men, through the succession of bishops coming down to our time, we put to confusion all who in any manner, by their own self-will, or through empty glory, or through blindness, or from malice, gather otherwise than they should. For to this church, by reason of its more powerful headship (principalitatem), it behooves every church to come, that is, those who are faithful everywhere, in which (in qua) has always been preserved by men of every region the tradition which is from the apostles." He goes on to say: "The holy apostles, founding and building up the church, gave to Linus the episcopate of administration of the church. Paul makes mention of this Linus in his letters to Timothy. To him succeeded Anacletus; after him, in the third place from the apostles, Clement (who also saw the apostles, and conferred with them) obtained the episcopate, while he yet had the preaching of the apostles sounding in his ears and tradition before his eyes; not he alone, for there were many then living who had been taught by the apostles. Under this Clement, therefore, a not trifling dissension having arisen among the brethren who were at Corinth, the church which is at Rome wrote a very strong letter, etc. . . . To this Clement succeeded Evaristus, and to Evaristus Alexander, and afterwards the sixth from the apostles was Sixtus, and after him Telesphorus, who also gloriously suffered martyrdom; and then Hyginus, next Pius, after

whom Anicetus. When Soter had succeeded Anicetus, now Eleutherius has the episcopate in the twelfth place from the apostles. By this order and succession, that tradition which is from the apostles in the church, and the heralding of the truth, have come down to us. And this is a most full showing that one and the same is the life-giving faith which from the time of the apostles down to the present has been preserved and delivered in truth. And Polycarp, not only taught by the apostles, and conversing with many of those who saw our Lord, but also constituted by the apostles bishop in Asia, in the church which is at Smyrna, *whom we also saw in our early youth*, taught always the things he had learned from the apostles, which also he delivered to the church, and which are alone true. To these things all the churches, which are in Asia, and those who up to to-day have succeeded to Polycarp bear witness." And in his letter to Florinus St. Irenæus says more explicitly that he was a disciple of Polycarp, that he had a most vivid recollection of his master, of his ways and words, which he cherished more in his heart even than in his memory.* Eusebius, in the *Chronicon*, says that Polycarp was martyred in the year 169, the seventh of Lucius Verus.

Nothing clearer, more explicit, or of greater value than a tradition with such links as St. John the Evangelist, St. Polycarp, and St. Irenæus could be desired to establish beyond a doubt that St. Peter came to Rome and founded the church there.

This fact having been shown to rest on a solid basis,

* See *Op. S. Irenæi*, Ed. Cong. S. Mauri, Ven. an. 1734.

we have now to say a word with regard to the time at which St. Peter came to Rome. On this point there is a difference of opinion; but this very difference of opinion as regards the epoch is a new proof of the fact. The most probable opinion, that which seems to have found most favor, fixes it at the year 42 of the Christian era, the second year of Claudius. This is what St. Jerome, following Eusebius, records. The learned Jesuit Zaccaria puts it at the year 41, in the month of April, the 25th of which was kept as a holyday, in the time of St. Leo the Great, in honor of St. Peter. This writer bears witness to the very remarkable unanimity among the fathers with respect to the twenty-five years' duration of the pontificate of St. Peter in Rome, which according to St. Jerome would fix the date of his death as the fourteenth year of Nero, the 67th of the present era. The words of St. Jerome are: "Simon Peter went to Rome to overthrow Simon Magus, and had there his sacerdotal chair for twenty-five years, up to the last year of Nero, that is, the fourteenth; by whom also he was crowned with martyrdom by being affixed to the cross."* St. Jerome, we know, was well versed in the history of the church, had dwelt for a long time at Rome, and may consequently be presumed to have been excellently well informed with regard to the general belief and tradition of the people of Rome. The manner of the death of both apostles is mentioned by Tertullian, in his book *De Præscriptionibus*, c. 126, where, after bidding those he addresses have recourse to the apostolic churches, he

* *De Viris Illustribus*, c. i.

says: "If you be near to Italy, you have Rome, whence also we have authority. How happy is this church, for which the apostles poured forth all their doctrine with their blood, where Peter equals his Lord's Passion, where Paul is crowned with the end of John (the Baptist), where the Apostle John, after suffering no harm from his immersion in the fiery oil, is banished to an island." Origen, too, says: "Peter is thought to have preached to the Jews throughout Pontus, Galatia, Bythinia, Cappadocia, and Asia; who, when he came to Rome, was finally affixed to the cross with his head down." *

Before concluding what we have undertaken to say on the subject of St. Peter's coming to Rome, we wish to notice the objection against this fact, and the duration of his pontificate, which must naturally appear to those not well acquainted with antiquity, one of not a little strength. How could St. Peter hold the primacy at Rome, when the Acts represents him continually as in Judæa, among those of his nation to whom he had, as St. Paul says, a peculiar mission, the apostleship of circumcision? We reply, first: that the apostleship of St. Peter to the Jews did not exclude his labors with the Gentiles; in fact, we know from the Acts that St. Peter had a vision which led him to work for the latter, and that vision was immediately followed by the admission, by St. Peter himself, of the centurion Cornelius. Moreover, it is well known that there were Jews dispersed throughout the world, to whom St. Peter is said to have gone, as we have

* *Ap. Eusebium*, H. E. lib. iii. c. i.

shown—in Pontus and the other countries of Asia Minor; and also in Rome they were numerous. Duty therefore, both to the Jew and Gentile, could and did lead St. Peter to Rome.

We say, secondly: there is no difficulty in the fact of St. Peter having been often in Judæa. The apostles, from their very charge, were obliged to travel much; and the sound of their voice was heard in every land. As is narrated of them, they divided the nations among them; and, burning with the fire of zeal sent down upon them on the day of Pentecost, they went about, everywhere kindling in others the flame that burned within themselves. As for the difficulties or facilities of travel, especially in the case of St. Peter, we cannot do better than to cite the words of the learned Canon Fabiani in his *Discussion* with those who impugned the coming of St. Peter to Rome. In the authentic report of this discussion, page 52, he says: "How many days were required for a journey from Cæsarea to Rome? Little more than fifteen days. . . . Lately very learned men among Protestants, and at the same time men thoroughly skilled in what regards the seafaring art, Smith and Penrose, have calculated from the very voyage of St. Paul, and from the narrations in the Acts, the time that vessels took to come from Cæsarea to Rome. They went at the rate of seven knots an hour, so that it took one hundred and seventy-seven hours, or seven days and a third, to come from Cæsarea to Pozzuoli; and Pliny himself assures us that vessels came from Alexandria to Pozzuoli in nine days, from Alexandria in Egypt in nine days, and from Alexandria to Messina in seven days. Cæsarea and

Jerusalem, you know, differ but little in distance to Rome, from Alexandria in Egypt. The journey from Messina and Pozzuoli to Rome was made in about two or three days, so that the whole time required to go from Rome to Jerusalem was not more than half a month." It is easy then, to understand how St. Peter could be often in Judæa, though he had fixed his permanent residence in Rome.

To sum up what we have been saying, no argument can be had from the silence of Scripture to prove St. Peter never came to Rome, because the Acts and Epistle to the Romans do not cover the whole epoch of St. Peter's apostleship. Moreover, the silence of Scripture does not prove that St. Peter did not rule the Church of Rome twenty-five years, because, as we have shown, there was no reason why either the Acts or the Epistle to the Romans should speak of St. Peter's going to Rome and being there. What we have here asserted is all the more true because we have positive testimony not only with regard to St. Peter's coming to Rome, but also respecting the date of his coming, the period of his ruling the church there, the time and the manner of his death there, and because we have the monuments recording the memory of the Apostles Peter and Paul, the trophies of the apostles, as Caius calls them, *tropæa apostolorum*, which exist to this day, surrounded by the marks of veneration and the pious traditions of the people of Rome. Against all these proofs difficulties of history and chronology are of no avail; for, in the first place, the very difficulties and discussions only serve to confirm the fact, especially since these difficulties and

discussions have lasted for fifteen centuries without bringing about the rejection of the main fact; in the next place, we know there are many well-established facts regarding which there exist difficulties to clear up, and this nowhere more than in past history. When we have proved by one solid, unanswerable argument a fact, we should not trouble ourselves much regarding what may be brought against it. The elucidation of knotty points may delight us and reward the labors of the erudite; for common practical use the matter is settled; and any one who rises up against it must not wonder if he be looked on as either not well informed, or, to say the least, eccentric.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

VIII.

COLLEGE EDUCATION.

(The Catholic World, September, 1877.)

THE schools of the country have held their days of exhibition or of graduation, the young men are enjoying their holidays, and the teachers are preparing themselves for a new year of work. It would seem to be a favorable moment to say a word about the question that more or less occupies all who think seriously of the future—education. This word, so often used, conveys different ideas, according to the person who speaks. Its etymology undoubtedly gives it a certain definite meaning: *educo, erudiri* are two words that signify the bringing forth from a negative state to a positive one—from ignorance and rudeness to knowledge and culture. But this general idea does not cover the whole matter. We have to consider the end to which this process is directed in order to have an adequate idea of what it should be. Now, this end we shall have clearly before us if we call to mind the end for which man is here on earth. Christians all acknowledge and teach that man is here to know, love and serve God and save his soul. These two, therefore—redemption from ignorance and a rude state, and the end for which man is here—give us the right idea of

what education ought to be. The appreciation of both will enable us to avoid two fatal obstacles—presumption and error. The proper state of mind of any one beginning a course of education is the recognition of his want of knowledge. There is nothing so hurtful as a spirit of pride; for this blinds the mind, makes one overweeningly confident of his powers, attached to his own opinions, and loath to receive instruction. We have heard in our day young people discussing the question whether a man were not able to work out the most difficult problems of human science of himself; whether he absolutely stood in need of the guidance of others; and whether there were any branch of human knowledge or achievement of past times *any one* might not be able to attain to or accomplish, provided he turned his attention to it, and circumstances were favorable. And when a young man had succeeded in mastering a certain amount of learning or science, we have been witnesses of the very remarkable phenomenon of seeing him set himself up as one whose opinion should cut short every discussion, and form the law of belief or action for those around him. Any one having had any experience of truly learned men, who even may not have been models of virtue, must have been struck at the humility of mind they give proof of. They, more than others, appreciate how little they know of what it is possible to know; they see the vast field of knowledge of which they individually can cultivate but a part, and common sense keeps them from thinking themselves possessed even of all that can be known of what they are actually engaged in. They agree in spirit with the celebrated master of Plato, whose saying is familiar to us: "I know only this: that I know

nothing." The first requisite, therefore, for sound education is a humble state of mind, a disposition to be taught and receive the lessons with docility—a disposition not only needful in a beginner, but required even more the further one advances into the domain of knowledge. When one adds to the original and relative ignorance of us all the further fact of the ease with which we go astray, fall into error—a facility so great as to have given rise to the adage in universal use, "*Humanum est errare*" —it is impossible a man of sense should not recognize the necessity of keeping down the spirit of pride and self-confidence, and confess that, in not having controlled himself in this respect, he has given the most complete proof of the adage in his own case. We are therefore all in the same condition, all in need of learning, and stand in want of a teacher to instruct us and lead us in the path of truth. What is the truth we are to seek after, who the teacher we are to go to, results from the study of the end to which education is to be directed. We have seen that the end of man is to know, love, and serve God and save his soul, and this tells us what education should be. Anything that conflicts with this end is to be rejected; whatever aids us in attaining it is to be embraced; and as all truth is in harmony with that end, it follows that education can embrace all sciences that are truly such, while it must eliminate all error; for error has a logical effect of keeping us from the attainment of that end, especially where that error regards the higher branches of speculative education.

Here, then, comes in the most important element in the education of man—religion; religion, that is, to teach his head and train his heart. If, as is most certainly the

fact, man was made for God and for immortal life hereafter, education that would exclude this element—religion—which regulates the relations of man with God, and teaches him how he may gain that everlasting state for which he has been created, is wanting most deplorably in the one thing needful. Such an education fits a man only for matter; is of the earth earthy. It has no higher aim than the objects around him; it is a guide that does not bring into the presence of the King, but takes one no further than the domain over which the King's power is exercised. However much it may delight the eye with grandeur of scenery, proofs of power and of wisdom, it has no right or ability to introduce into a close communion with the Sovereign, the source of all it beholds. It is simply an unworthy servant banished forever from the face of his Master. This kind of education, which we shall style secular, professedly excludes all religious control of any kind whatsoever, and it consequently relies only on reason and scientific examination. Now, reason has been found wanting. In the brightest examples of pagan times, familiar to students of history, are to be found not only actions nature itself condemns, but principles laid down by them subversive of natural society and of all Christian virtue—pantheism and immorality. And we owe it to Christianity that we have been rescued from the social life in which such principles prevailed and were in practice. Any one nowadays who knows something of men will bear witness to the fact that both the one and the other—pantheism and immorality—are on the increase and show themselves publicly in the speech of the men and women of to-day. This can be owing only to one cause—the divorce of religion from

education. And because this is so, because secular education does not lead us to God, but takes us from Him, a dividing line must be drawn between religious education and secular education ; an insuperable barrier exists between them, which must and ought to keep all that believe in revelation on the side of a training under the eye of religion. And if this be the case with regard to all who profess belief in Christ, how much truer is it with reference to those who have given their names to the Catholic Church and look to her infallible voice for their guidance ! In saying this we do not wish to speak disparagingly of the learning, the ability, or the zeal of those engaged in the cause of education who are not with us. We respect all those who are striving to increase the treasure of human knowledge or dispense it to their fellow-men. We join hands with all who are earnest in their study of true science, and rejoice in their success. We have no right to question their sincerity. But between their efforts and success in discovery, or in acquiring and imparting learning, and the way in which they educate, there is a difference most vital and essential. The one investigates the works of the Creator, while the other leads men practically, where it does not absolutely tell them as much, to ignore the Creator himself. Godless science can only fill a man with himself, while it offers no guarantee for the preservation of his morals and the attainment of his last end.

On the other hand, religion goes before the education which is allied with her. With her torch of faith she illumes the darkness of men's minds. She shows them how much more beautiful is the Author of all the beautiful things they contemplate than are the objects

themselves. She makes them behold in him the original essential beauty of which the universe is only a faint participation, and yearn for the possession of that Beauty and sovereign Good she tells them is within their reach; and she shows them how, under her direction, they may not be carried away by transient allurements, by what they see around them, but attain to an indissoluble union with that Beauty and sovereign Good—with God himself.

But it may be said religion has nothing to do with natural science; it cramps man's mind, fetters his intellect, stops his investigation. It will do well enough in its sphere, but its action is hurtful to scientific pursuits.

Is this true? It is not true; and we can refute the charge by principle and by fact.

All that exists belongs to God. All science, all truth comes from Him, the great First Cause, from whom all things proceed, in whom there can be no contradiction. His works, therefore, cannot contradict Him nor contradict each other. Natural truth and revealed truth must, then, be in harmony, and we do not fear a conflict between them. The Catholic student of science is as fearless an investigator as is his rationalist *confrère;* but the former will not rashly give himself up to speculations the other's further experience will oblige him to retract. The facts of science will never be in opposition to revelation, though the interpretation of scientific men may be, to their discomfiture later on. Even if the teacher of revelation, the church, should by any possibility, as is asserted in the case of Galileo, fail in a *disciplinary* decree with regard to scientific research, such decrees not being infallible utterances of the Holy See, there remains always the

remedy of a reversal when the incontestable proof of the contrary, such as he did not bring forward, shall be produced. So spoke Cardinal Bellarmine, one of Galileo's judges. Though we may safely say that those in charge of the interests of the church do well in being exceedingly careful how they interfere with scientific investigation, it nevertheless may become necessary at times to curb the license of those who undertake to interpret the truths of revelation according to their ideas or appreciation of science. How many scientific theories fall to pieces every day! And is it not reasonable that those who believe in a revelation should not be left at the mercy of every clever scientific man who is pleased to have a tilt against it? Let any scientific truth be fully proved, and the Catholic Church will be the first to applaud, for it redounds to the glory of her Head.

We need not, however, confine ourselves to this negative way of advocating the cause of revelation as friendly to science, for there is no dearth of positive proof of the fact.

Revelation is positively of advantage to the study of science. It is clear that any one who keeps me, when on a journey, from going out of my way saves me an amount of time and trouble. Instead of wandering in the woods and by-paths, I am enabled to keep the highway and so reach sooner my destination. This is one of the important services revelation renders science. It tells us: Don't direct your attention hither or thither; for you will find out you are wrong, after losing precious time and making yourself a laughing-stock. Don't go in search of the "missing link," for you won't find it.

Don't divide the unity of the human race, for it is one —of one man and one woman. Don't grovel with the materialists; for man has a spirit, and he is destined for a better life hereafter. Such like warnings we have from revelation, and, instead of going astray with evolutionists and so-called philosophers, we employ our time and talents on points that are serious and practical in science and nature; and Heaven knows there are plenty of these to engage us. The result is useful knowledge that does not undo but builds up society and perfects civilization. For this our grateful thanks are due revelation.

Then, again, revelation opens up to us new fields of thought. It gives us an insight into what we could not otherwise know. It is as if chance discovered to us some principle of art or science no one had before suspected. Once presented, reason can occupy itself on it, explore it as far as possible, make deductions and applications. How much human ethics have gained in clearness and usefulness by the light of the command to love our neighbor, and by the example of the Redeemer of man! How much speculative philosophy with regard to personality, responsibility, good and evil, and the future life! The crude theories of pagan times excite our compassion nowadays, though we honor the ability of their original propounders; yet these same theories we see now broached by those who have cast aside revelation, but often with less depth and less wisdom than the pagan in whose mind not all the light of natural religion was quenched. No! revelation is the friend of science; science divorced from religion, the vaunted glory of to-day, is the enemy of

progress; retrogade in all save the energetic talent that is lost in its service.

A few examples will show what revelation or the church has done and is doing for the cause of education; whether it has checked the development of man or favored it.

We will go to the "dark ages," in which those who oppose the church as an educator are wont to find their *cheval de bataille*, their bugbear to frighten off those inclined to trust her. We say nothing of the unfairness of Protestants who wilfully ignore the sad state of the Roman world consequent on the barbarian invasions of the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, and the struggles with the Saracens, who penetrated even into Italy—a condition of things most inimical to the quiet requisite for study; who pass over the conquest of those barbarians and their civilization by the church; who pretend to know nothing of what was done by the monks to preserve learning in their monasteries, to whom the preservation of the classic, philosophic, and ascetic works of antiquity and of the early church—the Bible among them—is due. We come to the thirteenth century. There we see, burning with a light that is celestial, a luminary not of the church only but of human reason—St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor. There was hardly a branch of intellectual pursuit of which he was not a master. His works are wonderful, and have always been a precious and useful legacy in every subsequent age. His great work, the Sum of Theology, has remained the text-book of theologians. In fact, no theologian is master of his subject who has not made St. Thomas the object of his constant

study. Though at times somewhat neglected, we may safely say that at present there is an increasing appreciation of his works. Certainly this is true of his philosophical treatise *Contra Gentiles*. There is now a widespread movement in all civilized nations to return to the use of the metaphysical and ethical teachings of St. Thomas, and it will be the means of regenerating such philosophical studies in this epoch of individual self-assertion, of *ipse dixits*, when every man of talent who lists puts forth his own hazy speculations as the truth, and strives to force down his deductions as the *ne plus ultra* of science. Domenico Soto, at the Council of Trent, defined scholastic theology to be reason illumined by faith; we may, like him, style scholastic philosophy reason kept in its right path by the torch of faith. In the works of St. Thomas will be found the refutation of the pantheism of Spinoza and the present German school, of the materialism of Hobbes and Büchner, of the utilitarian ideas of Mill, Spencer, and others of the followers of Puffendorf. We shall find, too, in his writings the ablest defence of revelation, and the sound principles that will enable us to put to flight the whole host of mythical theorists of the age. So much for theology, metaphysics, and ethics.

If we wish to speak of the work of the church in poetry, science, and literature, we have a monument of what she could do, even in the middle ages, in Dante. We hardly know which to admire most in this extraordinary man—his native genius, his extraordinary powers of imagination, the beauty of his imagery, the remarkable knowledge of theology and philosophy he exhibits in his writings, or the beauty of the language

he created. His culture was due to the church; his inspiration was drawn from revelation; and his science he drank in at the great schools established and carried on by the church in Italy, in France, and in England. So pre-eminent is this writer, philosopher, and poet, that even in the nineteenth century our own poet whose works are read and justly appreciated wherever the English language is spoken—Henry W. Longfellow—has deemed it well worthy of his own genius to be his translator. Yet Dante is the product of the Catholic Church.

But the fashion to-day is to extol physical science. Of a truth, physical science does not hold, and should not hold, the first place. If man were only matter, it might and should; but he has a soul, and the spiritual and intellectual world is his proper sphere. Scientific knowledge is useful for the arts that serve to make commerce prosper, and should be sought after; but to make commerce and what pertains to it, and the material comforts of man, the main object of his thoughts and aims is a monstrous disorder.

However, even in this sphere of physical science the church is not afraid of her competitors. We leave to one side old Friar Bacon and other patriarchs of science, and we come to our own day. The church can point to Angelo Secchi, one of the first of living astronomers and physical scientists, and a member of a society that counts among its members men distinguished in every branch of human knowledge—the Society of Jesus. So great is the pre-eminence of this distinguished *savant* in his native Italy that, since the city of Rome has been in the hands of the present

rulers, they have left nothing undone to gain him over to their side. And it is a pleasure to us to pay this public tribute to the noble fidelity he has shown to his faith, his church, and his society, giving as he does a splendid example of the alliance between the most advanced physical science and the Catholic Church.

As faithful adherents to revelation, though not Catholics, we may mention the late Prof. Faraday and the no less distinguished Dr. Carpenter, who show that revelation and science do not war against each other.

But we need not content ourselves with showing that the church is not hostile to human learning. It is easy to bring forward facts that put her before the world in her true character as the real friend of man, the guardian of his dignity, the zealous protectress of the truth of his intellect and of the freedom of his will. *In medio stat virtus*—Virtue avoids extremes. Our tendency to go wrong is by doing too much or too little, and we need something to keep us from either of these two extremes. It is here the church comes in to fulfill this friendly and much-needed office.

There was in the fourth and fifth century an intellectual movement that attributed more than its due to human nature. The Pelagian errors gave to man a power he does not possess, and those errors are very widely spread in this nineteenth century. They ignore the efficacy of grace, or the help the will stands in need of to serve God. Grace, according to their most favorable view, was only a light for the intellect. Here was an excess; too much was claimed for human nature. Such doctrine is contradicted by Scripture and by the fathers. Our Lord tells us: "I am the vine, and you

are the branches; without me you can do nothing." And St. Paul says: "We are not able to think of anything [conducive to salvation] of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." And St. Augustine, against those who spoke of some of the precepts as impossible, writes: "God does not command what is impossible; but commanding (thereby) counsels us to do what we can, to ask for aid to do what is beyond our power, and aids us that we may be able to do it." In this case we have the church curbing human pride and keeping the intellect and will within its true limits.

In the sixteenth century there was a movement, resulting from pride and rebellion, that had its own punishment in the degradation to which it reduced man's nature. Luther's dogmatic system had, and has—for it lives in Protestantism—the effect of so debasing human nature as to deny light to the intellect and power to the will to do anything that was not sinful; for he held that the will of man is essentially changed, so that it depends on who directs it, God or the devil; and, besides, whatever it does is sinful, though covered by the merits of Jesus Christ, which, like Esau's garments, prevent the knowledge or sight of the true state of things and the imputation of sin.

Here was a defect; human nature was denied some of its powers.

The church fulminated this doctrine, and taught formally that man's intellect and will, though weakened by sin and passion, are not essentially changed, and that all man's acts are not sinful. She recognized something of his original dignity in man. Hers is the spirit

of the great St. Leo, whose eloquent words made the Christians and Romans of his day remember their origin, and the height to which they had been raised by the Incarnation. He exclaims: "Remember, O man! thy dignity, and, having been made a partaker of the divine nature, return not by degenerate conversation to thy former vileness." She bade man remember that his nature, never essentially corrupt, had been purified by the grace of God, and that "in those that please God there is nothing defiled."

Luther's teachings shed a sinister influence far and wide that tainted even Catholic universities and affected writers who still professed to be in union with the church.

In the former University of Louvain, Jansenius went so far as to say that some of the Gospel precepts were impossible, and that no grace was given to fulfill them. The words that were used by St. Augustine to refute the Pelagians, were turned against Jansenius, and the voice of the church was heard anew vindicating man from the necessity of committing sin. Later on came Baius, of the same university, teaching also a doctrine of universal depravity; and the sovereign pontiff proclaimed that negative infidelity—that is, idolatry in good faith—is not a sin; that consequently those who have not grace or the illumination of faith can do many good actions, though such actions have not the merit of those which are made available through the merits of Christ. Thus again did the church prove herself the friend of human dignity.

Further on we meet those who, suffering the infection of the air caused by the doctrines of universal depravity, deny to the intellect the power of discovering the truth by itself. The traditionalists wish to trace everything to

an original revelation; man has nothing he has not received from outside. Even his knowledge of God comes from tradition. And this doctrine the church, through her supreme teacher, discountenanced. She bade them recall to mind the words of the Book of Wisdom and of St. Paul, where we are told that God can be known from the contemplation of this visible world.

We will crave indulgence if we go so far as to venture the assertion that the doctrines of Malebranche and his school had their origin in this same depreciation of the powers of the human intellect. It may be said that the idea of intuition is a nobler one than that of painful analysis and deduction; that intuition—vision—is the lot of the blessed, and therefore a higher state. But this is a state above nature, for the blessed; not a natural state in our present condition. Moreover, there are reasons to make us believe that Malebranche did not escape the infection of the world of thought prevalent in his day—the disesteem of human nature; an infection not, indeed, logically connected with the system of Luther. It was, if we may be permitted so to speak, a psychological effect—a habit of mind being induced, whereby one was led so to think. This would appear to be evidenced by his doctrine of occasionalism, which made God always acting because man could not—a doctrine the authority of the church obliged him to modify, for he would thereby have made God the author of sin. Though no official condemnation of the theories of Malebranche, regarding the primary mode of knowing truth, has ever been given by the church, or is at all likely to be given, the deductions of certain of his followers have been condemned; and it is well known that the weight of the influence of the

Holy See has been cast in the scale of the psychological theories of St. Thomas, whose principle, clearly laid down, is: "Operatio intellectus præexigit operationem sensus"—"The operation of the intellect prerequires the operation of sense"—I. 2, quæst. iii. art. 3, resp. And in his first part, quæst. xviii. art. 2, he writes: "Intellectus noster qui proprie est cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii objecti, accipit a sensu: cujus propria objecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est, quod ex his quæ exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam essentiam rei"—"Our intellect, that properly takes cognizance of what a thing is (its essence) as its proper object, receives of the senses, the proper objects of which are external accidents. Hence it is that from what appears externally in a thing we come to know its essence." Of course sense is to be taken in its widest meaning, so as not to exclude the perception of the modifications going on in our internal being, which are the accidents of our spiritual essence. Man, therefore, has no natural revelation, but he arrives at knowledge by the essentially inherent powers of his mind—perception, abstraction, generalization. God sees by intuition everything in himself—this is essential in him; created intellects see what is, or intellectual truth, the archetype in God, reflected from creation as from a mirror.

From these instances, then, it is evident that the church has always been the friend of human nature, asserting for it the possession of faculties denied it, protecting it from error, and guiding it in the search of truth. She is, therefore, worthy of the gratitude of mankind for what she has done in the cause of education, as well as of the confidence of men as an instructor of youth in the future.

We come now to a more directly practical part of our assumed task, and shall consider it our duty to speak plainly, and perhaps in a way to be censured by some; but we do it in what seems to us the interest of our people and country. The Rev. Father T. Burke, O.S.D., while in this country some years ago, addressing a society of young men, told them that Americans could not expect to take their position among the civilized nations of the world unless they studied, and studied not superficially but well. For our part, we thank him for this word. It is time to put out of our heads that we are the most cultivated, civilized, well-informed people of the world. We are not. Alongside the generality of the educated men of Europe, the generality of the educated men of America do not appear to advantage. Who and what is to blame for this?

In the first place, we blame parents. They ought to know better; they have had experience of the world. They are the natural guardians of their offspring, and should provide by their experience a remedy for the inexperience of youth. Yet they, and especially Catholic parents, are those who put the greatest obstacles in the way of those engaged in teaching. They want their boys hurried through school; they can't see the use of Latin, much less of Greek. As for philosophy, a man can make a fortune without philosophy; as if a fortune were the only thing worth living for! If that were the case, your California stage-driver who has struck a "bonanza" is the type of what a man should be intellectually. Heaven save the mark! We have had such men say to us: "I assure you, sir, it is a very great misfortune my education was neglected; I have

wealth and don't know how to enjoy it." There are numbers of unhappy wealthy Americans traveling in Europe whose children are looking forward to brilliant futures, but who themselves rush from one place to another, tortured by the necessity of having to come in contact with educated people and learn daily their own inferiority. We have met such people, and, out of sheer pity for their unhappy lot, have done what was in our power to make them forget for a while their troubles.

The fact is, no greater boon can a wealthy parent bestow upon his child than a thorough, careful education, and every effort should be made to secure such education. And one of the first steps to be taken is that parents second the efforts of zealous educators in our Catholic institutions. These institutions have their defects, but those defects can hardly be remedied without the co-operation of parents. What that co-operation should be will be seen further on.

There are defects in our institutions of education. This is our next point. These defects are in the manner of teaching and in what is taught.

We acknowledge that there have been great improvements in the manner of teaching since we were boys; but with all this the want of uniformity, scarcely attainable in this country, will always leave the door open to defects in teaching. As a rule, the mind of a boy is too much taxed with speculative matter, and his memory comparatively neglected. The memory is one of the first faculties to show itself active, and it is also capable of wonderful development. In the earlier education of the child the exercise of the memory should predominate; as little strain as possible should

be put on the mind yet tender. As the education progresses the exercise of the memory should be kept up; choice extracts from the best poets and writers should alternate with the useful storing in the mind of facts and definitions. The preliminary education should consist in the learning of languages, which are means of acquiring further knowledge by intercourse and reading, not by any means the sum total of education. We wish our Catholic parents would understand this; for when a boy succeeds in knowing a little French and German they seem to think everything done. These languages are only the keys to the treasures locked up in the writings of other nations. They are principally to be acquired by memory; and, in fact, this is the way the most successful and generally used method—that of Ollendorf—adopts. There is no reason why the boy should not be put at a very early age to learning foreign languages. There is, too, one great advantage in this: that his work at such languages will be lighter and less absorbing when he comes to be engaged in scientific study. Again, care should be taken not to put into the hands of a child books of an abstruse or relatively difficult character; for excessive caution against straining the mind of such a scholar can scarcely be taken. A great deal of harm is sometimes done from the too high standard exacted by school boards of the various categories of boys. We have never ceased to praise the judicious interference of our father, who, finding us with an analytical arithmetic put into our hands at seven years of age, took it away and placed it on the highest shelf of his closet.

When a boy is well under weigh in the languages—

we do not speak of religious education, which we take for granted—he may very properly be introduced to the study of experimental science and the more difficult problems of analytical arithmetic and mathematics. But these branches should not be arranged in such a way as to compete, as it were, with that much-neglected study, so lightly thought of—mental philosophy. If one visits our different Catholic institutions of learning, and examines their system, still more looks into the practical working of it, he will find that the year of philosophy, much talked of, is employed in a most perfunctory manner. We would not be understood as attributing any *culpa theologica* to the instructors. We consider this state of things owing first to parents, and consequently to their children, and in part to the want of appreciation of the need of such philosophical training on the part of the teachers; though, also, sometimes, to want of competency in the teachers themselves, whose previous education has been on the old plan. We conceive that too great attention and zeal cannot be expended in the correction of these defects. Corrected they can be, and they must be, if we wish to take and keep our proper standing. We cannot have a university for the present, and, therefore, it is all important that the one essential thing a university can give—a higher mental training—should be given to our young Catholic men. They must receive this in our colleges; they will not have it elsewhere. Of the need of it there can be no question. The great number of able, educated Europeans who, from political causes, have had to leave their native country and come to us, and the large number of

Americans who nowadays study in European universities, all of whom, in conversation and through the press, retail to us the wildest phases of infidel, metaphysical, and social doctrine, is a sufficient argument to decide the matter, should any one hesitate. The church, to be sure, is our infallible guide, but there are many questions she does not treat, or, if she has treated them, her decisions can be understood only by careful study and explanation in the language of philosophy. So far from discouraging the study of philosophy, of metaphysics, and of ethics—possibly the more important of the two—she encourages us to make a good use of this handmaid of theology. It is, therefore, a duty incumbent on those in whose hands is placed the education of our young men to pay more attention than ever to this kind of instruction. We know of efforts in some instances that have been made in this direction, but which have failed. We are afraid they were not very numerous. In some instances a tincture of metaphysics was deemed enough; ethics were wholly neglected. How this could be has always been a puzzle to us. But it should not be any longer. A careful course of metaphysics that would embrace particularly the refutation of pantheism and materialism, besides establishing thoroughly the existence of God and the spirituality and immortality of the soul; and an equally careful course of ethics that would refute the utilitarians and socialists of the day, while making clear the claims of authority, the nature of law, the origin of right in the eternal fitness of things as seen in the divine Mind, and such kindred questions, should be the object of the most earnest solicitude of the superiors of

our Catholic colleges. The young students should be made to apply their knowledge thus received either by short compositions in addition to the repetition of the lessons taught; or, far better still, by academic exercises in which one student defends in the school-room before his teacher and fellow-students a thesis or proposition already explained, while one or two others object against it all they can think of or learn, and, this, too, in strict syllogistic form. Exercises such as these would be of the greatest advantage in training the mind to the ready use of logic, and to refuting the arguments possible to be urged against sound doctrine. Nothing better than this would tend to take away the reproach so often, and perhaps in some cases most unjustly, made against our educational institutions, of incompetency for thorough education. Did it depend on us to have the recasting of the system of education, we should be inclined to add on a year of further study as a requisite for graduation, and during the last two years of a young man's course we would employ him entirely in the study of metaphysics and ethics, including the principles of political economy, of the philosophy of history—in which the great questions of history, as far as possible, might be reviewed—and in the further polish of his literary English training. The philosophy of history is most important, for it is a powerful teacher. History is not to be studied as a bare narrative of facts; the facts have a language of their own which needs an interpreter. The polish of literary education is of great necessity, as it is the one thing those educated in the non-Catholic colleges may be said to excel us in. We do not dwell much on

scientific education, because that is really of secondary importance, and it is impossible to give boys more than an elementary training in this branch, which may serve as a groundwork for further pursuit of it, if one is destined to turn his attention in that direction. To enable the superiors of our colleges to carry out such a plan would depend upon the parents of young students having the fortitude to oblige their sons to remain the requisite time and make a diligent use of their opportunities. Herein lies their co-operation in the great work of the future education of the Catholic young men of America; and our word for it, if they follow this counsel, they will never have cause to repent. They will give us, too, far abler champions of truth than our young men have shown themselves to be in the past.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

IX.

CATHOLIC SOCIETIES.

(American Catholic Quarterly Review, April, 1879.)

BY Catholic Societies we mean those bodies of Catholics who are united together for some purpose more or less relating to religion or morality, and under the guidance and approval of the church, an approval ordinarily signified by the presence of their chaplain. Not every association of Catholics, therefore, is a Catholic society, otherwise any banking company, composed exclusively of Catholic business men, should be called a Catholic society or association. We are aware that this is sometimes done; but with bad taste, and with more or less harm to religion, often made responsible in this way for the shortcomings of individuals. We remember once reading some sharp remarks of the New York *Herald*, venting its spleen against some one by styling him "*a professional Catholic.*" It was wickedly witty. But our enemies sometimes shoot these remarks at us, not without a certain spice of truth in them. And it is to be hoped that the abuse of the word Catholic, for business or other purposes not religious, will be confined to the narrowest limits compatible with human frailty. In his late Encyclical our Holy Father, Pope Leo XIII., recognizing the existence of societies as a

special feature of this age, and deploring the evil influences under which societies generally are, which with truthful appreciation he points out, recommends as an antidote for the children of the church, the formation of other similar societies among laymen under the guidance of religion. His words are: "It seems fitting that societies of artisans and workmen be encouraged, which, placed under the guardianship of religion, may make their members content with their lot, patient under their burdens, and lead them to live a quiet and tranquil life.

The question, therefore, is not whether we should have societies, a question already practically settled, and now officially settled by the sovereign pontiff; but how are our societies to be constituted; how are they to be organized; what are the dangers they are to guard against; how are they to stand in relation to the church; how far is the church to wield her influence over them; how far are they to be allowed to take their part in solving the labor questions of the day;—all these are very important questions, which we shall strive to answer after we shall first have treated of societies in general, and the relation of the church to them in the past.

The spirit of association is in man in virtue of his very nature. Once the inhabitants of the earth became numerous, and the ties of the one family became loosened, common interest formed men into nations, and varied interests common to a number had the effect of making this number cling together, and constitute a body united together by common customs. The remains of antiquity that have come down to us

tell us of the existence of colleges of those whose pursuits were similar; the well-known college of bakers of ancient Rome, for example, and the guilds of the Middle Ages are only another confirmation of this tendency of human nature. The church, whose office is not to pervert human nature but to foster it, with her characteristic prudence took these associations under her protection and guided them in the right path, except where her influence was set at naught by the passions of men. She was herself one vast society, and the experience she had gained by centuries of experience was placed at their disposal. Even at the early period of her struggles she had within her these colleges, and in the catacombs are to be seen the representation of the *fossores*, or guardians of her cemeteries, allusions to coopers and to other tradesmen. Acting under the guidance of the Spirit dwelling in her she formed the most perfect of colleges—the Religious Order, realizing what the Tusculan philosopher had written: Omnium societatum nulla præstantior est, nulla firmior, quam cum viri boni moribus similes sunt familiaritate conjuncti. Off., lib. I.

We see, therefore, the church, given by God to govern and direct the moral order of society, taking the association of laymen under her ægis, laying down for them laws, endowing them with privileges, and giving them a canonical status, which made them respectable; securing also for them a legal entity, she conferred importance on them, giving them a legal power which checked the daring of the feudal lord who chanced to be a tyrant.

But if they were made what they became by the

power and widespread influence of the church, she did not give them full sway to do as they listed. On the contrary she curbed them by salutary restraints. From time to time it would happen that they forgot themselves, and asserted their independence of their local ecclesiastical superior. Then would come the appeal to the central authority of the church, and the decision reasserting the power of the bishop. There are some of these decisions on record, which, as interesting exemplifications of what we have said, we introduce here.

It must be remarked that these societies came to be known as Confraternities, and were instituted for all kinds of purposes, all more or less connected with religious exercises. Thus there existed at Lanciano, in Italy, a society or Confraternity, known as the society for taking care of the dead. These good people came into conflict with their archbishop, and the case went to Rome. They didn't want him to have anything to do with the election of their officers, and much less did they desire him to look into their accounts; and if he did, they wanted the work done through men of their own choosing. The Sacred Congregation of the Council, on the 20th of September, 1710, decreed, after mature deliberation: (1), that they must proceed with their election in the presence of the vicar-general, as commanded by the archbishop; (2), that an election made otherwise was invalid; (3), that the election of the officers required for its validity the confirmation of the archbishop; (4), that the society must give an account of its funds and expenses to the archbishop; (5), that the archbishop could make use of his own

agents, and was not bound to make use of those chosen by the members.

There was another society at Offida, near Ascoli, in Italy. They were also a body of men who, in like manner as the above, had as their special object to pray for the dead. They had their legal and canonical status. They differed with their bishop, and the case went to Rome. Like those just spoken of they tried to keep the bishop from having anything to do with their elections, and from auditing their accounts. The same Sacred Congregation of the Council, on the 3d and 24th of March, 1725, decreed, in answer, that the bishop, personally or by deputy, could be present at the elections; that he could remove the officers who were unfit for their place; and that the society was bound to give an account of their pecuniary administration to the bishop. It is of no use to multiply instances. These are enough to show the spirit of the church, and her mode of dealing with such societies.

The societies we have nowadays are of two kinds; one is the Confraternity, as described above; the other is the society which has no recognized legal or canonical status, but which consists of laymen united together under the patronage of the church for some beneficial purpose. They are societies for mutual aid; and that aid, according to the scope to which it tends, generally gives the name to the organization.

It is of these latter societies that we shall now especially speak, as they are those which have arisen from the circumstances of our time, the outcome of the vicissitudes of the nineteenth century.

It may prove a useful guide to us at the outset to

remember that these Catholic societies have been rendered necessary by the secret societies that have overspread the nations of the earth. They have been constituted as it were in self defence. The manner, therefore, in which secret societies have been constituted will to some extent give us a clue as to the constitution of our Catholic societies.

It is no secret that the so-called secret societies here in America are in great part merely beneficial associations, for mutual aid in sickness or distress, and especially for the advancement of business relations. That some of them, if not all, have affiliations with the secret societies of Europe, societies political and rationalistic, as well as beneficial, is a fact known to us; for we have had it from the mouth of those who, not understanding the languages of the countries through which they were journeying in Europe, found, in spite of that, the sign-manual a passport, and a command obeyed with alacrity. Their principal feature, however, here, besides their secrecy and strange forms, or rituals, is the business and beneficial feature.

From these societies, Catholics are necessarily excluded by the circumstances of the case. The oath of secrecy, and the false principles which are the basis of these societies, sapping the foundation of religion and government, have long since, as we all know, made the sovereign authority of the church condemn them formally. The exclusion in this way of Catholics makes them look around in self-defence for means of protection. The movement is general, and we should regard it with favor. Our Catholics should band together, come to each other's assistance, and give that mutual aid and

comfort, and even business help, denied them by the other social combinations of the day; for it is an undeniable fact that unless a man belong to some secret trades-union, he will hardly be able to find employment. We are the last person to wish to array our fellow-Catholics against our non-Catholic fellow-countrymen, to whom we acknowledge ourselves sincerely attached. But when we behold them acting as they do, and treating worthy men and faithful citizens with disregard, and neglect, and ostracism, because they are conscientious, then we say the time has come not to array ourselves in a hostile manner against our countrymen, but to band ourselves together in self-defence; then we say the time has come for us to stretch out our hands to each other, to employ each other, to favor each other, to form societies for mutual aid, and for mutual benefit in sickness or distress, and to further each other's business relations, to secure insurance of property or life, in a word, to form the counterpart of the associations from which the laws of the church exclude us, but without their objectionable features, and in a spirit of charity which will contrast to advantage with the spirit that animates them, and therefore not to the exclusion from employment of non-Catholics, who of course are not members of our societies.

Our societies thus constituted as to their general form are to be organized on the basis of religion. The church which is given us by God to guide us, which is God working in the midst of mankind, is our only sure corner-stone, and anything standing without her is sure to fall. We want our societies to last, to prosper, and to do a real good work. The only thing then to be

done is to make God's church, first and last, the foundation and the binding power of our fabric. The way to do this is to take as our standard the decisions and openly declared principles of the church, to make respect for her authority paramount, to resolve that a word from her will make us give up any cherished plan; and all this must be from the deepseated conviction of our faith, looking on all authority, and especially the authority of the church, as of God. Here, again, the principles that are the basis of the secret societies in general will serve as an indication to us, telling us what principles held and taught by the church are to be those especially held as guides for our Catholic societies. We find these societies standing on a selfish principle. They seek themselves at the expense of society, for they disregard the essential safeguard of society, authority, when they deem their interests require it. The history of these associations, if not here, certainly in Europe, is one of plotting against government, of thwarting of justice, of violation of trust, of violence, bloodshed, and even secret assassination. How far anything of this kind takes place here we will not go on to say. We know that the excesses of Europe have not, thus far, been imitated here; but that there is imitation to some extent of the blamable features of European secret societies in this country, is true. We shall only mention one fact to show we are not speaking wildly. A friend of ours was passing the night with a family that had given him hospitality in his journeying. The members of the family were all together talking with our friend, in saddened tones, of one of their number, who had led a bad life and, as a result, had killed a man, and was to suffer the penalty of the law by

hanging on the following day. While they were yet talking, there was a rap at the door. It was opened, and who should walk in but the condemned man himself. For a moment all were breathless; but when a near relative found words to ask him, how it was he escaped from prison, his answer was: "Had I not been a Freemason, it would have been all up with me."

It is unlawful to thwart justice; and therefore such an act as the above could not be tolerated one moment among conscientious Catholics, and could not be the act of a Catholic society, whose blazon must be *respect for authority.* In fact, this spirit of obedience and respect, and, what is more, love for authority, is a special characteristic of the True Religion. For God is the Author of all things, and the Author of all authority. He Himself is Authority itself, and any created authority is but a participation of that authority which is essentially in Him. In the same way we owe to that primal essential authority, God Himself, obedience, respect, and love, so do we owe to the created participation of it a proportionate degree of obedience, respect, and love. This is the reason why the Catholic should set himself against that spirit born of Protestantism, private judgment and self-assertion, which leads men to condemn authority, to look on it with jealousy as an enemy, and to cherish unkindly feelings towards those that exercise it, even though they exercise it justly. Catholics, on the contrary, must follow the advice of the Apostle, obey cheerfully, and from conscience, that those ruling them may discharge their onerous duties in joy, and not in sorrow.

Another dangerous principle against which Catholic societies must guard, and with regard to which they will find the church guiding them in the right way, is the leveling tendency of the day. If any one will take up the preamble of some of the trades-unions, he will find therein more or less of socialistic theory—the arraying of the working classes against the moneyed class, and it may be that he will find the condition that when a member becomes an employer, he must cease to be a member. He becomes one of the hostile class. Certainly this state of things is not Christian. We are not going to censure unduly the working class; we feel more disposed in our heart to censure the wealthy class, whose grasping at wealth has brought about this uprising against them. But undeniably both classes are wrong. Each has ignored the other; each disregards the rights of the other. As the sovereign pontiff, in the Encyclical, *Quod apostolici muneris*, beautifully and learnedly writes: "Catholic wisdom, taking its stand on the precepts of natural and divine law, has with great forethought provided for public and domestic tranquillity by means of what she believes and teaches with regard to the right of dominion, or of property, and the division of those possessions which have been gotten together for the wants and uses of life. For, while socialists traduce the right of property as an invention of man, repugnant to natural equality; and, affecting a community of goods, think that poverty is not to be borne with equanimity, but that the possessions and rights of the wealthy can be violated with impunity; the church with more propriety and utility recognizes among men, differing

naturally in the strength of their body and intellect, inequality also in the possession of property; and requires that the right of property and dominion, which is from nature itself, be for every one sacred from the hands of others and inviolate."

How true is this! One man is born almost an idiot, another with talent; will the career of these two be the same, their success the same? One man has health, the other is a cripple; will these two be equal in the results of their physical labor? One man has given him the advantages of education, and culture, and experience; the other's lot is ignorance and neglect; will their social position and influence be the same? The socialists themselves know it is their men of education that lead them; they follow.

There is no such thing as universal equality. It is a figment of the wild brain of the agitator, coquetting with the ignorance of the mass of mankind. We are equal in this, that God loves us all, wishes us all to be saved, and will judge us all according to our works, without respect of persons. We are said to be equal before the laws of our country. Beyond this, there is and can be no equality, unless you change nature, which even the socialists will not pretend they have the power of doing.

The first duty, therefore, of a Catholic society, after recognizing the right of God to our obedience, is to recognize the rights of one's neighbor, the right of property, the right to liberty undisturbed by interference of others, the right to social position, the right to influence and reputation honestly gained by talent, industry, and good conduct, the right of each one to

lead a life of tranquillity and happiness; in a word, the rule of charity which does unto others as we should wish them to do unto us—this is to be the principle of action among Catholic societies. We are to respect inviolably the rights of others as we look to having our own respected. If the Catholics who compose these societies of ours will take care to follow the decisions and teaching of their church, they will have an unerring rule, by which to discharge this great and imperative duty; while by doing so they will show themselves to be the salt of the earth.

How are Catholic societies to stand in relation to the church, is a point which may receive a different answer, according to the way in which one understands the question. We simply say, first, that every one in the church is subject to the higher powers in it, in all that relates to spiritual matters; secondly, that in what is temporal, it would seem advisable that the liberty of administering their own affairs should be interfered with as little as possible by church authority. But they should always cherish a loyal and submissive spirit towards the church, God's representative on earth. How far the church should wield her influence over them is a delicate question. But when we consider that she is given us from above as the guide to truth, there can be no other opinion but that, as the influence of the church should penetrate our whole life and influence every action of ours, in accordance with the great expression of St. Paul, "The just man liveth by faith;" so this influence should be felt in the same manner in every Catholic body of men. This influence should be represented in them by their chaplain, who,

if for no other reason, should be there to keep the members from being indoctrinated with the false notions of to-day, so easily taken up from the newspapers, even so-called Catholic newspapers, from the workshop, and from the example and principles of men of like avocations, banded together in secret organization. We consider this of the very first importance; for it cannot be denied that not a few Catholics of the lower walks of life have imbibed socialistic principles to a greater or less extent. They have forgotten their catechism, and are learning the catechism of the secret societies.

There remains one point more to be dwelt on—how far any Catholic society can be permitted to take part in meeting the labor questions of the day. The matter is a very extensive one, and we do not pretend to exhaust it in a few words. Still, certain principles can be laid down that are very important. The labor question, as understood by those who generally speak of it, is the question not of finding work, for the demand regulates the supply, but the struggle between employers and employed. It is carried on by the trades unions on the one side and capitalists on the other. The action of the union is ordinarily despotic. They settle the question of strikes, and how much is to be asked as wages. If capitalists always gave fair wages, we may confidently say there would be no need of such associations with such an aim. But it is notorious that greed of wealth does not often allow capitalists to be generous or even just. Hence the poor hardworking man seeks support in combinations and in his numbers. The order given must be carried out; the strike is ordered, and woe

to the man who will not take part in it. What is worse, if any one presumes to work in spite of the prohibition, he is made to understand that he must desist on pain of risk to life or limb, and the threat is very often carried out.

We suppose the existence of a Catholic trades-union, for our ordinary societies have nothing to do with this question; their scope lies in a different direction. Obviously, a Catholic society could not countenance active interference with the rights of others; it could not take the law into its own hands; it could not foster sedition, destruction of property, violence and bloodshed. There is one right, however, the members have, and which they could not be denied the use of. As they can hire out their labor, so if they do not think the remuneration sufficient, they can refuse to work singly, or in a body. They can use all lawful means to gain their point; but they cannot go further. But even this exercise of right might be in abeyance, owing to the danger of civil discord that might arise; and it should, therefore, be used with moderation. We apprehend that among Catholics, who are not so only in name, such a state of tension would be next to impossible; for charity on the part of the employer and reason on the part of the workman, would settle the matter at once, or prevent its coming up. Still, the conflict is possible, and the men have their right to labor or not as they wish; but, as we have said, no right beyond what the law of God, and the law of the land when not in contradiction with God's law, allows them. They could, therefore, to that extent, and to that extent alone, sympathize with their

fellow-workmen and take part in the solution of the question of just remuneration. They would, however, even in this, encounter stumbling-blocks, for they would find that many of the labor associations are led on by men whose principles are socialistic, and they would for this reason find that many propositions are broached and measures initiated which would not observe the just and natural relations of labor and capital. In reality the laborer has no right to a cent more than he has contracted for. He is at liberty not to enter into the contract; once he has done so he must keep his word.

We do not refer to instances of grinding exaction on the part of employers taking advantage of the poverty of their employees. But we speak of those who aspire to get possession of their employer's goods, to have a community of goods. They form their own ideas of how much they ought to have of the profits, and take advantage of their employer's straits to force him to terms. This is what checks industry, and contributes to people the country with tramps. Ordinarily speaking, the daily support of the man himself and of his wife and children, ought to be the least remuneration a good workman should receive; what his wife could make should go to provide for the future. Skilled labor should, of course, receive proportionately more. Once workmen receive this amount they have no just reason to complain. They should stifle envy, and, to use the words of Pope Leo XIII., learn to live contented with the lot God has given them. What will certainly make the Catholic workman so live is the truth so beautifully announced by the Apostles:

we have no permanent citizenship here, but we look for another. We are not here forever; we are journeying to our real country and home, the hereafter; and our status or condition there depends not on worldly wealth or influence, but upon our works done here, so that it is in every man's power to secure for himself a high position and a great degree of glory in his true home. If any man will keep this well before his eyes he will find it a powerful help to make him content with the station of life Providence has allotted him.

We close these few remarks with an observation regarding the importance of our Catholic societies looking to the church more than ever for guidance. There never was a period when wilder theories were broached, more extensively circulated, or more read by the people. In our own midst we have hosts of Europeans, many of them clever and well-educated, who were forced to leave their respective countries because of their efforts to overthrow social order. These men have become editors of newspapers, and have been feeding our simpler American population with what they call their advanced ideas, till we hardly recognize the land of our youth. These false ideas in religion and in the social order the church examined thoroughly where they first arose. She has condemned them, and her condemnation has been met with an acknowledgment that she has spoken truly, but at the same time with a cry of defiance. Let us, therefore, stand to this church, which has the Spirit of Wisdom from above; let us have as our compass the Syllabus of the great Pius IX.; let us reverently receive and emblazon on our banner the late Encyclical of the learned Leo XIII.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

X.

THE FREQUENCY OF SUICIDE.

(*The Catholic World, February*, 1882).

THERE has just now been published by Appleton & Co. an abridged English translation of Professor Morselli's work on the frequency of suicide. It is a carefully-prepared work, based, as the author tells us, on the analysis of facts which lead him to his synthetical conclusions. There is a great array of statistics which he acknowledges are not altogether what he could desire —not always corresponding in date and period. Still, it is a very valuable collection, and, though it may be said statistics mislead, we think in this case they cannot mislead substantially, and we can therefore trust the learned professor in his presentation of them and in many of his deductions; others we can learn from the facts ourselves.

The first conclusion at which he arrives, as others have done before him, and which he proves by his tables, is that from the beginning of the present century there has been a steady increase in suicide. This is a fact; and he shows that the latest statistics tell of the highest increase.

What is the meaning of this frightful and most abnormal development of human society? Can anything be

imagined more out of keeping with all the theories of progress, enlightenment, and culture? We thought we were, in this nineteenth century, in the most prosperous and happy period of the existence of our race since man first appeared upon this planet! And yet here are men putting a stop to all progress, enlightenment, and culture by taking a plunge in the dark—in fact, putting an end to their existence. If this is not a comment on our civilization it is hard to say what is. There is something wrong somewhere. What is it?

It cannot be the ignorance and the barbarity of the people. The professor shows this with his eloquent tables and his strict logical deductions. Page 132 he tells us that, of the four nations he mentions, "Prussia stands first both as to education and suicides; France comes next, second in both sociological characteristics; lastly, Italy and Hungary." Turn to the ethnological map of Europe, and you find that the Russian dominions, except the portions near the Baltic and St. Petersburg, are remarkably free from suicides. The Russians of all this vast region are certainly far behind in culture; the cultured portion near the Baltic give proof of their progress by increased frequency of suicide.

It cannot be claimed that climatic influences have very much to do with this increase, because the climate of Europe has not changed from what it was in the early part of the century. Moreover, the advance in mechanical means of protection against the depressing influence of climate enables people to bear up against it better than they used to.

There is no use seeking for any other than a moral cause for the increase of suicide.

Undoubtedly the wild speculation and greed for wealth which characterize this period play a very important part in this phenomenon. Many minds are unsettled, and not a few suicides result from insanity. We remember having heard a physician speak of a case of attempted suicide to which he was called. The sufferer had been intemperate, and his mind gave way. It was during a fit of insanity that he cut his throat. The care of the physician brought him safely out of his perilous state, and he gave an account of how he happened to resort to so desperate an attempt. He said that he was laboring under an hallucination. He found himself continually annoyed by a little black imp, who sat on his shoulder, and when driven off one shoulder went to the other, always caressing him and saying strange words. One day he went to shave, and the imp was there as usual. He continued his troublesome caresses, and, when the man took the razor in his hand, kept saying: "Cut, it will do you good; cut, it will do you good." Urged on by this fatal influence, he drew the razor across his throat. It can hardly be doubted but that this is a fair explanation of not a few suicides. But it does not meet the majority of cases, especially where fixed, steady purpose has been shown, as in the case of remarkable suicides of the past and present well known to all.

The real cause of this increase in the frequency of suicide is to be found either in the state of society brought about by the rejection of revealed religion, or else in the adoption of that form of revealed religion which, by upsetting the order that the Founder of Christianity, who made human nature, had established in accordance to its wants, rejected authoritative teaching

and substituted for such authority the use of private judgment. The strain upon the human mind in striving to grasp and understand what cannot be grasped or understood by a finite mind has often ended in disaster and self-destruction. Hopeless in their effort, always striving after the certainty of truth, and never being able to attain it, men look on death as a relief, as what will solve the problem that puzzles them—long for it and seek it. The author says, somewhat naïvely, the mystic and metaphysical character of Protestantism has much to do with the preponderance of suicide among those who profess it.

Before we call the professor to our aid in this solution of the question we shall state that he is an enthusiastic admirer of Darwin, Tyndall, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer. This fact will give value to his conclusions and assertions, should they favor the view given above. We wish, too, to enter a protest against what he calls the law of increase in frequency of suicide. That there has been this proportionate yearly increase in many cases is a fact; but not a universal fact, as he himself admits in the case of Norway and of England. There is therefore no law, properly so called. This graded increase is to be sought rather in the hurtful influences of irreligion and modern social theories, which year by year are more widely spread with the facilities men have in publishing and in circulating their ideas everywhere. Such facilities have been going on, increasing too, undoubtedly, in a well-defined proportion. There is here merely the relation of cause and effect; and man remains a free, responsible agent, who is to give an account of his act in taking his own life. Let us now

direct our attention to the tables and maps found in the work before us.

Table xvi., p. 122, gives us the influence of religion on the tendency to suicide. Although in this table the data refer to different periods as regards the different countries, they belong to the same period with respect to the same country, and they justify the author in saying that he has been able to ascertain the frequency of suicide among individuals of different religions in the countries he puts in this list.

In Table No. xvi. we have the following proportional rate of suicide among Catholics and Protestants, per million of each religion:

	Catholics per million.	Protestants per million.
In Bavaria (1866–67)	56.7	152.7
In Upper Bavaria (1851–52, 56–57)	56	237
In Lower Bavaria (1851–52, 56–57)	28	148
In Prussia (1869–72)	69	187
In Austria (1852–54, 58–59)	51.3	79.5
In Bohemia (1858–59)	69	132
In Upper Austria	41	68
In Lower Austria	105	247
In Galicia	45	16
In Bukovina	80	—
Military frontiers	28	25

These extracts will suffice for our purpose; the general average of excess of suicides among Protestants in this table is three or two to one among Catholics. In studying the table it would seem to result that where Catholics largely preponderate, their influence over their non-Catholic neighbors is beneficial in reducing the number of suicides—as, for example, in Austria and in Bohemia: while in Bavaria, where Catholics are only about 71

per cent., their influence being comparatively weaker, the proportion of suicides is nearly three Protestants to one Catholic. The learned professor, who is willing to concede everything he can to the positivists of his day, is too honest not to see something very significant in these figures. Page 125 he writes: "The very high average of suicides among Protestants is another fact too general to escape being ascribed to the influence of religion." He goes on to give further explanation which has undoubtedly foundation in fact; the most salient feature of this explanation is that the neglect of religious ideas which naturally would have an influence to check suicide comes from the little hold any ideas have on the mind of men, except such as are directed to material improvement and the gratification of ambition. Naturally when a reverse comes there is no religious foundation to fall back on. It is a pity that the professor does not see that the very philosophical principles which directly tend to breed and foster such a state of things are not, as he says, "harmless to strong minds." It is these strong minds that will develop and reduce to practice these theories with increased evil to themselves and to their fellow-men.

We may be pardoned for not looking on as quite fair the remark he makes on p. 126, regarding the relative frequency of suicide among Catholics and Protestants. He says: "Where the tendency of suicide is great among Protestants it will be found to be also high among Catholics, as may be observed in the statistics already quoted of Baden, Würtemberg, Franconia, Galicia, Bavaria, etc." Why he brings in Bavaria here, with the table before us, we are at a loss to see. In Upper Bavaria the proportion of suicides of Protestants

to suicides of Catholics is about 4 to 1; in Lower Bavaria, 5 to 1; in Bavaria in 1857–66, 2½ to 1; in Bavaria in 1866–67, nearly 3 to 1. The other countries he cites above do not compare in all respects to those we have given in the table above. The Catholics in Baden are 65 per cent. of the population; in Würtemberg a little over 30 per cent.; in Lower Franconia, where the Catholic population is 80½ per cent., the suicides are, among Catholics 1, among Protestants over 3; in Central Franconia, where the Catholics are 21.9 per cent. of the population, suicides among Catholics are 1 to $2\frac{1}{3}$ among Protestants; in Upper Franconia, percentage of Catholics 42 4, the suicides are 1 to a little less than 2 among Protestants; in Galicia, percentage of Catholics 44.7, suicides among Catholics 3½ to 1 among Protestants; in Bukovina the proportion is against Catholics, as also in the military frontiers. These latter regions—Galicia, Bukovina, and the military frontiers—are guarded frontiers. It would be interesting to know how many among these suicides were soldiers, their followers or attendants, and how many of such cases were Catholics from other parts of the empire. The author says, p. 259, that suicides in the Austrian army are very numerous. However, these three mentioned provinces are an exception to the general rule which results from the examination of the statistics: that *where Catholics are the more numerous they not only are far below Protestants in the proportion of suicides; they exert also a healthy influence on Protestants in restraining them from committing suicide, while where Protestants predominate they exert a hurtful influence on Catholics which leads to more frequent suicide.*

Leaving the statistics, we take up the map, colored and lined in proportion to frequency of suicide. What countries are freest from suicide? Looking over the map, we find in this category Spain, Ireland, Roumania —the population of which last is largely of the Greek and Catholic churches—and Italy. Next comes Russia, the religion of which is the so-called orthodox Greek, with the priesthood and sacraments of the Catholic Church; also Scotland and Wales. England, according to Professor Morselli, has remained for a considerable time stationary in regard to suicide, coming third in the scale. The lowest place is held by Lower Austria, Saxony, Saxe-Meiningen, and the Isle of France. With regard to Lower Austria it must be remarked that suicides, both of Catholics and non-Catholics, are summed up together in this latter conclusion, and the total is three hundred and fifty-two per million, plus a doubtful number of Jewish cases. The Ile de France has within it the enormous and heterogeneous population of Paris, with its host of men without religion and a good number of non-Catholics professing belief in Christ.

A second map which merits close attention is that of Italy, the study of which will repay us; for it is wonderfully instructive. The revolution has been at work there for over thirty years. What is the state of the peninsula regarding suicide?

The professor's map gives us the relative proportions of the different provinces. The smallest number of suicides is found in the old kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Next comes the Roman district, with several portions of the kingdom of Italy. Next to the very lowest place comes Milan, the "moral capital" of new Italy. The

lowest place on the scale is occupied by the districts of Bologna, Modena, Mantua, and Forli! To any one who knows Italy these facts are very eloquent. The Italian revolution has had Bologna in its coils for over twenty years. That university which did so much for Catholicity and civilization, has been a thorough means of perversion of youth from obedience to the Catholic Church, and its baneful influence has almost made Bologna a byword in Italy. Milan is not much better; it is a commercial city and at the head of modern material progress, and its influence, in an anti-papal sense, has been so great as to merit in Italy the appellation we have given above. In Rome and its district we have no means, as far as we see in the professor's book, of contrasting the Rome of the king with the Rome of the pope. Suffice it to say that to hear of a suicide during our residence there under Pius IX.'s rule was the rarest of things; to hear of suicide after Rome fell into the hands of the Piedmontese and became overrun with people from the north of Italy, and from every part of it in fact, was a frequent occurrence. In the old Neapolitan kingdom, which has always retained a very cordial dislike of the Northern Italians and a great attachment to its clergy and Catholic customs, so as even to defy in Naples the efforts of the Piedmontese iconoclasts—to its credit be it said—there is less suicide than in any other part of Italy. And of this section of the peninsula the freest from this moral blot is the Terra di Lavoro. Here certainly is everything that could keep men from making away with themselves. Not only does religion flourish there, but the soil is rich and the people industrious. Coming from the sterile Campagna of Rome, one seems to enter

into the garden spot of Italy. We remember well, one September morning, passing through the heart of this province in the train for Naples. Having left on our right the picturesque abbey of Monte Casino on its rocky height, the home of St. Benedict and the store-house of knowledge and the nursery of art in the middle ages, which has not lost its reputation in this our day, we were rapidly carried southward. We soon found ourselves in the midst of the vine-clad hills, on which stood forests of elm trees, the vines clinging to them and hanging in graceful curves from one tree to the next, realizing the idea that so pleased the Mantuan Bard—the vine wedded to the elm. Suddenly we came upon a group of young men and women clad in the picturesque attire of the people; they stood with their heads turned to us and fixed as in a tableau. A young man was on a short ladder placed against an elm, holding on to the round with one hand, while with the other he was in the act of gathering grapes from a richly clustered festoon. On the ground below stood a young girl, her apron spread to catch the fruit as it fell. Two other young women were in the act of placing the grapes in a pannier; while a youth stood by the faithful little animal which was to bear the burden—a demure little donkey that took his part in the group, not marring it by any movement, as the train swept by. The beauty of the scenery, the bright and happy faces of the young people, the nature of their work, the grace of their pose, and the picturesque beauty of their garb, altogether made such a scene as an artist would fain paint. Surely this land has every physical characteristic to bring about a contented spirit and exorcise the demon of suicide. When

to this we add the influence of religion, to which the people are strongly attached from the conviction of their bright intellects and by the love of their warm hearts, one can readily understand why, of all Italy, it should be perhaps the privileged spot where men think least of insulting their Creator by usurping his right of life and of death.

It is not, however, on the physical or psychological conditions of a country that the rarity of suicide depends. Trouble comes everywhere; care enthrones herself in the palace and in the hovel, on the smiling prairie and on the rocky mountain side. There is needed something else. That something is not the development in man of "the power of well-ordered sentiments and ideas by which to reach a certain aim in life—in short, to give force and energy to the moral character" by the means Professor Morselli recommends. It is *not* this. The real means is religion so cherished as to become the life of the people. Do you want a proof? Look at Ireland, a Catholic people by excellence. Here is a people ground down by centuries of religious persecution; their priesthood proscribed; their worship forbidden; the education of their children unlawful; their families reduced to poverty, to live on the wild products of nature, the roots of the forest and the weeds of the sea; even those who could raise themselves a little above the lot of the rest allowed to till the land at a rack-rent which tardy justice is only now reducing one-half. So wretchedly has the economical condition of this people been administered that Ireland has become almost the classical land of poverty and famine. Was there ever a state of things more likely to foster a tendency to suicide?

Where was the *aim in life* for this people, debarred from every position of political preferment, of social standing, or of acquired wealth? There was no aim in life for them; but there was an aim beyond this life, and that aim was God! To God and to His religion they clung; and in the day of dark despondency the eye of faith, piercing the darkness, saw beyond the light eternal of the house of their Father. This kept them up; this formed their character; this gave them an aim in the life to come and in that of the present; this made this gifted people an example to the world of sound morality and of sterling love of virtue. Their history has demonstrated to the world what it is sustains man in trial and forms the character of man; it has shown that the preventive of self-destruction is not to be found in the schemes of the rationalistic professor, but in the supernatural power of the religion of Christ, the Redeemer of the world.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XI.

DARWIN'S MISTAKE.

(*The Catholic World, June*, 1884.)

NOT long ago there was published the reply of the late Charles Darwin to the letter of a German student, J. N. Doedes, dated 1873, which attracted a great deal of attention to his system of reasoning in his scientific treatises, and very justly. There is no denying the ability of the celebrated naturalist, the reputed author of the so-called system of evolution. His knowledge of facts is remarkable; his patient study wonderful; his deductions, while strictly within the limits of natural science or comparative anatomy, most frequently not to be gainsaid. But in this letter he has given the key to his method, and we have accounted for the extraordinary bound by which he leaped to his conclusion that all animals have a common ancestor and that species have evolved one from the other. We use the word extraordinary advisedly, because this proceeding is not in accordance with the sound reasoning that should obtain in the study of natural facts. He has not reached it by the proper study and correlation of facts. He noticed the resemblances between the various orders of animal life and guessed at his conclusion, and that in the very face

of facts revealed by the accurate study of the relation of species among themselves. It is a well-known *fact* that a species maintains itself, propagates itself; does not pass into another, though there may be races comprised under each species; moreover, when violently joined with another species, or rather race of widely differing characteristics, hybrids are produced which are not prolific. This is the general, well-known law. So well known is this that to note the exceeding fertility of the province of Rieti, in Italy, there is a common saying that "*in terra Reatina mula peperit*"—a mule brought forth there. Yet, in the face of this law, Darwin asserts the convertibility of species—makes all one family, with power of reproduction among the members of it. And he does this in spite of the fact that he can show no link, fossil or other, of any such transformation of species. He acknowledges he cannot. He puts the question to himself, and says he cannot *completely* answer it. But he immediately tries to answer it, and says his fossils of missing links have not yet been found, it is true, but he believes that they are buried in submerged continents. On this point Dr. Constantine James, in his recent work, *Moses and Darwin*, of which we shall make frequent use in this article, very justly remarks that it is strange the fossils should be found in their proper strata, according to time, and yet the intervening fossils of Darwinian transformations should nowhere be seen. He speaks of Darwin's use of Lyell's comparison of the archives of nature, and laughingly says that these archives are a very strange book, of which every alternate page is wanting. It is not necessary to call attention to the numerous following of clever men the Darwinian theory has. The names of Huxley,

Büchner, Haeckel, etc., are too well known. How is it that all these brilliant intellects have gone wild over this theory?

To us, especially after the letter cited above, the answer is easy. Darwin started out with the practical disbelief in a Creator. He acknowledges, in this reply, that he knew of no proof of the existence of a God, and, this being the case, he ignored the Creator entirely. It must be said he was not frank in this. He was afraid to say it. He used expressions that misled many into a conviction that he did believe in a Creator, and in this he did a great deal of harm with the incautious. It was the fashion to say that Darwin's disciples were responsible for atheistical conclusions, not he. Those who read his first edition of the *Origin of Species* saw there his statement that animals received "the breath of life." The expression is Scriptural, and naturally was understood in the Scriptural sense of man's creation. He was violently attacked for this by Haeckel, Mlle. Clemence Royer, his translator, and others In his second edition he gives up the obnoxious expression, and in an apologetic tone says he did not intend to convey the Scriptural meaning, but thought the wording well adapted to show our ignorance of what really did take place; and that, *perhaps*, he should have used some other expression! What does all this mean, if not that Darwin really did start out with a disbelief in a personal God; that he was a pantheist; that his school is pantheistic, and that, this being so, he and his are perfectly logical in their assertions? We shall endeavor to show this briefly.

Any one who starts out with such a principle as the negation of a personal God has no other refuge but to

attribute to matter all the energy that exists and is possible. To him matter becomes God. This is the inevitable conclusion of every one who denies even one essential attribute of the Divinity. He must, therefore, exclude any plan outside of matter itself. Any other procedure he is right, from his standpoint, in calling absurd, or, more delicately, unscientific, as Darwin does in his *Descent of Man* (c. i. p. 24, Appleton & Co., 1876). In his mind matter is the only factor, an impersonal one, a blind one, developing itself by a law of its own, a necessity of its nature. It is the old proposition over again, that God develops himself in nature, condemned by the œcumenical council of the church. This mode of development, absurd as it must be to any believer in God the Creator of all things, is by no means unphilosophical in the eyes of Darwin, Büchner, Huxley, and Haeckel, with their followers. Matter with them is capable of spontaneously evolving itself into all possible forms. Such energy belongs to it necessarily. So all things visible have come from it. Circumstances surrounding any object are a sufficient reason to account for the peculiar development or evolution of the matter it contains. The seeds of plants and the ova of animals, all come spontaneously from matter, are this natural divinity developing or evolving itself; and therefore we can readily understand how similarity of parts and progressive development are convincing proof that what is has come out of what is similar to it and prior to it. Spontaneous generation of the seeds and ova, of the germs of all things, first came about; and this impulse inherent in matter, continuing in its ever-increasing ctivity, suffices to produce the never-ending work of a

evolution, one species giving origin to the one next in order.

We pause here for a moment to remark that such evolutionists are, in making the above assertion, guilty of most unscientific teaching. They are, moreover, in a dilemma: they must so teach from their principles; while, on the other hand, the researches of Professors Tyndall and Pasteur, with others, have convincingly proved that there is no such thing as spontaneous generation. This is the deduction from *facts*, and all positivists must admit that a deduction from carefully observed facts is a scientific deduction. The pantheistic school, to begin their reasoning, must perforce admit as a postulatum spontaneous generation, and science tells us there is no such thing. The result of starting out in this way leads a man to construct his theories beforehand and adapt his facts to them. Everything that does not agree with his ideas is to be swept aside disdainfully as unscientific; for his ideas, logically in keeping with his first principle, pantheism, must necessarily be right. In this view we have taken of the system of reasoning of the Darwinian school it is a source of great satisfaction to us to have the support of such an authority as Agassiz. This distinguished naturalist writes as follows: "Darwin, by the disdain he affects for material proofs (apropos of his 'missing link,' and supposition of submerged continents which contain them), recalls that school of thinkers who, taking their inspiration from Schelling, applied his philosophy to natural history. Then, too, was seen acclaimed a doctrine, ready-made, embracing all nature, and offering no other guarantee but the infatuation of its authors. I believe Darwin's teaching will meet with the same fate

which overtook that of this sect."* It must be remembered that Schelling's philosophy is pantheistic, and that the infidel philosophers following in his wake threw aside everything that Christianity holds dear, to see, later on, their efforts fail and the religion of revelation assert a still stronger hold on the human mind. So will it be with the pantheistic school of to-day. If nothing else will convert them, men of judgment will understand that a system which confounds man with the brute creation, takes away free-will and responsibility, and opens the gate to the free indulgence of passion, which in the masses even now is developing in the forms of socialism, anarchism, and nihilism, cannot be a sound one; for no sound system produces such fruit, and from the fruits one comes to know the tree.

Darwin's system, therefore, has a sin of origin which taints it essentially and vitiates his conclusions, as far as they are deduced from his first principle—pantheism. His conclusions, as we have already said, when strictly in accord with the sound principles of comparative anatomy which made the name of Cuvier one that will outlast his, are most worthy of respect and evince his undoubted ability. Having, however, unscientifically leaped to his conclusion, it is curious to mark how he is dominated by it in such a way as to draw the very gravest deductions from the very weakest grounds, or rather from no ground at all. Let us take for example, a very important and capital instance on which Darwin bases his deduction that man came from a fish.

We are not aware that Darwin lays claim to being a physiologist. But he supports his views by frequent

* Quoted by James, p. 236.

citations of what he thinks favors them, from physiologists of name. In his *Descent of Man* (c. i. pp. 9, 10) he speaks of the similarity of the human fœtus with that of other animals, and especially with the fish, and he refers to the branchiæ, or gills, of the fœtus, in which later on are to be seen "the slits on the sides of the neck" where the gills were. He gives from Ecker a drawing of a human embryo at the twenty-fifth day. The impression left on the mind of the reader is that here is the convincing proof that man came from a fish, for he has gills! The fish developed into an animal with lungs by frequently-repeated acts which forced the gills down into the breast, and so the gills became lungs! Now, what is the real state of the case? The human embryo, in the early state such as this drawing represents, having no attachment by which to draw sustenance from the mother, gets its sustenance indirectly from her through the medium of the fluid in which it floats. The absorption must take place through the arteries, which must come in contact with this fluid for such a purpose. Hence the arteries form the arches which are in contact with the fluid and therefore necessarily outermost. When the placental formation takes place, then the exposed condition of the arteries is no longer necessary, and they recede into the interior of the body, leaving the marks where they were exposed in the neck. In the meantime the air-passages, entirely distinct from these arteries, begin to form, and, coalescing with them so as to be immediately in contact with the arteries, which, as it were, come to meet them to be enveloped by them, the lungs are formed, useless till birth, because the blood circulating

in the placenta takes its nutrition entirely by exosmosis from the blood of the mother. Huxley and Haeckel could easily have seen this and understood it; they could have comprehended that an accidental resemblance of the arteries, disposed as above, to the gills of a fish in the embryo, did not constitute them essentially the same thing, inasmuch as the gills are for *breathing*, while these arterial arches are for *nutrition*. That accidental resemblance came from both the fish and the fœtus floating independently in the fluid from which they draw what they need—the fish the oxygen required for the blood, the fœtus the oxygenized matter from the mother for nutrition. The condition of the fœtus is temporary and transient, and in no way can such a thing as gills be made out. The gills are a permanent, essential organism of the fish, made to live and die in the water from which it draws oxygen; the arterial arches of the fœtus, on the other hand, have only an accidental, temporary exposure of the vessels to the circumambient fluid, and they are not gills, nor, being gills, do they become lungs by being forcibly driven back into the body—a really strange idea. Still, this makes no difference with our evolutionist. All species came from prior ones, therefore the fœtus bears the mark of gills—there is the proof! Instead of his having a proof of his theory, Darwin has only furnished a proof of the unscientific reasoning into which his preconceived theory has betrayed him.*

* We had written the above, when, consulting a professor of standing, we learned what it never would have entered into our mind to suspect Darwin of being ignorant of—that the most weighty physiologists and authorities in this matter have rejected entirely the theory of these arterial arches being gills, and therefore the name branchiæ is a misnomer. They tell us

To cite one more instance of this precipitate way of drawing conclusions, we mention his argument drawn from rudiments. Now, we do not believe we risk anything in saying that no proof of transformation of species can be drawn from the existence of rudimentary bones, muscles, or organs. The type of animal life is more or less one. To sustain and develop it certain tissues have been created, and the beginning and growth of these tissues depend on *life;* they will not develop without life. What life is we shall see further on. The fact stands that life is what makes tissues begin, evolve, and perfect themselves from inert matter. Take, says Dr. James, phosphate of lime. What more incapable of self-development as you look at it? Let life once begin its action, and forthwith you see the fish form from it its fins, marvelous in their beauty and adaptation; the various animals their bones, hoofs, horns, claws; man his body's frame of bone. Now, whatever tissues are needed for the body the mysterious agency of life takes, and the development of the tissues depends on the circumstances of the animal. They will be fully developed or rudimentary according to these circumstances. Accidental circumstances may cause hypertrophy, or fuller development, such as

that from the very first the nutrition of the fœtus is from the mother, through the filaments which mediately or immediately come in contact with her blood. Such is the teaching of Em. Bailly in the *Dictionnaire de Médecine*, etc., and also of A. Kölliker in his most valuable work on embryology. These writings are those of experts in the matters of science they treat of, and no one in the medical profession can gainsay the weight of their authority. What are we to say of Darwin, with such evidence on the other side, building up a most momentous theory with results of the very gravest import? It is certainly not the mark of wisdom to make grave assertions on the lightest foundation; and in this matter the part played by Charles Darwin is not happy,

irritation, which determines a flow of blood to the part, greater nutrition therefore, and growth of teeth, hair or bones, where only the possibility of their production existed. On the other hand, quiet or disuse determines a less flow of blood, consequently less nutrition, less growth, atrophy or reduction to the condition of a rudiment. As all these tissues are more or less alike in all animals, it is to be expected that rudiments should exist, as not all animals call their tissues into play equally. Nature seems to abound in precautions, so that these rudiments sometimes come into play in a very curious and often very important manner. It is wonderful to see how nature will at once adapt itself to a changed condition, and what is rudimentary will not unfrequently, to compensate, develop fully in a most extraordinary way. Even in some of the prehistoric animals of vast proportions there are to be found teeth hidden in the gums, though the other teeth have not fallen out as yet. Darwin makes an excellent remark (p. 61, *Descent of Man*): "I am convinced, from the light gained within the past few years, that very many structures that now appear to us useless, will hereafter be proved to be useful." We think we are justified in applying this remark to rudiments; may not rudiments which are considered by his school to be useless and only signs of descent from other species, be hereafter proved to be providentially useful, at least in certain contingencies? It seems to us exceedingly probable, and that therefore the argument from rudiments in favor of transformation of species is not only a weak one, but unfounded, a piece of mere conjecture.*

* Darwin, p. 61, *Descent of Man*, acknowledges he "perhaps [in his *Origin of Species* prior to the fifth edition] attributed too much to the action

The work of Dr. Constantine James, *Moses and Darwin*, to which we have referred, is one of decided merit and bears evidence of great research. The writer is a French physician, and was formerly a co-worker and assistant of the celebrated Magendie, whose brilliant success in studies of physiology and comparative anatomy gained him deservedly a world-wide reputation. His efforts are all devoted to showing the baseless nature of the theories of Darwin on the origin of species and on the descent of man. His work is accompanied by a brief of the late venerated pontiff, Pius IX., which is more than usually liberal in terms of commendation and of congratulation, as well as of condemnation of the absurd "dreams" which Dr. James undertakes to refute in the name of true science. Such words are grave and impressive, for they are not uttered at haphazard; without being intended to contain any "infallible judgment," they are the words of authoritative decision based on the views of intelligent and learned men employed by the sovereign pontiff to expedite such letters for him; and for this reason they mean a great deal.

It is the fashion to look on anything English, and perhaps American, in the way of scientific investigation and critical judgment as of supereminent value, and to rank with these the Germans who agree with them. With all

of natural selection or the survival of the fittest." He "did not formerly consider the existence of structures, which, as far as we can judge at present, are neither beneficial nor injurious; and this I believe to be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my work. I may be permitted to say, as some excuse, *that I had two distinct objects in view:* FIRSTLY TO SHOW THAT SPECIES HAD NOT BEEN SEPARATELY CREATED, AND, SECONDLY, THAT NATURAL SELECTION HAD BEEN THE CHIEF AGENT OF CHANGE!" Preconceived notions appear to have led to this result of unscientific reasoning.

due respect we beg to be regarded as not sharing this opinion. One of the reasons why we do not share it is because a clever Englishman has taught us otherwise. Something over two hundred years ago a learned and able English writer, Thirlby, who knew what he was saying, editing an edition of the works of St. Justin, martyr and philosopher, wrote as follows: "The art of judging and critically discerning the value of facts and of documents, of determining what is genuine and to be received, and what is false and to be rejected, is a most difficult one. Not many among us succeed in it. In France more have been successful. In Italy, where 'fervescente sole coalescit ingenium'—the heat of the sun, that is, seems to force the intellect—those who have succeeded are still more numerous." The two hundred years and more which have gone by since Thirlby wrote, have not changed the Italian mind. The Ausonian Peninsula can boast of great writers still, of that calm and judicial temperament so valuable, yet so little appreciated except by the learned. At this moment there is no man in Europe who ranks higher in this respect than the distinguished Roman, Giovanni Baptista De Rossi, whose word is listened to with the utmost deference by men of learning in all matters of antiquity requiring critical examination. It is precisely this character of calmness, of exclusion of all preconceived notions, of weighing well all facts before coming to a conclusion, which distinguishes the real man of science from the superficial lecturer, half-learned and full of preconceived notions. The man who is to be trusted is the one who realizes the extent of what he does not know; and only a truly learned man, one who has studied and appreciated the difficulties of

the matter he has in hand, can be said to belong to this category. Such a man can be relied on with confidence when he gives evidence of not being under the influence of a preconceived idea, than which no idol is more fatal to his usefulness. We have referred to an Italian as an example of the frame of mind so necessary for the discovery of truth. Among the French, also a Latin nation, we have Barthélemy de St. Hilaire, Quatrefages—both cited by James—and Pasteur and Moigno, men of world-wide reputation in their respective spheres. It strikes us as injudicious, therefore, to look only at the American or the English or the German side of a question, especially when in all those nations there is a larger contingent on the other side, and not to take into consideration what may be said by able men of France, of Italy, and of Spain, particularly when, in the judgment of a critical scholar of English nationality, those latter nations are especially prolific in that very kind of intellectual ability so useful and so necessary for the discovery of truth.

Although the author of the book we have referred to indulges from time to time in the sarcasm and ridicule which, we must confess, spring naturally from such a theme as the learned English naturalist has made so prominent, Dr. Constantine James writes as a scholar and man of science, as he is. Thus, for example, page 249, he says: "Darwin establishes as the basis of his system that there is not only question of a simple modification of species, but of their radical transformation. Thus from the larva a fish is produced; from a fish a reptile; from a reptile a bird; from a bird a mammal; whence results the unheard-of phenomenon that each of these metamorphoses brings with it a complete renewal of

the solid and liquid parts. I said that the solid and liquid parts must be completely renewed. As for the solid parts, the thing is evident. It is enough to recall the fact that the bone and flesh of one animal differ essentially from the bone and flesh of another. The differences do not consist only in the disposition of the cellules and in the arrangement of the fibres; the microscope reveals a difference in the woof, so to speak, of the organs. Every animal, therefore, to pass from one species to another, must perforce lose its proper material organization to take on that of the species into which it is transformed. So much for the solid parts. As for those that are liquid there is not less evidence. Let us take the blood, for example. It is well known that the blood is not a homogeneous fluid, but that it contains in suspension myriads of little bodies known as 'globules.' I could not give a better idea of them than by comparing them to the little golden flakes which float in the brandy of Dantzig. These globules are fitted, in volume and form, to the diameter of the extremely small vessels they must go through. Lenticular in men, elliptical in birds, ovoid in frogs, they vary according to the species. They will, therefore, vary each time the species changes. This enables us to understand why, in the operation of transfusion of blood recently again resorted to, there cannot be injected into the veins of a man any but human blood, under penalty of causing the gravest disorders in the circulation, owing to the stopping of the globules in the capillary vessels." We ask: Are we to accept such extraordinary changes and revolutions on the faith of a theorist who has not proved his theory?

At page 253 Dr. James begins an interesting chapter on Hervey's celebrated axiom, "omne vivum ab ovo"—every living being comes from an egg. He continues: "But that egg, as long as it is only a germ, represents only a colorless globule, inert, and without determinate characteristics; however skillful you may be in handling the microscope, you will never be able to distinguish the germ of a bird from that of a fish or from that of a mammal. From that period, the manner in which the organs gradually come out of a mass apparently homogeneous; the changes, the complications, the relations, the functions which are established at every new phase; the manner in which finally the young animal takes on his form and definitive structure to become a new and independent being, prove that there is in the egg a very extraordinary something which differs from its material composition, and which is very extraordinary in its nature, and is due to the pre-existing action of an organizing spirit. Whence we are to conclude that every animal bears in itself the principle of its own individuality." Or, to speak more clearly in the language of strict philosophy, every animal has a form—that is, a principle in virtue of which a thing is actually what it is. This form is the substantial form of St. Thomas. Thus a human body is a body in virtue of the substantial form, the soul, which it has. It is this soul which united to matter determines the development of that matter into what becomes the human body. This is the "breath of life" of a body; this, with the development it determines, is life. Each animal and each organized living plant has its own form or deter-

mining simple essence, varying in grade of excellence till we come to what is called inert matter, which seems to act merely by general laws exterior to it or inherent in it — crystallization, endosmosis, exosmosis, expansion or contraction, chemical combination or chemical decomposition. To matter thus acted on, without power of self-movement, we may, by comparison with higher organizations, attribute a form, but the wording in this case, it seems to us, would be more figurative than exact. It is the First Cause which wills the laws in every instance; but his action, if we may so speak, is more immediate in the case of inert matter than in the development of living, organized matter, though that action in this latter case is of a nobler grade, requiring greater exercise of creative power, inasmuch as the form is created directly to make use of general laws and thus determine the development of the matter it needs to constitute with it a composite unity. To make a further application of this theory of forms, upon which depends the development of matter, we say that each animal has its own proper form, which is simple in its nature or essence, and not compound or material. This being so, this simple form or essence cannot change into another; it either exists as it is or is annihilated, ceasing to exist at all. It follows, therefore, that one species which owes its existence to its form cannot change into another; but if a species essentially differing from another is to arise, a new form must be created. Whether this can be done by the new form being made to take on the qualities of a preceding form, plus what is in it distinctively essential, seems to be a disputed question, as we find some writers, who hold to

revelation, referring to a possibility of a perfected species being raised to a higher grade by the creation of a higher form for it. Thus Professor St. George Mivart, in his recent article in the *Catholic Quarterly*, January number, 1884, thinks it not untenable to teach that this actually took place with regard to man, and that, when the evolution of species had reached the desired perfection, the Creator infused the nobler form, the soul of man, into the species so perfected, and, doing it only to one pair, thus made the whole race of mankind of one man and of one woman. We confess, however, we are not convinced of the truth of the position; for the facts we have already given—the absence of the missing link in the chain of development, the impossibility of breeding a different species from a pre-existing one, the sterility of hybrids, etc.—seem to us to make such a position very unsafe as a scientific theory. It is certainly simpler, safer, and, we think, sounder to say that a personal God, creating matter, gave it the forms he wished it to have; and having first the noblest of all in his mind—that of man—made the other forms partake, in varied degree, of the excellence of that form, first in his intention, though ultimate in realization, beginning with the simpler form of animal life and by successive steps reaching the most complicated, that which immediately precedes man. In this theory there is no need of the missing bond of development, and the sterility of hybrids and of differing species among themselves is explained; for in the case of communication between differing species the form is not created, while in the case of hybrids the action of the form is hampered by the physical state in which it finds itself, it being not essentially but functionally rendered incom-

petent to produce an animal organization like to its own, the reason being that the Creator has made no provision for such a state of things.

In conclusion, we think it well to state that what we have written on the present subject we have given as a matter of individual opinion; and we hereby disclaim any intention of representing any other than ourselves.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XII.

HERBERT SPENCER'S ENIGMA.

(*The Catholic World, August,* 1885.)

THE recent controversy in the *Nineteenth Century* and the *Popular Science Monthly* between Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. Frederick Harrison merits, not only from the character of the writers, but especially from the matter so carefully formulated by the first-named in his article, "Religion: A Retrospect and a Prospect," thoughtful and respectful consideration. To our mind he has done a decided service to the cause of religion. A man of vigorous thought, a writer of clearness and precision, a teacher who has the courage of his convictions, and who utters them with the truthfulness and candor of one who is willing to risk everything for truth, whatever Mr. Herbert Spencer says will carry weight, and influence widely. Of course we differ with him; we cannot for a moment admit his assertion of the impossibility of knowing the existence and attributes of God after our limited but none the less sure way, and our reasons will appear in the sequel. We feel, moreover, that in his earnestness to uphold his theory, as put forth in the article we are reviewing, he has gone too far, according to his own rules of reasoning, and, overstepping the limits, has contradicted himself. He is very categoric in laying it down

as an axiom that man is conscious of a feeling in himself that leads him to believe in the existence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy which he cannot apprehend, of which he knows nothing, and which he therefore calls the Unknowable. Yet, notwithstanding the assertion that it is unknowable, he proceeds to tell us something of what it is, and a good deal of what it is not. Thus, for example, he says:

"The cruelty of a Fijian god, who, represented as devouring the souls of the dead, may be supposed to inflict torture during the process, is small compared with the cruelty of a god who condemns men to tortures which are eternal; and the ascription of this cruelty, though habitual in ecclesiastical formulas, occasionally occurring in sermons, and still sometimes pictorially illustrated, is becoming so intolerable to the better-natured that, while some theologians distinctly deny it, others quietly drop it out of their teachings. Clearly this change cannot cease until the belief in hell and damnation disappear. Disappearance of them will be aided by an increasing repugnance to injustice. The visiting on Adam's descendants, through hundreds of generations, dreadful penalties for a small transgression which they did not commit; the damning of all men who do not avail themselves of an alleged mode of obtaining forgiveness which most men never heard of; and the effecting a reconciliation by sacrificing a son, who was perfectly innocent, to satisfy the assumed necessity for a propitiatory victim—are modes of action which, ascribed to a human ruler, would call forth expressions of abhorrence; and the ascription of them to the Ultimate Cause of things, even now felt to be full of difficulties, must become impossible."

Here we are told that the Unknowable is the Ultimate Cause of all things, and that it cannot by any possibility have acted as he supposes the Christian religion teaches God has acted and does. Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy is at fault. He starts with a false principle. It is

only another illustration of the old saying: *Causa mala patrocinio pejor erit.* And yet we are far from calling his a bad cause. There is too much of good in it to be spoken of in that way. It is bad by defect; what is in it is good, though that good be but twilight, a glimmer of truth. The good consists in this, that he teaches, without subterfuge of any kind, the existence of an Ultimate Cause, of an Infinite, Eternal Energy; the bad, or the defect, is that he pretends we can know nothing about it, and that the only progress in the appreciation of this great Being will consist in a far greater increased consciousness of the belief that it is. What is still farther good in his theory is that this consciousness cannot be destroyed, as it belongs to nature; but, on the contrary, will go on, becoming ever more stable and constituting the essence of all religion. To use other words, this is the testimony of nature, of which Tertullian and others spoke long ago; and we may exclaim of Mr. Herbert Spencer: "Testimony of a soul naturally Christian!"

To us, to whom the explanation is so simple, it must appear surprising that this well-informed writer should speak so lightly of the language of Holy Writ where it treats of God in the speech of men. With the knowledge that we must use material expressions to signify our internal intellectual and spiritual operations, our thoughts and feelings, how can any one be surprised that in writing of God and of his operations, so far above our limited comprehension, the inspired author should have used terms easily understood by those for whom he was writing, and who certainly would not have understood him had he used recondite phrases and words known only to himself? We should have thought a moment's reflection, with the light

of common sense, would have prevented such a mistake as Mr. Herbert Spencer has made here. We could expect this from a Robert Ingersoll, but from Herbert Spencer we did not expect it. If he has ever given any attention to the theology he combats, such as every fair-minded man ought to give to theories he impugns, he must know that Catholic theologians teach that such expressions as he objects to are only figurative, while referring to acts which, among men, are accompanied with the phases of thought and feeling described by the writer of the inspired text. God is said to be angry, to repent, to be glad, etc. These are our ways of speaking. He himself is unchangeable; seeing and knowing all possibilities from the beginning, he cannot be subject to the changes such possibilities would produce on one who had not foreseen them. But the actions of God have the sequence they would have had, had he been capable of the emotions described, while all the result the actions of men could have on God is coeval with the eternal act whereby God willed creation and ordered his providence; for, in his eternal foresight, he knows all things past, present, future, or possible; nothing can escape him who willed all and made all things what they are.

Another false view we must comment on is the one which causes Mr. Herbert Spencer to stigmatize the wording of Scripture where God is spokon of as requiring the praise of man. It is strange that the obvious distinction between the Creator and the creature should have escaped so acute a thinker. The inspired writer says, speaking in the name of God: *In gloriam meam feci eum* [*i.e.*, *hominem*]—"I have made him [man] for my glory." Mr. Spencer rightly condemns

self-glorifying in a man; and then he goes wide of the mark by applying the same rule to God, forgetting that the reason why man does wrong in glorifying himself is because all he has he has received of God, and all the glory, therefore, belongs to God and not to himself, who can do nothing without God. Justice requires that glory be given to him to whom it is due. God, being infinitely just, as we shall see, must exact that glory for himself, all the more because he must correct the continued tendency of man to prevaricate in this regard. Again, God must act for an end worthy of himself, and he can have, therefore, no end but himself, as nothing worthy of him exists outside of himself, for only an infinite end can be worthy of infinite action. God must hate the robbery of his glory by man, and must teach man to repair the disorder of which he has been guilty in attributing to himself any honor whatsoever. St. Augustine, in his book of *Retractations*, tells us how he made the mistake of attributing to himself the first steps in conversion, and how he was corrected by reading the commentary of St. Cyprian on the words of St Paul: "What hast thou that thou hast not received, and if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?" The same may be said of every gift, even physical, and therefore all the glory belongs to God, and he would fail in justice if he did not bid all men give it to him.

A somewhat similar error Mr. Herbert Spencer falls into where he speaks of the Divine Intelligence, or intelligence ascribed to God. He gives us an argument, subtle but faulty, to show that the First Cause could not have been intelligent, as we understand the word,

because this intelligence is dependent on alien activities—" the impressions generated by things beyond consciousness, and the ideas derived from such impressions." Now, intelligence is the exercise of the intellectual faculty on ideas, it really makes no difference how they come. They may come from consciousness or from outside, or they may so be in the mind as to be identified with it. The recognition of one's being and relation with others is itself an act of the intellect, an act of intelligence. The First Cause, therefore, could be intelligent at least in this way. But this is only to answer the argument. The real fact is that the First Cause, being first in order, must be also first in the intellectual order and possess it most perfectly; and as the perfection of intelligence is to understand the Infinite, so this First Cause must understand itself, all its possibilities which it sees in itself viewed, as it were, materially, these possibilities being the archetypes according to which things come to exist in the actual order.

To come, however, to the fuller and more direct reply to the assertion that the First Cause is unknowable, the profession of belief in the existence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy frees us from the necessity of proving this existence. We see that Mr. Herbert Spencer, by a different process perhaps, and in a different degree, is in harmony with the assertion of St. Paul, quoted by the Vatican Council, that man's mind can attain to the knowledge that there is a God. But St. Paul goes further, and so do other texts of Holy Writ, the writers being more logical than our author, and not under the baneful influence of nineteenth-century unbelief. Once grant the existence of a

First Cause, and reason recognizes it as infinite, and must do so, because it could not be limited, as it is the First, and it would be absurd to say it limited itself. This infinitude cannot be considered a mere name; it implies no limit of any attribute compatible with it, and it must, in fact, be infinite Reality, in which everything is in itself or as possible, and without which nothing can be. It must be, therefore, infinite truth, infinite goodness, infinite perfection, infinite power, infinite energy or will. Whatever is must first have existed as an object of that divine, infinite intellect from the beginning; for no one can give what he has not, and beings must, therefore, have received what they have from a Cause which first had what it has given them. Consequently reason shows us that the First Cause, whom we call God, has in him Infinite Intelligence; he is the pure act of Intellect whereby he understands himself and all he is able to do—in a word, all possibility.

Again, reason teaches us that the First Cause must be Truth itself, all that which is in any way, as explained above. Therefore it excludes all error or falsity in this First Cause. And as it, moreover, recognizes in God infinite perfection, it excludes from him all untruthfulness, and all derogation from the moral law which is indeliby stamped on our mind and heart. The doctor of grace, St. Augustine, quotes the words of the Psalmist, "Who shall show unto us what is good?" and he answers with the words that follow, "The light of thy countenance is stamped upon us." This law first is in God and then exists by participation in man; and, as we have said, it could not be in

man if it were not in the First Cause, on the principle that no one gives what he has not. The eternal fitness of the ideas of the Divine Intellect constitute this moral law which is natural to man, and found in him, in its essence, everywhere.

In like manner reason recognizes personality in the First Cause, being the principle which makes a rational being the adequate source of his own operations and responsible for them. This noble prerogative is what makes man eminently worthy of respect, like unto his Maker, and merits for him the grade he holds in the esteem of his fellow-men. All society is based on the fact that man is a person. It comes into play everywhere, in daily life, in business, in the law-courts, in the Patent Office, where a man is awarded a right of property in an invention because it is his own, from him as a person. To pretend that man could possess such a noble and eminent and perfect quality, and that the First Cause from whom he comes has it not, were to do outrage to reason.

Reason can know more. It can know that this infinitely good First Cause cannot irresistibly lead man into error, and that, therefore, when man makes use of every proper means of becoming certain, he can arrive at the knowledge of truth to the extent it may please this First Cause to manifest it him, by ordinary or extraordinary means. It makes him realize, too, that the Infinite and Eternal Energy, being all-powerful, can maintain the physical laws, or alter or suspend them; and therefore it recognizes the possibility of miracles, of which man judges surely by the use of the laws of evidence. And when he sees miracles used as a testi-

mony to the truth of teaching he recognizes that teaching as of God. Reason, therefore, declares its belief in the possibility of revelation.

To sum up. So far from man not being able to know what God is, so far from declaring the First Cause Unknowable, reason can know God; know that he is; that he is infinite; that he is perfect; that he is intellect itself; that he is goodness itself and justice itself; that he is the author of all that is, the Sovereign Personality who has made man after his own image; that he is morality itself, and the source of the moral law in man; that he can make known his mind to men, cause men to recognize him as speaking, by signs of his omnipotence we call miracles, and oblige men to accept the truths which constitute a revelation.

We have not given special attention to the arguments of Mr. Frederick Harrison. Materialism is so gross that it is not likely to hold long-continued sway over the minds of any large body of men. It is unfortunate that this form of error should have taken such hold on the minds of physicians especially. They are so much wrapt up in matter, and see so many strange and interesting phenomena of reflex action, that they come to regard matter as the only thing that is, and the source of all activity. Were things as they should be, theology would hold the first place in a man's estimation, law the next, then physical science. But the theologians, so-called, have rejected divine or church authority and given their own comments, and therefore have lost immensely in public opinion; lawyers, by substituting expediency for justice, or because they have to take the ignorant legislation of semi-cultured bodies as the law

they interpret and apply, share the same fate, and are not in the esteem they should naturally have as a profession. The people remember the words of Scripture, "Honor the physician on account of your need," and, as that need comes often, the physician is considered as more important than the minister or lawyer, while the brilliant discoveries of the profession dazzle the public eye. Those, too, who share the opinions of Mr. Harrison are apt to look on the physician as the high-priest of humanity, and hence make him share in the cult they pay it. Certainly the physician who does his duty, who is faithful to God and to man, is a noble being and a most powerful agent for good, not alone for the health of the body, but for the social weal. Such a man every one will willingly honor, and we should be the last to detract from his merit. But the physician who has given up God, and especially the materialist, has no code of morality but his own ideas, and is therefore a dangerous man, liable at any moment to do, perhaps in invincible ignorance, the greatest ill. We remember in our young days meeting with one of these physicians, who had not the fear of God before his eyes. He was speaking before several, we being of the number, of his treating a young woman for some ailment, and told us he had for this purpose given her to read works of an immoral character. That incident has never been blotted out from our memory, and the thought of this physician comes up always as of one who was a traitor to a noble profession. The only safety there is for society is the moral law; and without belief in God and in his revelation, which confirms and sanctions the moral law, that law loses its hold on men and untold evil will be the

result. Mr. Herbert Spencer's belief in an Ultimate Cause which is an Eternal, Infinite Energy, goes far to safeguard the natural law; but we hope and pray that his earnest and manly truthfulness will be rewarded by a still greater knowledge—the knowledge which surpasses all earthly knowledge and which so satisfies man's yearnings. When that time comes he will experience something of the joy and happiness that fill the heart of those who have found the truth. One of these, formerly a prominent writer on the infidel press of Paris, afterwards a doughty champion of the faith of Christ—Louis Veuillot—thus speaks of his feelings: "I was ruined the day I dropped from the clouds. But it is God who ruined me, blessed be His mercy! These clouds concealed the lightning; it lit up when mercy dissipated them. I have seen heaven, and in my dust I am heir to a kingdom that will never perish. Formerly, to my eyes, all was but the splendid decoration of vast emptiness unfathomable; the delightful sound of an ingenius mechanism put up by a fantastic workman, who without saying why, had withdrawn from his work. At present all is clear; at present I see, I hear, I know. The smiles and the sounds of nature are a language I understand; my heart answers it with a beat that tells of brotherly love. I know why the hills are clothed with joyousness, why the seed rejoices in the earth, why a song of praise comes up from the valleys, why the little stream leaps and claps its hands. I know this, and my voice, uniting itself with those voices that are never silent, has begun to chant an eternal hosanna."

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XIII.

THE ENCYCLICAL "IMMORTALE DEI."

(*American Catholic Quarterly Review, January*, 1886.)

THERE never, perhaps, was a time when clearness of ideas was more demanded among Christian nations than at the present day. Protestantism, which, as its name imports, is a rebellion against God's church, and as His Eminence Cardinal Newman has observed, can maintain its position only by asserting that the church of Rome has gone astray, set up its tribunal of private judgment. That tribunal has called before it every question, religious or moral, with the result of a confusion such that the most ordinary and obvious truths are misapplied, distorted, or rejected, while the most pernicious theories of religion and morality are working havoc among our poor misguided fellow-men. It is no wonder this has occurred. At best, as the sacred writer has said: "The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our foresight uncertain" (Wisdom ix., 14). When men deliberately stray away from the fount of living waters, and from the source of truth, they must expect the natural result. Reason, always of its nature liable to err, will then find itself irresistibly driven to conclusions the folly of which will be shown by the practical results. In the midst of the upheaval of society at this epoch, when the masses rise up

against legitimate authority, class is arrayed against class, the most sacred duties are disavowed, and the most tender and delicate ties are sundered and the family made desolate, what a blessing to have speak to the world one whose thoughts are not timid, and who, like his Divine Master, gives forth his utterances "as one having authority!" The Encyclical "Immortale Dei," dated All Saints' Day, of the year 1885, is a boon to the world. Not since the Vatican Council has a more important document issued from the pen of the sovereign pontiff. Non-Catholics as well as Catholics recognize its truth, its wisdom, its opportuneness, and its eminently practical utility. The liberal press of Vienna was, we believe, the first to style it "The Covenant between Church and Society." Of course, these journals must have their say, and they, therefore, here and there make their reservations; but those reservations are made lest their expressions of admiration should lead their readers to infer they were about to surrender to the pope. The London *Tablet* has published a number of extracts from the newspapers of the Continent to show in what esteem the Encyclical is held by those opposed to the church. As is to be expected, the journals edited by those not of the faith make objection according to their peculiar opinions; but it would be an interesting work to show how, while they do this, the greater number would be found on the side of nearly if not every teaching of the Encyclical. The reason is obvious when we come to review briefly the document in detail.

In a style classic and easy to understand, even by those not used to theological treatment of religious or moral questions, our most Holy Father, Pope Leo XIII.,

comes to the aid of society, and lays down the Catholic doctrine of social life familiar to a Catholic ear, but having a strange sound to the world which habitually refuses a hearing to the Catholic side. The commanding position of the sovereign pontiff, however, compels attention, while his personal worth exacts homage even from the proudest men of culture. The effect, therefore, of this Encyclical is apt to be very far-reaching, and it would be a panacea of social ill, were it not that too many of the class Holy Writ tells of, *nolunt intelligere ut bene agant*, do not wish to understand, because they do not want to do what is right.

The first point the pope speaks of is civil society and authority. We feel it is a pity to curtail these extracts, but the limits of a short article do not permit anything else. In his preamble he says: "No more excellent a manner of establishing and governing a state has been found than that which of its own accord springs from the teaching of the Gospel." How true! Christian charity is the true political economy. The laws of commerce, demand and supply, increase, population, poverty and wealth, would all be the more solid and less liable to error or variation were charity their basis; while the stability of the state founded on the Christian idea of authority would guarantee also the firmness of law of whatever nature.

Authority, the pope tells us, is from God. Listen to his words: "It is in the very nature of man that he live in society, since he cannot obtain in solitude the necessary culture and ornament of life, and likewise perfection of mind and soul, it has been divinely provided that he should be born for the society and intercourse of men,

as well domestic as civil, which alone can supply the perfect sufficiency of life. Inasmuch, however, as no society can exist unless there be some one to preside over the rest, moving each one by an efficacious and like impulse to the common end, it results that authority by which the civil community of men is governed is necessary; which, not otherwise than society itself, comes from nature and, therefore, from God. From this it follows that public authority in itself is only from God. God alone is the most true and greatest Lord of all, to whom everything that is belongs, and whom all must serve, so that whoever have the right to command receive it from no other source but from God, the sovereign prince of all." "There is no authority save from God." How wonderfully clear and logical all this is! What dignity it gives to human society and government! How it safeguards authority, and puts an obligation on every human being to obey the law! The whole of this part of the Encyclical is replete with wisdom, and condenses in a most cogent manner the sayings of the wisest and best men of Christianity. The pope declares that no special form of government is essential, but that may be taken which fitly secures the common utility and welfare. This, be it understood, must be done with order and with no violation of right. The pope is no partisan of revolution. He says that those exercising authority must act as the ministers of God, and with paternal charity; to act otherwise is to be a tyrant, for authority is for the common good, and not for the personal benefit of the ruler. On the other hand, those subject to authority must obey. These are his words: "To despise legitimate authority, in whatsoever person it be, is no more allowable than to resist

the will of God;" which, if any resist, they go to ruin of their own choosing: "Whoso resists authority, resists the ordination of God; those who resist, purchase to themselves damnation" (Romans xiii., v. 2). This official teaching of the pope is a pledge to our country of the good which will come to it from the Catholic Church. We have the republican form of government, established in a proper, orderly manner, and as Dr. J. Gilmary Shea has ably shown, by the cordial and unanimous coöperation of Catholics, from the soldiers of "Congress' Own" to the distinguished signer of the Declaration of Independence, Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, and to Jesuit Father John Carroll, afterwards the first Archbishop of Baltimore. Every Catholic, the pope declares, must obey that government. As a consequence the Catholic Church will be found to be the most effective bulwark of American freedom, and of individual rights. Nor need our good fellow-countrymen, bred up in the false ideas of their various creeds, in dread and dislike of Catholicity, fear encroachments on their rights of conscience; for further on the sovereign pontiff not only states that princes can tolerate in their dominions, for just reasons, a difference of faith, but also asserts that the church is wont to see that no one be compelled to believe against his will, quoting St. Augustine, when he says: "No one can believe except by an act of his will." This act of the will we know is an elicited act, and cannot be forced; otherwise a man would will and not will at the same time the same thing, which is absurd. As for just reasons to tolerate difference of opinion on matters of faith, surely no juster reasons can exist than here among us, where those who differ with us do so in the best of good faith. They will

always find us good neighbors and friends, and loyal to the words of the Holy Father which we have just cited. But while the pope speaks thus with Christian charity, that same Christian charity makes him condemn in outspoken language, for which we are sincerely grateful to him, the doctrine that the choice of one's religion is a matter of indifference; that the various creeds are on an equal footing, and equally safe. He proclaims that only one is the true and safe one, that of the Holy Roman and Apostolic Church; that all are bound to seek in it the means of salvation, and, therefore, to respect and cherish it.

Passing from the consideration of authority in the state and in the church, and of the good that comes from their mutual good feeling and agreement, the pope comes to the serious question of revolution as advocated by the secret societies of the present day, and condemns it as it has always been condemned by the church. And here let us remark, that the secret organization of Masonry, the chief expounder and actor in the propagation of revolutionary ideas in Europe, is entirely out of place in this country and unpatriotic, a menace to our institutions if it were to succeed in spreading its doctrines among us. Americans do not need any dark-lantern work. Let the children of darkness go whence they came, to their place of birth in Europe; they are out of place here. We want education and light, the more the better; not the education which Freemasonry gives without God, but the truth which comes from God, whose light illumes it through the fostering care of His church. The head of that church speaks in unmistakable terms of revolutionary principles. He quotes the

documents on this subject given to the world by his predecessors, confirms them, and then sums up. "From these prescriptions of the pontiffs the following are to be by all means understood: that the origin of public power is to be sought in God Himself, and not in the multitude or people; that the license of sedition (revolution) is repugnant to reason; that it is wrong in men, and wrong in states, to give no place to the duties of religion, or to look on all religions in the same manner; that immoderate power to think and publish one's thoughts is not the right of any citizen, nor is it to be classed among those things that merit favor and patronage. In like manner it must be understood that the church is a society, not less than the state itself, perfect in kind and right."

We have referred sufficiently to the first two points of this last passage. The remainder of this article will refer to what the pope says about the church in its relation to the state. Once grant that the church as well as the state is from God; that the church has her authority directly from God, given to the Apostles and their successors, so that those who hear them hear Him, that this authority is abiding in the church now as on the Day of Pentecost, and no sane man can avoid seeing that both these societies, the state and the church, are independent, the one of the other, each in its sphere; but that the state which is constituted for the material order must be second and subordinate to the church in what relates to the spiritual condition of men, for which Christ constituted the church. So evident is this that the "reformers," who found they had to depend on the rulers of states they were in, invented a hitherto strange

doctrine, that religion belonged to the one who ruled the land, *cujus regio illius religio.* Professor Schaff, in a recent article in the *North American Review*, deservedly and unmercifully scores the slavish condescension of these men who pretended to preach liberty of opinion. They not only made man the slave of kingly power, but enslaved his soul too! And so, while the iron heel of the European despotism was stamping out the true faith of Christ from the hearts of poor, simple people, the minister stood by and applauded and bade the people accept what the prince said they must believe. Degradation of humanity! Was this the conduct of the popes, and bishops, and priests, and martyrs of the early Christian centuries? No! They gave the people the example of dying for the faith, and bade them die for it. They followed the example of the Apostles, who said: "We ought to obey God rather than men" (Acts v., 29). In this Encyclical the pope lays down the law given by Christ: "Give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's; but to God the things that are God's." There is no fear of the church trying to usurp the rights of the state. History shows that the danger is just the other way. The calumny of her enemies has blackened the fair fame of Christ's spouse, who must always defend His interests, and bear the consequences, persecution and calumny. That many questions arise in which the two orders, the civil and religious, meet, comes necessarily from the fact that man has a soul, first subject to God, and then to the state. Those questions, as the pope ably intimates, can be met by agreements which accurately determine the relations of each order, known as concordats. Where these are observed, there is no danger of any clash. That

such agreements will be needed in this country, where the church enjoys the fullest liberty, is not at all likely. It is far more likely that the state, in the possible troubles which may result from the too unrestricted importation of the refuse of Europe, and extension of the right of suffrage, may have to call on the church to keep her simple people from the delusions of socialism abroad in the land, brought hither by those who learned such principles in the countries that have cast off the "yoke of Rome," or turned a deaf ear to the counsels of the church. It is such doctrines as these, atheistical literature eminently destructive of society, and such publications as Mr. Comstock so meritoriously wars against, which make Pope Leo XIII. condemn the unbridled liberty of the pen, and society should thank him for what he has done.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XIV.

TENURE OF LAND AND EMINENT DOMAIN.

(*Read before the Leonine Union of Indianapolis, Oct.* 7, 1887.)

YOU have been good enough, my dear friends, to invite me to address you this evening, and, on my part, there is a sincere desire to meet your expectations to the extent of my ability. In casting about for a subject, I have thought I should meet your wishes by saying something that would not only interest, but give instruction on some question of our day regarding which it is important to have exact ideas. It was not difficult to find such a subject, as a variety of topics are nowadays discussed of a very serious and of a very practical character. The change that is working in the world from the old order to the new, from the state of tutelage, in which the mass of the people have been in all countries, to the individual freedom which exists among us here, and is gradually coming into existence or increasing in all civilized nations, is continually bringing ideas to the front which have to be examined and pronounced upon. This begets great activity of mind and a great strife of opinion, which has its advantages, if there be temporary disadvantages. We are not afraid of the use of reason. Reason is God-given, and, like

everything that comes from God, it leads to God if rightly used. There is hardly a more interesting passage in the acts of the Plenary Council of the Vatican than the IVth Chapter of the Dogmatic Constitution on Faith and Reason, approved in the IIId Solemn Session. In this the Ven. Fathers of the Council and the Sovereign Pontiff speak nobly of reason. They recognize it as a source and order of knowledge; declare it, with St. Paul, to be able to arrive at the knowledge of God; deny that there can ever be any real dissension between faith and reason, as God, who gives faith, gave the light of reason to the mind of man. They further affirm that faith and reason mutually aid each other, since right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith. We are therefore justified in trusting to the use of reason, though, happily, we acknowledge a still higher tribunal, that of revealed truth which comes from God and which is in the keeping of that church in which dwells the Paraclete promised and sent by its Divine Founder. With the light that revealed truth sheds, the defects of reason are remedied, and the path is so illumined as to make mistake impossible. By the use of both these concordant means of knowledge, we can safely take in hand any question.

The subject I have selected for your consideration to-night is one which, from the intense interest it has lately and still excites, might almost cause one to hesitate treating it. But I have, nevertheless, come to the conclusion to speak of it, because I know your desire for precise information, and have, in common with you, seen the false notions which have been spread before the public that show a want of understanding of what

is essential; while, moreover, these false notions, having a very practical bearing, menace the foundations of social order. And as you, gentlemen of the Leonine Union, have for your purpose the furthering of social science among us, and inscribe upon your banner fidelity to the teachings of the church and its head, whose name honors you, I therefore crave your courteous attention, and that of the guests who have honored us on this occasion, while I discuss the question of the Tenure of Land and the relation with it of what is known as Eminent Domain.

How land came to be held as private property might seem a very plain and a very obvious matter, as it certainly does to those who, with a simple and unprejudiced mind, look at things as they are. But not all are such simple and unprejudiced persons. Early education, surroundings, the influence of theorists, have their weight in drawing one from the way of correct judgment; while there are others to whom the retort may be addressed: "Much learning doth make thee mad." The words, too, of St. Paul (I. Tim., ch. 3, v. 7), in this connection, occur to the mind; for these persons are "ever learning, and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth." But if the matter is so obvious, how is it that writers and speakers have gone astray?

It is an easy stumbling-block in the path of those who are wayward, that, primarily, God made the earth and gave it to the children of men in common; and that the natural law contains no dictate which says that land shall be held in one way more than in another. The theme, consequently, suggests itself to a philanthropist of fanciful mood and of unpractical ways, how shall land best

be held, in common or otherwise? and he decides that it is far better that it be held as it was originally given, in common. From that to the condemnation of those who defend individual ownership of land the passage is easy. Then the historical student goes to work to investigate how, from the land being common property, it came to be possessed as private property. He goes back till he comes to the dawn of civilization, or to the days of barbarism, and he hunts for the germs of the idea of individual possession, and on his researches others may base their theories on the subject. Thus, in his Constitutional History of England, Professor Stubbs, of Oxford, goes to Germany and investigates the manners and customs of the Saxons and other tribes who contributed their quota to the invasion and conquest of England. It is interesting to hear what he says, for it is from England, the mother country, that our own common law, which regulates this question of land tenure, has come; though, as I shall have occasion to develop, the idea of holding from the crown or the state, which, it appears, underlies the system, is rather a *fictio juris*, a fiction of the law, and, at all events, merely an accidental mode of tenure, and by no means from the essence of things.

I would premise, lest there should be misunderstanding, that Professor Stubbs, to my knowledge, nowhere argues in favor of holding land in common. But he quotes ancient writers to show what was the original custom among the Saxons. On page 19 of vol. I., after speaking of the writings of Julius Cæsar, he quotes the historian Tacitus saying that "possessions of land are held by all, by turn—that is, in common, which they presently divide

up according to the rank or dignity of the cultivators."* Commenting on this passage, Prof. Stubbs goes on to say it is evident there were classes among the early Germans—the noble, the well-born, the freedmen, and the slaves. "But," he adds, "the inequalities in the use or possession of land involve no inequalities in social or political rights." These tribes, therefore, seem to have held their possessions originally in common, and to have divided them up annually, or periodically, according to the importance or need of those who cultivated them, on the principle that those who had greater need on account of their flocks, or greater merit in defending the country, should be more bountifully provided for; which, I think, all will look upon as a beginning of that unavoidable inequality in the distribution of wealth which always and everywhere manifests itself among men. Further, on page 23, the professor tells us that the slaves paid rent, which shows that even this tenure in common had its modification. Speaking of the gradual change from possession in common to that of the individual, Professor Stubbs goes on: "Without conjecturing how the change took place, we may safely assume that, although traces still remain of a common land tenure at the opening of Anglo-Saxon history, absolute ownership of land in severalty was established and becoming the rule. We may, then, regard the land as referable to two great divisions: that which was held by individuals in full ownership, and that of which the ownership was in the state." The former, because recorded, was called "*bookland*;" the latter was known as "*folcland*," or public land.

* "Agri pro numero cultorum ab universis in vices (al. in vicis) occupantur, quos mox inter se secundum dignationem partiuntur." Dr. Waitz contends for *in vicis*.

We come now to the period in which the feudal system prevails and still further modifies the tenure of land. This system came from the peoples that invaded the Roman empire, and was founded on conquest. The conqueror allotted the land to whom he pleased, and the holder held his possession or feud from his sovereign, the donor. Blackstone, on the Rights of Things, book II., ch. 1, pp. 45–46 (Sharswood's edition, 1875), says on this subject, allotments of this nature "all sprang from the same right of conquest." Professor Stubbs, referring to the Germans (vol. I., p. 35), remarks: "The military *princeps* has but to conquer and colonize a new territory, and reward his followers, on a plan that will keep them faithful, as well as free, and *feudalism springs into existence.*"

From what has been said it is evident, first, that the possession of land in common, where it existed, was found to be impracticable on a large scale and in need of modification; and it finally gave way to individual ownership: and, secondly, that the feudal system, in which all hold from the sovereign, is an artificial condition of tenure. Possession in common, therefore, being impracticable, and the possession by the sovereign of all land being a forced and not natural condition, it would follow, it seems, that neither possession in common nor the feudal system is according to nature, that is, according to what reason demands, although not contrary to reason.

What will our reason teach on this subject? What will the study of the essence of things make us understand?

Let us consult the masters to whom the world looks for guidance, and hear what they have to say.

A great lawyer, and an authority consulted by all who use the English language, shall be the first to whom we address ourselves.

"As the world by degrees became more populous," says Sir William Blackstone, "it daily became more difficult to find out new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former occupants; and by constantly occupying the same individual spot the fruits of the earth were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any provision for future supply or succession. It therefore became necessary to pursue some regular method of providing a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced, or at least promoted and encouraged, the art of agriculture. And the art of agriculture, by a regular connection and consequence, introduced and established the idea of a more permanent property in the soil than had hitherto been received and adopted. It was clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities without the assistance of tillage; but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labor? Had not, therefore, a separate property in lands, as well as movables, been vested in some individuals, the world must have continued a forest, and men have been mere animals of prey, which, according to some philosophers, is the genuine state of nature. Whereas, now (so graciously has Providence interwoven our duty and our happiness together) the result of this very necessity has been the ennobling of the human species by giving it opportunities of improving its *rational* faculties, as well as of exerting its *natural*. *Necessity begat property*; and

in order to ensure that property recourse was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable concomitants—states, government, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of religious duties." Sharswood's Blackstone—"Of the Rights of Things," book II., ch. 1, pp. 7, 8.

Clear as the statement of this learned jurist is, it is surpassed in lucidity and cogency by the words of the great doctor of the church, St. Thomas of Aquin, the theologian of the church, whom the reigning sovereign pontiff proposes to us all as the teacher we should follow. Where Sir W. Blackstone says, *Necessity begat property*, St. Thomas shows what that necessity is, and how nature herself calls for property, or individual ownership.

In the second part of the second division of his great work, his Sum of Theology, in showing what is naturally just—*justum naturale*—he writes thus: "A thing is naturally fitted to (or for) something else by reason of what follows from it, as, for example, ownership of property."* St. Thomas here has recourse to an everyday mechanical experience of one thing fitting into another, like two pieces of wood measured and cut so as to fit one into the other. So he says there is a certain fitting of ideas with each other, and this fitting we discover by the study of their nature, and thus from what naturally follows from a thing we judge of its agreeing with, fitting with, some other thing. The study of the nature of land shows that it is fitted for ownership—that there is a natural fitness in land that

* 2a, 2æ, quæst. LVII., art. 3, and quæst. LXVI., art. 2.

it be held in ownership. The idea of land and the idea of private ownership fit together. This special fitness flows or follows from the nature of land. That nature, in this as in other things, determines how it is to be possessed, how used. Air and running water, for example, can not be held like land, from their very nature. It follows from the study of their nature that every one has a right to them; to consume the air by breathing, by burning, or in other ways; to consume or use the water for drinking, for steam, for washing, or other purposes. From the study of the nature of land, as it must be cultivated to produce plentifully, or what is wanted, it naturally follows that there is a special fitness in it for private or individual ownership.

In this connection St. Thomas is very exact in distinguishing what is primarily according to natural law, and what reason recognizes by deduction as in accordance with that same law. He says:* "What is naturally just or fit is seen in things in two ways. In one way it is seen by the mere (absolute) study or simple consideration of the thing, as, for example, it is natural for a father to provide food for his child. In another way, not by the simple consideration of the thing, but by something that follows from it, which is apparent from a further study of it, its relations, etc." An example of this second kind of natural fitness he says is *individual ownership of possessions*, to give the very word he uses. That by the word *possessions* he means *land* is evident from the fact that he immediately illustrates by the example of a field (*ager*): "If this field be

* 2a, 2æ, quæst. LVII., art. 3.

considered absolutely, there is nothing in it why it should belong rather to this one than to that one; but if it be considered with regard to cultivation and peaceful use, in this it has a certain fitness for being owned by one and not by any other."

In the second article of Question LXVI. he goes still further into this matter. He says: "In relation to what is exterior to him two things are proper to man. One of these is the power to procure and dispense; and in regard to this it is lawful for him to have what is his own. And this is necessary for human life for three reasons: first, because one is more solicitous in taking care of what is his alone, than of what is common to all or many." In this latter case each one would avoid work and leave it to others, as happens where there is a multitude of servants. To illustrate by a homely but good phrase: "What is everybody's business is nobody's business." "Secondly," he continues, "because human affairs are carried on with more order if it be incumbent on each one to take care of some one thing; for there would be confusion if every one, without distinction, should take care of everything. Thirdly, because in this manner peace is kept among men, as each is content with what is his own."

Here comes in a most interesting and lucid distinction and explanation by St. Thomas. He takes up the main objection to his teaching just laid down. This objection he thus states: "It seems it is not lawful for any one to possess anything as his own. For whatever is contrary to natural law is not lawful. But according to natural law all things are common; to this holding in common, private ownership is in opposition.

Therefore, it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing"—land or other. This is certainly categoric. Let us see how he answers it These are his words: The principle of "community of goods we attribute to natural law, not because the law of nature dictates that everything is to be held in common, and that nothing is to be possessed as one's own, but because according to natural law there is no distinction of possessions, but such distinction (*of yours and mine*) is rather according to human agreement, which is a matter of positive law, as we have said above. (Quest. LVII., art. 2 and 3.) Wherefore, private ownership is not contrary to the law of nature, but is superadded to it by the deduction of man's reason."

At first sight these words might appear to favor the communistic opinion. But St. Thomas is not going to contradict himself. He makes a distinction between the natural law and the positive law, and says private ownership is according to this positive law. What does he mean by this? Turning to art. 2 of Quest. LVII., he tells us what he means by "positive law"—"what the whole people, by public agreement, declare right;" and lest any one should misunderstand him, he says, "the will of men can make just what is not repugnant to natural justice, and such enactments *are positive law*. But if anything have in it what is repugnant to the law of nature, it can not be made just by the will of men."* This positive law he calls the *law of nations* (*Jus Gentium*), and he gives the Jurisconsult Caius' definition of it: "*What natural reason has determined among all men,*

* Ad 2um.

that which is observed among all people, is called the Law of Nations." St. Augustine, speaking of a law, uses the terse expression, *Ratio est anima legis*—Reason is the life of law. St. Thomas means the same thing; and therefore the dictates of the positive law, or of the Law of Nations, are based on reason. The jurisconsult quoted above by St. Thomas still further illustrates the character, the nature, of the Law of Nations, in his comments on the Pandects of Justinian (l. 41, § 1, leg. 1), by saying that "before civil law, the Law of Nations was given to the light with the human race itself"—that is, came into existence with the human mind itself.

The theologian Toletus, well known for his commentary on St. Thomas, says (vol. XI., p. 346, ed Palmé, 1869) on this point, what results from the study of the words of the Doctor of the Church, that "human law is twofold: one the Law of Nations, which is derived by sequence and argument from the natural law; the other positive law, which has its origin in man's will." But St. Thomas, as we saw a moment ago, teaching that "man's will can not make just what has in it anything repugnant to the law of nature," embraces all the enactments of reason under a general term of positive law, and classes under it individual ownership of land, having first clearly stated, as we have seen, that this individual ownership of land follows from the natural law.

In using this expression, "individual ownership of land follows from the natural law," I do not, therefore, mean to say that *primarily* nature dictates that land is to be divided, for *primarily* all things were common. But, by this expression, I do mean that ownership by a private person so follows from the nature of the case that reason,

easily perceiving the fitness of private ownership in the present state of things, dictated it through the common agreement of men; so that whosoever opposes such individual ownership opposes nature, the natural law, the common law of nations, which, as we have seen, is what right reason has everywhere ordained.

From this natural law differs the positive law of men, or civil law, which is founded on reasons not intrinsic to the state of things, but which men, using their reason, judge proper to enact, though they might judge otherwise without violating the law of reason. The decisions of this kind of positive law are, therefore, arbitrary, not following from the nature of the things considered; but they are not in contradiction with it. To illustrate, the theologian, Cardinal Cajetan (commenting, 2a, 2æ, quest. LXVI., art. 2), says: "In ownership two things are found. First, that one thing belong to one person and another thing to another person; second, that this field belong to this (definite) person, and that field belong to that person. In the first case ownership is by or according to the Law of Nations, for reason dictates this. In the second case ownership is by or according to positive law, because, before a thing is appropiated, there is no reason why it should rather belong to one than to another."

Commenting also on this portion of St. Thomas (2a, 2æ, quest. LXVI., art. 2, p. 346), Toletus says the theologians he is quoting and Cardinal Cajetan call the Law of Nations (*Jus Gentium*) the Law of Nature, because it is derived from the natural law.

It is clear, therefore, according to the teachings of the great Master of Theology we have been consulting, that the right of the individual to have property, to own land,

is taught by reason, and that those who assert the contrary are wrong. So true is this that we find him (in his book Contra Gentiles, l. iii., p. 127), when writing of the early heretics who would possess nothing, speaking in this manner: "Therefore are these men heretics because, separating themselves from the church, they think those have no hope of salvation who use what they themselves do not possess." (Nunzio Signoriello, Ethica Specialis, p. 59. Naples, 1883.)

I shall, therefore, using the expression of St. Thomas, 2a, 2æ, quest. LXVII., as up to the present, during the remainder of this lecture, speak, in the sense thus declared, of private ownership of land as existing by natural law (*justum naturale*).

While nearly all who call themselves Catholics will be found holding strongly to this doctrine of individual ownership of land, there are some who unwittingly play into the hands of the enemies of the truth, owing to the confused idea they have concerning the rights of the state over the property of individuals. They confound what is known as the right of Eminent Domain with a right of possession to the land itself, attributing, at least in the abstract, such dominion to the state. This is a fatal error; for there can not be two possessors. The concession that the state is a possessor even in the abstract gives up the whole case to the Communist and Socialist; for the principle carried out legitimately would make the individual only a tenant at will. It is for this reason very important that we should have a precise idea of what Eminent Domain is.

It is not, in the first place, a dominion properly so called, which implies ownership. The term "*Dominium*

altum" was used by Suarez and others to signify a certain power, but not to exclude the ownership of the individual. The theory, which originated in feudalism, that all land in England was held by the crown, originated in the right of conquest. But this conquest is an accidental thing, and any right which flows from it must have the same accidental nature, for it can not rise higher than its source. This theory, therefore, does not pertain to the essential ideas of natural right to which alone we are to go for principles by which our judgment is to be formed. The same thing is to be said about various ways of tenure of land in different countries. It is said, with how much truth I confess I am not able to say, that the land in Ireland was not held in private ownership in early times, about the fifth century, but in common by the people. It would seem to have been a system such as Professor Stubbs speaks of as obtaining in Germany among the Saxons. It may have been patriarchal, a system possible where the people are not numerous, and are very closely allied with each other by blood or interests. But just as in the case of the Saxons it was found impracticable to hold land in common, just so patriarchal systems are doomed to disappear and be succeeded by a tenure more in accord with the exigencies of society and with the dictates of human reason; for, as we have seen, supposing no prior owner, and placing men face to face with the question what they are to do with the land upon which they are to dwell, the solution will be that individuals are to own the land, and the community is to protect the rights of each one.

One or two preliminary remarks will help us to understand better what eminent domain is, regarding which

we shall consult authorities, as I have just done. Government exists for the benefit of the people subject to it, and authority is a trust to be used for the good of those under it. All authority comes from God, and it is to be obeyed for conscience sake; who resists the authority of the state resists the ordinance of God. But the state must proceed by law, which is an ordination of reason emanating from the person or persons having the care of the community, and made for the common good. Reason is the life of law. The state, therefore, has to act for the public good and according to reason. Its rights, therefore, are not unlimited; reason limits them in the first place, and the public good in the second place; though the reasonableness and the utility of a law are, in themselves, inseparable. The state, therefore, can not arbitrarily and unnecessarily interfere with the rights of individuals. But there come circumstances in which reason itself dictates that the state must interfere, and put in abeyance the rights of individuals, for protection or general welfare; occasionally, in cases of necessity, even destroy property, as in times of war. In the present instance I am not called upon to examine the various phases of this supreme power inherent naturally in every state. I here call attention to it in regard to the property, the landed possessions of a country, and ask the question, what is the power of the state with regard to property? what is meant by eminent domain, the name by which this power is known?

Mr. Henry E. Mills, in his treatise on eminent domain, calls it the power of the sovereign to condemn private property for public use. He quotes Puffendorf (B. 8, c. 5, § 3), styling it "the exercise of transcendental pro-

priety," a definition which, implying right of possession by the state, a kind of dominion in the abstract, can not be accepted. But, further on, he quotes him again as saying: "As a general rule, any contribution made by a subject to a sovereign, greater than his quota or portion, requires compensation to the subject." (Puffendorf, B. 8, c. 8.) The fact of compensation would seem to conflict here with the idea of right of possession on the part of the state, for such compensation recognizes, up to the moment of seizure, the rights of property of the person from whom it has been taken. "The civil code of France recognizes the necessity of just compensation, and the annals of all nations enjoying a constitutional government, and of many despotic nations, show that the moral sense of mankind requires such compensation. In the United States this right of the subject is secured by the Federal Constitution, and by a separate clause in the bill of rights of almost every state in the Union. In the absence of provisions in the constitution, the Courts have considered that the principle was so universal and fundamental that laws not recognizing the right of the subject to compensation would be void." (p. 1.)

Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations (3d ed., p. 523), defines eminent domain to be "the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand." The wording of this writer all implies the right of private property. For example (page 524), he says the right of

eminent domain "excludes pre-existing individual rights; it seizes property which government can not lawfully appropriate under any other right;" it is of strict construction because it interferes with rights. On page 520 he says: "It is conceded on all hands that the legislature has no power, in any case, to take the property of one individual and pass it over to another without reference to some use to which it is to be applied for the public benefit." In the case of Buckingham *v.* Smith, 10 Ohio, 296, Judge Wood ruled that "the principle (of eminent domain) is founded on the superior claims of a whole community over an individual citizen; but then only in those cases where private property is wanted for public use, or demanded by the public welfare. We know of no instance in which it has or can be taken, even by state authority, for the mere purpose of raising revenue by sale or otherwise, and the exercise of such a power would be utterly destructive of individual right and break down all distinction between *meum* and *tuum*, and annihilate them forever at the pleasure of the states."

Speaking of compensation, on page 559 Judge Cooley says: "It is a primary requisite in the appropriation of lands for public purposes that compensation shall be made therefor. This compensation must be pecuniary in its character, because it is in the nature of a *compulsory purchase.*"

Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, vol. II., pp. 297-399, says: "The right of eminent domain or inherent sovereign power gives to the legislature the *control* of private property for public uses, and for public uses only." "A provision for compensation is

a necessary attendant on the due and constitutional exercise of the power of the lawgiver to deprive an individual of his property without his consent; and this principle in American constitutional jurisprudence is founded on *natural** equity, and is laid down by jurists as an acknowledged principle of universal law." This language is worthy of attentive consideration. The power is one of *control* only; its exercise requires *compensation*, which, as we have said, excludes the idea of proprietorship by the state; *natural equity* requires compensation, because, evidently, the individual's right of ownership has been set aside. Such compensation, too, must be made, not for improvements, but for property. The Chancellor goes on to insist that this compensation must be offered before the seizure. The very idea of compensation offered thus previously to seizure gives us to understand that the state is in no way the owner of the land. Were it otherwise, the state might be considered to, and could re-enter into possession of its own, giving the tenant, afterward, action for damages, for reimbursement for improvements, if such understanding existed; for it is ordinarily understood that any improvement of a permanent character, put there by the tenant of his own accord, adheres to the soil and belongs to the owner.

This will suffice to show that in the minds of these three legal authorities eminent domain is not a right of possession of the property of individuals, but only a power of control for the public good; which power must respect individual rights, and make compensation

* Italics ours.

for loss when the state is obliged to seize property. By the exercise of eminent domain the state does not re-enter into any right; it simply uses all proper means to protect the community, which is the primal duty, and therefore right, of supreme authority.

Turning to some of our theologians of name, we find Suarez thus writing (Opusc. de Justitia Dei, s. 4, n. 6): "The republic or king has a certain *high dominion* over the possessions of all the citizens, and the private property of all, which does not exclude their private dominion; but, notwithstanding that, it gives power to use these goods for the common utility of the republic, when the moment of need calls for it."

Professor J. Costa-Rosetti, S. J., in his Moral Philosophy,* speaking on this point (p. 550), remarks that what is known as *Dominium Altum* "should rather be called "*Jus superius*," Higher Right; because this expression *Dominium Altum* (Eminent Domain) *is in danger of being abused, and has been abused by despots.*" He then states categorically that "this right of eminent domain is not dominion or right of possession of property, so called, for it is not the object of commutative justice, which alone regards dominion proper." Eminent domain, therefore, even in the abstract, is not a sovereign possession of the land which grants to individuals the right to use certain portions of it, reserving to itself the right to re-enter into possession when it judges necessary. It is the object of distributive justice as regards its exercise, for that regulates the burdens and the benefits of the citizens; as regards the citizen, legal

* Innsbruck, 1886.

justice requires him to obey and render the community what is due from him; commutative justice relates to purchase, and therefore implies dominion; but the very idea of the state selling its eminent domain is absurd. Why? First, because it has no dominion to part with by sale; and because, secondly, that right is a right essential to sovereignty, and, like the sovereignty of the state, can not be parted with. It transcends all idea of dominion—is, in fact, a right to be used not to despoil the subject, but to protect him in the enjoyment of his rights, among these also his right to his land.

Having seen what legal authorities and learned theologians have to say on this point of eminent domain, let us sum up briefly.

Eminent domain differs from ownership:

First, in itself. Ownership gives dominion, eminent domain does not; for it is only a right of control, though a sovereign right, inherent in supreme power. And this right of eminent domain does not differ in any essential point from the general control which the state exercises over all the rights of its citizens. *Salus Populi Suprema Lex*, the Safety of the Republic is the Supreme Law, is the axiom which is a key to understanding the true nature of this higher right or eminent domain. How the right of control is to be exercised is determined by the special nature of the right or rights the control of which has become necessary.

Second, in its conception. The idea of private ownership is first in the mind; then arises the idea of the control of it. Ownership in common, we may grant, was the original mode of ownership. But it was only one mode of ownership, just as private ownership is

another mode. When, by the act of the community, ownership in common ceased, the community no longer retained any ownership in what the private individual had begun to own. There remained only the sovereign right of control inherent in the supreme power. This idea of sovereign control, in the logical order, arises in the mind following on the idea of private ownership; as we must first conceive the idea of *what* is to be controlled before we can have the idea of controlling it.

Third, in its scope. Ownership is for the benefit and support of the family. Eminent domain exists, not for the support of the state, but for its protection, and consequent protection of the rights of all. The state may purchase and hold property for its benefit and support, as, for example, a tract of wooded land. But, then, this is the same ownership as that enjoyed by the individual, and is regulated by the same laws.

Fourth, in its powers and in the exercise of them. Ownership allows the owner to dispose of his property when and how he pleases. Eminent domain seizes property only in certain cases determined by the public need. That need also directs how that property shall be disposed of. Compensation, too, must be made. Even when eminent domain is spoken of as "a right of transcendental propriety," as we have seen Puffendorf style it, the writer requires compensation, which implies ownership by the individual. The law requires compensation to be offered before seizure, which shows respect for the owner's right.

Eminent domain, therefore, is essentially distinct from the right of ownership, which it excludes from its very conception, compensating as it does the owner for his property, which can be seized only for public uses for

the public good. It is easy to understand, then, how wide of the mark they are who confound it with dominion proper. It would be bad enough to err in stating the contrary, were such an error only speculative or theoretical. But in the present tendency of many to apply this erroneous judgment in a practical manner, so as to take away property from the owner and tax it to its full value per year as rent to the state, it becomes a most dangerous error, and should be guarded against most carefully, for it is the basis of the Socialistic and Communistic systems, which, as a learned writer already quoted, says: "agree in this, that they war against property." (N. Signoriello, Eth. Specialis, p. 58.) Socialism has been too often condemned by the supreme authority of the church to need that we enter any further into the treatment of it. It will suffice to refer here to the Encyclical Letters of Pius IX., "Qui Pluribus," of Nov. 9, 1846, "Nescitis et Nobiscum," of Dec. 18, 1849, and "Quibus Luctuosissimis," of Sept. 5, 1851. Finally, the Encyclical Letter of the present sovereign pontiff, Leo XIII., "Quod Apostolici Muneris," of Dec. 8, 1878, speaks thus in condemnation of this and like systems: "Allured by cupidity of the goods of this life, *which is the root of all evil*, in seeking which some have erred from faith (I. Tim. vi., 10), they attack *the right of owning property, which right the natural law sanctions*, and by an enormous crime, while they seem to consult the needs and desires of all men, strive to seize and hold in common whatever has been acquired by title of legitimate inheritance, by mental or manual labor, or by frugality of life." So speaks the leader of God's hosts; the trumpet gives no uncertain sound; we know our banner, and upon it we read, "Be just to all; respect every man's right."

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XV.

TEMPORAL POWER AND THE PAPACY.

(*The Forum, May*, 1888.)

THE recent events at Rome, and the sympathy so generally shown toward Pope Leo XIII. on the occasion of his priestly Jubilee, have again called attention to the question of the temporal power of the pope, which by many had been judged a thing of the past. Emilio Castelar, in his article on the subject, published not long since in the *Fortnightly Review* may be taken as the exponent of this class of persons, and very fairly. He has a facile pen and ready speech, but this is not enough to guarantee a writer from going wide of the mark. Were Emilio Castelar not a Spaniard, that is, born and bred in the midst of a Catholic atmosphere, where he could or ought to have known better, little fault could be found with his taking the views he does. But nearly every line betrays the partisan of ideas which cannot but be condemned by the church, in the bosom of which he is supposed to have been baptized in his first days of existence. He moreover makes evident his want of knowledge of Catholic principles in his observations on the encyclical, *Immortale Dei*, which is no new departure, but the affirmation of the old teachings of the church. He is

superficial, too, in his criticism of Pope Leo XIII.'s course with Italy and with Germany. He has lost his bearings, and misjudges, in consequence, the action of the pontiff, who is bound by every reason to seek the welfare of the church, which absolutely calls for the very steps he has taken in both countries; steps which in Germany have already produced such useful results, and have made the German Chancellor declare that the papacy is not a foreign institution in the German Empire. Señor Castelar, instead of looking on the "abrogation of the laws of May" as a triumph of papal diplomacy, holds it up as a proof of the fact that there still exists in Germany hostility to the papal "tiara," and opposition to the pope's spiritual jurisdiction, because this abrogation has only "just" taken place. The partisanship displayed here makes the writer, despite his experience and reputation, an unreliable judge in the matter we are about to consider.

We propose to place before the reader, in these remarks, what may enable him to form his own judgment on the question of the necessity of the temporal power of the pope, free from all undue influence. To effect this we must clearly give adequate reasons to make it evident that, if the church is to be free and untrammeled, and not under "hostile domination," the temporal power is a necessity. There is no need to go into details as to the origin of the temporal power. It is enough to know that no one can dispute the legitimate claims of the temporal dominion of the popes in the past, which was the outcome of the circumstances of the times. The subject is narrowed down just now to this: Is the restoration of the temporal power advisable, in view of

the greatly increased influence of the papacy since September 20, 1870? Is it a necessity to the church? If we succeed in showing that it is necessary, its advisability becomes a matter of course.

What is this Catholic Church, for which we are claiming something so incompatible with modern ideas as the possession of temporal sovereignty for its head? An answer sufficient for the case is, that the Catholic Church is a necessary union of the people of the earth; necessary, because the church is a body under one visible head, the successor of the Apostle Peter, as is the fundamental teaching; and for all nations, because Christ gave the command to the apostles, with Peter at their head, "Go teach all nations;" and for these reasons it is the strongest, the most compact and necessary moral organization on the face of the earth, embracing over two hundred millions of the most enlightened men, and with all the moral force that such an organization means. It follows that every individual of this vast multitude is directly concerned in the welfare, the relations, and the position of the head of the church. It is a vital question with the members of the body whether the head is in good condition. The office of the pope is to teach and to rule his spiritual subjects, and temporal sovereignty is a secondary and accidental adjunct to this, though one that is morally necessary. Why? Because it is necessary that his power to teach and rule be so free from pressure as to be above suspicion, and, we may add, so unhampered as to give in his immediate surroundings the model of that ecclesiastical economy which is to be copied by others elsewhere in the world.

It does not seem a difficult thing to impress every one with the absolute necessity of the freedom of the pope from all undue influence. Is it not, in fact, the universal answer to the complaint about the want of freedom of the pope, that he is free, that the Italian Government does not interfere with the pope, that he can do what he pleases, hold consistories, give audiences, celebrate canonizations, and say mass in St. Peter's? "So the pope is free"—such is the refrain. It proves one thing, that those who so speak recognize, from the nature of the case, the necessity of such freedom. Whether they believe or not the faith he teaches, they see that one whose lightest word is treasured up by millions of every clime, who look upon him as the guide of their conscience, must be above suspicion of any controlling influence; must be, not in word, but in fact, supreme. This cannot be otherwise than by a perfect temporal independence, to be brought about only through the possession of territorial dominion. Let us see if this assertion can be substantiated.

The popes have often been dispossessed. Every time this has happened social conditions have been disturbed, and order has been restored only by the restoration of the pope to his dominions. History records some forty such vicissitudes. It has thus come to be, as it were, an axiom among statesmen, that the Bishop of Rome must be a temporal sovereign. This may sound strange to an American ear; but we, who at the outset of our country's history disfranchised the District of Columbia for the good of all the States, should not object to Rome and its dependencies remaining under regal rule, even should Italy become a republic, which it is not.

While the church holds that, "justice being observed," the republican is a good form of government, she also takes the common-sense view that the monarchical form is not to be condemned as bad. That statesmen should see the need of temporal sovereignty for the pope, we can appreciate from a few facts.

What happened to the Roman pontiffs under the Roman emperors and till the time of Charlemagne is generally well known. They were made to feel, time and again, the power of the sovereign; imprisonment and death too often waited on the conscientious performance of duty; and it is impossible to think of these historic facts without admiration of the heroism the popes displayed, and astonishment that the church could have been able to survive. At times all the engines of imperial hate and tyranny were brought to bear on the one man who dared to brave, in the name of God, the fury of a despot. The barbarian rulers of Italy, who succeeded each other after the fall of the Western Empire, treated the Bishop of Rome with haughty contempt. The reigns of Odoacer and Theodoric are most instructive in this respect; the former, asserting for himself, through pretended concession of Pope Simplicius, the right of consent to the succession of the next pope, was the first to interfere with the freedom of election. Theodoric, the Arian king of the Ostro-Goths, not only interfered with the succession, but threw Pope John I. into prison, where, on the 18th of May, 526, he died.

But we have an illustration of the same thing nearer our own day. Napoleon carried off Pope Pius VII. into captivity, and detained him in prison, first at Savona,

and afterward at Fontainebleau. D'Haussonville has published the account of this captivity, and an interesting review of his work can be found in the *Dublin Review* of October, 1871. The pope was subjected to indignity and duress, and surrounded by spies. Dr. Porta, his physician, the prefect writes, was gained over; and while those faithful to the pope were left in straits, the doctor got his salary of 12,000 francs a year, because he was "of wonderful use to us." So harsh was the treatment to which the pope was subjected, in the determined effort to wring ruinous concessions from him, that his mind partially gave way. The Prefect de Chabrol, his jailer, writes confidentially to M. Bigot de Preameneu: "At this moment the mental alienation has gone by, and the physical disorder is less severe." It was during this time that, deceived by his counselors and by the creatures of Napoleon, he made the mistakes which he so nobly corrected in his better mind. These mistakes concerned the government of the church and the appointment of bishops. Next morning, when able to examine things more calmly, he would not forgive himself, declared he had not observed the last article of the document, insisted on recalling what he had consented to, and exclaimed, as he roused himself from his depression, "Happily, I have signed nothing."

Facts like these are known to statesmen, and therefore we are not surprised to see them recognize the importance of papal independence. Napoleon himself recognized it, though, in his own case, he trampled on the conviction or forgot it. In his conversation with M. Emery he says: "I took away the pope's temporal power because he does not know how to use it, and because

it interferes with the exercise of his spiritual functions. What do you say to that?" In reply M. Emery quoted Bossuet as declaring that "the independence and complete liberty of the sovereign pontiff are necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual authority throughout the world in so great a multiplicity of empires and kingdoms." Bossuet "rejoiced at the temporal power, not only for the sake of the apostolic see, but still more for that of the church universal." "Well," was the answer of Napoleon, "I do not reject the authority of Bossuet. All that was true in his times, when Europe acknowledged a number of masters. It would then have been unsuitable that the pope should have been the subject of any one sovereign. But what inconvenience is there in the pope's being subject to me—to me, I say, now that Europe knows no master except myself alone?" M. Emery's reply was a very wise one: "Your majesty is better acquainted than I with the history of revolutions. What exists now may not always exist, and therefore the inconveniences foreseen by Bossuet might once more make their appearance. Therefore the order of things so wisely established ought not to be changed."

M. Adolphe Thiers, the first president of the Republic of France, saw this same necessity of the temporal sovereignty very clearly. In a debate in the Corps Législatif he stated that he "had known all the archbishops of Paris from the beginning of the century. They were all most estimable men. But I should not have wished any one of them pope, because Notre Dame is too near the Tuileries!" In a diplomatic conversation with M. de Corcelle, the French ambassador

to the pope, he said: "We cannot give back to the pope his temporal power; we will give him the bishops;" that is, leave him free in the choice of them. The maintenance of the embassies and legations by the courts of Europe, the establishment of diplomatic relations by the German emperor, preceded by a visit to the pope on the part of the crown prince, who not only carefully avoided anything that could be interpreted as meaning forgetfulness of the claims of the pope to temporal sovereignty, but did everything customary to be done by the representatives of France and of Austria—all these facts show very plainly in what light the temporal sovereignty is held, especially when we take into consideration the recent honors diplomatically paid to Pope Leo XIII.

But, more than all this, the present state of things in Italy manifests the necessity of the pope's temporal dominion. What is that present state? Pius IX. declared himself to be "*sub hostili dominatione constitutus*" (subject to a hostile rule); and Leo XIII. has expressed frequently the same idea. Is this true? Let us see.

When the Ratazzi ministry resolved to invade what remained of the Papal States, Victor Emmanuel, appreciating the need of the temporal power, and not understanding fully whither he was going, assured Pius IX., through Cardinal Corsi, that Rome would not be taken. The pope believed him, and this is the explanation of the words of Pius IX., which the revolutionists laughed to scorn: "*Non sono profeta, ne figlio di profeta; ma vi dico che non entrarete.*" (I am not a prophet nor the son of a prophet; but I tell you, you will not enter.) The Italian troops did enter; the king gave way to his

customary ebullition of temper, then acquiesced, and Cardinal Corsi, mortified beyond measure, pined away and died. Rome became, through the farce of the *plebiscito*, the capital of Italy. But a *modus vivendi* was absolutely necessary to quiet Europe, and the law of guarantees, so-called, was enacted. Among sundry provisions more or less offensive to the papal dignity is Article XVII.:

"The recognition of the judicial effects of the spiritual and disciplinary acts, as well as of any other act of ecclesiastical authority, belongs to the civil jurisdiction. Such acts, however, are void of effect if contrary to the law of the state or to public order, or hurtful to the rights of private persons, and are subject to the penal laws if they constitute a crime."

The first draft of Article XVII. was too strong. It said openly that, in case of conflict between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, the supreme civil tribunal of the kingdom was to decide. This was toned down to suit rather tender susceptibilities; but the article says the same thing in even stronger terms, if we look to the penal sanction referred to. Here, then, was the official legal subjugation of the pope to Italy, making him a subject and a prisoner, as he already was by force of arms. Again, in a discussion in Parliament, the Senator Amari, speaking of the impossibility of reconciliation between Italy and the papacy, gave as a reason that the Constitution of Italy was little more than a document embracing the propositions of the "Syllabus," condemned by Rome. This is as true as it is pithy, and places the antagonism of the two powers forcibly before the mind. This is in the speculative order; in the practical sphere the exactions and confiscations of

the Italian Government, the suppression of religious corporations, the numberless acts of oppression on its part, make the opposition yet more pronounced. Even the property of the Propaganda, the gift of people of various nations for the welfare of the missions, has not been respected. To seize and sell the property of a board of foreign missions here would certainly be deservedly condemned by all. Yet this is what the Italian Government has done, giving in return credit, on the Book of the Public Debt, for a sum, the interest of which it taxes at the rate of thirteen and one-fifth per centum. More important than these financial embarrassments caused to the church, is the system of espionage kept up by the Italian Government's agents with regard to the Vatican. It is the boast, at the offices of state, that whatever goes on at the Vatican is known there at once. The appropriation and publication of the circular of Cardinal Rampolla, when we were last in Rome, we saw laid to the charge of those who were acting for the government of Italy. Is this freedom, or is it captivity? The weekly "Gossip from the Vatican," published by the *Italie* shows that profane eyes are watching, and profane ears listening, in the sacred precincts of the papal palace.

To all this we must add that the influence of the government is thrown in favor of teaching and of legislation favorable to irreligion and vice; for Moleschott teaches in the University, and the police license houses of ill repute. We have grave reason, then, to think, that the incompatibility of Italy and the pope is radical and lasting. What makes this more apparent is the fact that the spirit of the Italian Government is the spirit of free-

masonry. On what terms freemasonry and the church are, is well known. European masonry means naturalism, and the church means revelation, the supernatural in religion. The two have met on the field of Rome, and it is a duel to the death. When the late Signor Depretis, Premier of Italy, died, last August, Signor Adriano Lemmi, Grand Master of the Masonic Order, Sovereign Delegate, Grand Commander of the Supreme Council of the Thirty-three, sent to Signora Depretis the following telegram, which throws light on what we have just said:

"Italian masonry is proud of the honors paid to their illustrious brother, Agostino Depretis 33.°., who, up to the very last moments of his life, defended and professed masonic principles with honor, courage, loyalty. In our lodges we shall remember always that he devoted himself to the triumph of its humanitarian and generous aspirations. To you, madam, his faithful and dear companion, Italian masonry expresses its sincere condolence and its solemn desire: Educate his son that he follow the example of his father in the holy hatred of the implacable enemy of civilization and of our country. This enemy, covering itself with the spoils of Christ, redoubles, though in vain, its plots against the great work at which, together with the glorious band of our conspirators, soldiers, and martyrs, Agostino Depretis labored, to make, and cause so to remain, Rome intangible, eternal. "ADRIANO LEMMI."

With such facts and documents we are prepared to hear Pope Leo XIII. thus address the recent Italian pilgrimage, on January 3d, last. Speaking of the Jubilee, he says:

"This fact, certainly, is due to the action of Divine Providence, which makes the most ordinary circumstances and the least fit instruments serve the glory of the church. But this fact finds its true reason in the exceeding importance of the pontificate. * * * What nation would not think itself fortunate in giving hospitality to this divine institution? On the other hand, what folly to wish to belittle it, by making the mode and conditions of its existence a

question of the internal order of one country, of one nation! What an indignity to wish to have it cast down and humbled in its see, to wish to put obstacles in the way of its free and beneficent action, to place it in the position of a subject, and make it dependent on the will of an assembly or of a ministry! Assuredly, the Catholics of the whole world, jealous of the liberty of their head, and all who have at heart the cause of order and of the safety of human society, will never tolerate it."

We began this paper by criticising Emilio Castelar; we close it by quoting the words of another Spaniard, equally illustrious, Canovas del Castillo, who, on the 6th of February, 1885, being at that time a minister of the crown, made the following declaration, as published in the semi-official *Union*, of Madrid, in answer to Señor Labra's assertion that he had spoken of the Roman question as one of the internal order of the kingdom of Italy: "Whatever is possible and necessary in favor of the independence of the common father of the faithful, the present government of Spain will do with zeal, and so will do also the Conservative party as long as it shall remain in power." And he (Canovas) "will so act from his own convictions and antecedents. What I think, many Catholics think, the immense majority, not to say nearly all, and it is, that a certain historic form of the pontificate is most suitable, most important, necessary for this very independence." This is very categoric, and, considering the position of the speaker, who had to be guarded in his utterances, weighty, as showing this statesman's agreement with the words just quoted from the reply of Leo XIII.

Passing from statesmen to the people, we conclude with three telegrams lately sent to the pope. The first is from Switzerland, as follows:

"The President of the Council of Administration of the Catholic Publishing Society unites with the Director-general of the Work of St. Paul, in offering to your holiness their most sincere and respectful greetings, resolved to offer their life for you, that there may still be a small portion of the earth where the human race can breathe. This is our greatest glory, our greatest happiness."

The next is from Lisle, January 8:

"The Catholics of Lisle send to their most beloved father the homage of their fidelity, and their most ardent desires for the triumph of his rights."

The last is from the Catholics of Bonn, published December 29, 1887:

"The Catholics of Bonn, celebrating solemnly the most auspicious day on which your holiness completes your fiftieth year of priesthood, giving expression to their best wishes, declare their fidelity and devotion to the apostolic see, and trust that it may shortly reconquer its full liberty and recover its full power."

This article would deservedly be deemed incomplete did we not at least mention the movement going on in Italy, even among the Liberals, looking to the restoration of the temporal power. Colonel Fazzari, an ex-Garibaldian, was elected to Parliament on this issue. He resigned, because he found the members so hostile to the idea, but satisfied in having—we hope we shall not be censured for saying it—made a break in the record. General Turr, another ex-Garibaldian, proposed his plan for securing the papal independence by making Rome a seaport, and leaving it to the pope. The deputy Toscanelli, too, published a letter advocating the cession of a part of Rome and the territory back of the Vatican. Others have published views more or less similar, all showing that they feel that they have a knotty question

on their hands that must be solved in favor of sovereign independence of the pope.

This great demonstration, the facts, and the declarations we have cited, will speak for themselves. The Italian Government has not misunderstood them, and by its action in turning out of office the mayor of Rome, Duke Leopold Torlonia, and the mayors of Pocapaglia, of Trezzo Tinella, and of Gavazzana, because they, by acts, showed good feeling toward the pope, has given us the best evidence that it fears this demonstration in favor of the sovereign pontiff, as the handwriting on the wall, the "mene, thekel, phares," of Italian domination over Rome.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XVI.

CAN THERE BE SUCH A THING AS A MIRACLE?

(*The Catholic World, June*, 1889.)

FROM the press of Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1889, has issued a small publication which, but for the circumstances of the time, might have passed almost unnoticed. It contains two sermons by Prof. T. H. Green, M.A., LL.D., Fellow of Baliol College and Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. What constitutes their special interest is the fact that they are the lay sermons which Mrs. Humphrey Ward makes Robert Elsmere attend, and which had so powerful an effect on him. That anything could be written by a gentleman of such a position and acknowledged ability not meriting serious consideration no one would assert. Our expectation of finding a great deal that marked the man of learning and the metaphysician has not been disappointed. What, in addition to the ability and the ingenuity they manifest, has impressed us particularly is the earnestness of Prof. Green, a great factor in arresting the attention and conciliating respect, if not enforcing assent.

The remarkable feature, however, of these productions is the attempt to preserve the results and fruits of

Christianity while doing away with the great facts upon which it was founded, an attempt similar to that which would cut from its roots a fine tree in full foliage in the expectation of keeping it always fresh and vigorous. They are noteworthy, too, in another sense, as being the outcome of the systems which have constantly and persistently denied the possibility of miracles nowadays. By so doing there has been bred a habit of thought which has rendered Prof. Green's conception possible with many of those who belong, or have belonged, to the religious organizations which took form and shape after the beginning of the sixteenth century. This habit of mind rejects the supernatural, and rejecting it now, by an easy procedure rejects it in the past. Modern science, too, comes in as a most powerful auxiliary in fostering such a mental disposition; though, to do Prof. Green justice, he scores scientific men for issuing from their legitimate sphere of positive demonstration when they seek to deny the spiritual existence, although he does accept their rejection of miracle, because he and they do not admit of a variation from natural laws (p. 78). The process of denial has not stopped here. We do not think any one could be blamed for saying that the sermons, especially the one on faith, show the pantheistic leaning of the professor. We instance his words, p. 93, regarding the rejection of the "anthropomorphic formulæ in which we have been used to express to ourselves the presence and action of God as an external person moulding nature to his purposes, and intervening in it when and how he will"; p. 95: "It is yourself, not as you are but as in seeking him you become, that is his revelation"; p. 97:

"God is not something outside and beyond the consciousness of him, any more than duty is outside and beyond the consciousness of it." As Prof. Green, p. 78, intimates that science does not misunderstand "its nature and office in showing the supernatural to be a mere phrase to which no reality corresponds," as God only is the supernatural, it would seem to follow from his idea that God is merely a natural manifestation in human nature, by which he reveals himself in the soul; in other words, the consciousness of one's self, of the higher and better thought, is the consciousness of God; which appears to identify God with the soul.

But it is not so much with this or other points with which we cannot agree that we propose to occupy our readers to-day; it is the scepticism which pervades the book which calls for remark, a scepticism which reassumes all that has gone before it, such as was to have been looked for in a man so well informed and so familiar with the works of the greatest opponents of revelation, and its teachings or dogmas. Whether the scepticism is a reaction against the systems which, while setting up the right of private judgment against the claims of the old church to teach with authority, arrogated to themselves the right to dictate what should be believed, and enforced their views by penalties; or whether it has come from a genuine loss of faith; or from some less worthy motive, matters little to our purpose. The fact is there, and it is with the fact we propose to deal.

This scepticism may be said to be directed first against the accounts which tell of the beginnings of Christianity—that is, against the Scriptures, especially

of the New Testament; and secondly against the facts narrated which in any way are looked upon as supernatural—that is, wrought by God mediately or immediately, miracles.

We assume that all fair-minded men are looking for the truth, and that as far as preconceived notions, which we more or less all have, permit, are prepared to accept truth—fact; to deny a fact is to deny the truth. The appreciation of a fact is another thing. In this century it is undeniable, and a glory of our day, that the critical art, the art of judicially discerning the value of documentary evidence, has reached great perfection, has corrected many errors, and has led to many discoveries, the end of which we are glad to hope and believe is not yet. The more the light is concentrated on the Sacred Books of Christianity, the more they manifest their truthfulness. The immense mass of evidence which for a long time lay hid from the general gaze, buried in the writings of great men of the past, having been judiciously sifted and brought forward, has to a very great extent brought about greater trust in them as narratives, and has had the effect of blunting the shafts of hostile critics with all who, as Cardinal Newman has aptly put it, appreciate "that a difficulty is not a doubt." A man, for instance, may know a geometrical proposition is true, but may be ignorant of, or have forgotten, some step in the process of demonstration, which, however, he knows his teacher will show him. He has a difficulty, but no doubt of the truth. Just so must it be from the very nature of the case with Scripture, which for the most part we have in translations, not in the original, and which among us is

always read in the translation. In the original Greek there are thousands of varying readings which create difficulties, and this is all the more felt, because few have knowledge of the ancient languages and the leisure absolutely necessary for such study. Yet whatever difficulty exists did not prevent Tischendorf from giving us his splendid editions of the Greek text, notwithstanding he was not a believer in Christianity, and did his work only as a scholar. To us it has always seemed that the sole authority of St. Jerome, despite whatever it is possible to say against him personally, was more than sufficient to compel assent to the genuineness of the Scriptures, so great were his learning, his knowledge of languages, of Hebrew and of Syriac, and his opportunities on account of his contact with the Jews at Antioch and elsewhere, besides his fearlessness in saying what he thought.

To the aid of criticism comes archæology. The impulse given to archæological research in our day a Christian cannot but regard as providential. The discoveries of Layard at Nineve, of Schliemann at Troy and at Mycenæ, the Cesnola Museum of New York, speak a language that rebukes the doubt of Niebuhr and of Dr. Arnold. As Mr. Thomas H. Dyer writes, in his "History of the City of Rome:" "There is little motive to falsify the origin and dates of public monuments and buildings; and, indeed, their falsification would be much more difficult than that of events transmitted by oral tradition, or even recorded in writing. In fact, we consider the remains of some of the monuments of the regal and republican periods to be the best proofs of the fundamental truth of early Roman history." We

think one could go farther and warn people against rejecting blindly the traditions of a nation or of a city. We once saw the prudence of this very strikingly. Those who visited Rome some twenty years ago or less, and spent any time there, were familiar with the figure of Baron Ercole Visconti. He was a clever and a learned man, and so regarded notwithstanding some amiable foibles, very pardonable. The Romans were inclined to think he put too much faith in Visconti. One day he identified himself with a tradition of the Roman people at which the more learned smiled. The tradition had it that the marble-yard on the way to St. Paul's-outside-the-Walls, and opposite St. Michele, was the site of the old Roman yard for the sale of marbles of various kinds. We well remember the laughter at his expense, and his friends gently twitted him. But his reading led him to think as he did, and having obtained permission of Pius IX. to make the requisite excavations on the public ground, he began. It was not many days before all were amused at the result. The baron had found a graveyard. Deep down he had come upon a cemetery for slaves. But the inscriptions and the objects told him he was not much earlier than the middle ages; so he kept on, and finally was rewarded by discovering the Emporium, with its wealth of precious marbles, and the perfect slip going down to the water's edge, and the travertine block with the hole through which the hawser passed that moored the barges to the bank.

If such things happen in regard to profane history, why should they not also occur with reference to sacred history? It is a fact that the history of Abraham and

of the kings who with Chordorlahomor opposed him, and the history of Joseph, have received light and confirmation from the discoveries in Assyria, and from the hieroglyphs of Egypt. A sceptical spirit, therefore, in regard to history is unreasonable; it is as reprehensible as a prudent reserve is commendable. Critical examination has proven against all assault that the Scriptures are the most authentic and trustworthy books ever written, and the truth of the books of the New Testament has been borne witness to by thousands of Christians who sealed their faith with their blood at the very time when they were written, and received the name of *martyrs* precisely because they gave, in this way, testimony.

The other point at which scepticism aims is the supernatural event narrated in the Bible. This is the main object of attack; strip the Bible of everything miraculous, and there will be no difficulty in having it accepted, so much does its morality and beauty commend it to the admiration of all. Prof. Green admires it, but in proportion to his admiration is his repugnance to the supernatural and miraculous, which is so great as to make him reject everything of the kind, the Resurrection included.

The discussions on this subject have had for their result a certain indefiniteness of view with regard to what is miraculous. Recent writers have given definitions of a miracle, some of which it may be opportune to lay before the reader.

"Miracles," says Mr. Gladstone in his criticism of "Robert Elsmere," "constitute a language of heaven embodied in material signs, by which communication is

established between the Deity and man, outside the daily course of nature and experience." They are "an invasion of the known and common natural order from the side of the supernatural" (*Nineteenth Century* for May, 1888, pp. 177–178).

President James McCosh, in *Our Day*, February number, 1889, p. 147, writes: "A miracle is an event with God acting immediately as a cause" These two authorities speak of Scripture miracles, which they defend. His Eminence Cardinal Newman, as is well known, has written professedly a work on miracles. On page 7. ed. Pickering, London, 1873, he writes: "Miracles commonly so called are such events—that is, for the most part—as are inconsistent with the constitution of the physical world" Miracles according to these definitions, are not occurrences of the natural order; they are outside of it, above it, supernatural, even when the facts might occur by some natural event, as the bursting out of water by the splitting of a rock; *the cause* is what makes it a miracle, for the cause is God.

We know of no book which so thoroughly shows the law of evidence as the New Testament. It records the words and the way of acting of Christ in bringing men to acknowledge his mission. It is, therefore, a most interesting study in psychology. His whole life impressed his followers and gained their implicit confidence; he cited the prophecies regarding himself, and yet they did not fully comprehend; indeed, "they understood nothing of these things." But he had one means that did produce conviction and bring about belief; which still remained a gift of God. He said to his disciples, St. John v. 36: "The works which the

Father hath given me to perfect: the works themselves, which I do, give testimony of me, that the Father hath sent me"; c. x. vv. 37, 38: "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not"; v. 38: "But if I do, though you will not believe me, believe the works that I do." We may therefore supplement the above definitions by saying that a miracle is a sensible event or occurrence outside of the natural order, having for its author or cause God, and for its object to draw man to God directly or indirectly. That such is the character of the Scripture miracles no one can gainsay. Being occurrences of a sensible nature, to be perceived by the senses, they are subject to the ordinary rules of evidence that regard facts—such as are in use every day in the trial of criminal cases. It is a simple question, then, of fact. Did any one see it or not? If so, are the witnesses trustworthy? If they are, then the fact must be admitted. It will not do for prejudice to endeavor to shut its eyes to such facts. They obstinately persist in being. It is hardly worthy of the gravity of the matter, but we cannot refrain from telling what we once heard narrated of an Illinois statesman. He was enthusiastically propounding his views, when suddenly the hard-headed man in the crowd interrupted him with: "But, senator, the facts are against you." "So much the worse for the facts," was the reply. It will not do for Illinois statesmen nor any others to blind themselves to facts. Men are inclined to follow the laws of their nature, and they will accept a fact once they are certain the witnesses are to be trusted; while the willfully blind will always be a small minority. The most complete answer to the assertion that miracles are im-

possible in the past as in the present is the proof of a miraculous event itself, and we close this article with two such occurrences, one historical and the other of our day.

One of the best known facts of history is the apostasy of the Emperor Julian from the Christian faith. He is known as Julian the Apostate. Cynical and full of hate against the Christians, whom he contemptuously styled Galileans, he used against them every influence at his command. In accordance with this policy, he turned against them the Jews, and showing the latter his favor, resolved to re-establish them at Jerusalem and rebuild the temple; thus hoping to show groundless the predictions that told of the destruction of the temple and the dispersion of the people who had put Christ to death. These prophecies are briefly: Daniel ix. 26–27; and in the New Testament, Matthew xxiv. 2, Christ says to his disciples who came to show him the temple: "Amen, I say to you, there shall not be left here a stone upon a stone that shall not be destroyed"; Mark xiii. 2: "There shall not be left a stone upon a stone that shall not be thrown down." The same words are found in Luke xxi. 6. Encouraged by Julian, the Jews set about the work with the greatest enthusiasm, wealthy women contributing their jewels, and even carrying sand in the silken drapery that adorned their persons. The work was thorough, the foundations of the old temple still existing were torn up, and "not a stone was left upon a stone." They then set about building. What followed we may give in the words of the pagan Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus, whose testimony Gibbon himself declares to be "unexception-

able": "Whilst Alypius, assisted by the governor of the province, urged with vigor and diligence the execution of the work, horrible balls of fire frequently breaking out near the foundations several times burned or scorched the workmen and rendered the place inaccessible. The terrible element continuing in this manner obstinately to repel every effort, the undertaking was abandoned" (Ammianus Marcellinus, b. xxiii. c. 1). The Christian writers of the period, the fathers and the ecclesiastical historians, naturally do not fail to narrate in detail what a pagan historian deemed so worthy of mention as to record it. They tell of the luminous cross that appeared in the sky, and of the crosses that shone on the garments of people in Jerusalem. Gibbon does not attempt to deny the fact; but, as usual, he tries to destroy its weight by the remark that the "Roman historian, careless of theological disputes, might at a distance of twenty years adorn his work with the specious and splendid miracle." Sneers are not facts; this was a fact, and the friend and admirer of Julian would hardly have taken such a fact, that told of his failure, to *adorn* his pages with had it not been such a fact as struck the whole world and was on the lips of every one. Michaelis and Milman, following Gibbon, try to explain away the event by suppositions of fire-damp; if they had lived till our day they would have said natural gas. That would have been a better attempt at explanation. But fire-damp and natural gas have a certain natural way of burning that admits of control. This fire defied control and foiled the emperor, besides impressing all with the idea of a special intervention of Providence. Even were we to grant

that the fire was from natural causes, the circumstances of the case make us see that a ruling Providence brought about the combination of natural causes which produced the fire and drove away the workmen. The event has the mark of miracle upon it; for, besides being unusual and astonishing, it added strength to the faith, and led to God, who was the author of what fulfilled the words of his Divine Son. So great was the impression made on all, that this wonderful event may be said to have given the death-blow to pagan rule, for with Julian it disappeared from the Roman Empire for ever.

But it may be more interesting to hear of a modern miracle. It may add to the interest to know that the writer has personally investigated what follows, has seen the man mentioned, and not only spoken with the witnesses, but examined and cross-questioned them, having gone into Belgium for the purpose, recommended to the curé of Jabbeke, the Abbé Slock, by a Belgian prelate of high position. The 16th of February, 1874, Pierre de Rudder, living near Jabbeke, had his leg broken by the fall of a tree upon it. The tibia and the fibula were both broken at about the junction of their middle and lower thirds, say about five inches above the ankle. During ten years seven physicians tried to cure him. He would never allow the limb to be cut off. There was no bone lost, but there was in April, 1875, a suppurating wound about an inch and a half to two inches in width, which permitted the ends of the bones to be seen, separated about three centimetres. What was worse, the wound was infested with gnawing worms, which, on the 7th of

April of this same year, 1875, he tried to kill by putting on an oak-bark poultice. He could bend the lower part of the tibia at an angle to its upper part, and could turn the foot around and put the heel in front; as a witness put it, "les orteils par derrière." As a matter of course, his only means of movement was a pair of crutches. Humanly speaking, the case was hopeless. But De Rudder looked for help from above. He was sure Our Lady of Lourdes would cure him. So on the 7th of April, 1876, he went to Ghent, and thence to Oostaker near by, where, on the grounds of the Marquise de Courtebonne, there was an imitation of the Grotto of Lourdes with a statute of Our Lady. It was while praying here that day that Pierre de Rudder was instantly cured, and he was seen walking about, without any crutches or support, by two hundred people that evening on his return to Jabbeke. His little son did not recognize his father, because he missed the crutches, and after his father had reached his home and was seated, telling of what occurred, seeing his father rise up suddenly, fearing he might fall, he cried out in terror: "Father, your crutches!"

This is a fact the truth of which the writer vouches for, having already published an extended account of it. It is also given with more detail by M. l'Abbé Emile Scheerlinck, of Ghent, in his "Lourdes en Flandre." If such facts as these two have and do occur, is not Prof. Green too hasty in discarding miracle? Are the theories of this gentleman and of the school to which he belongs to be looked on as well grounded when such facts contradict them? And on such a fanciful basis are we to reject the great fact of the Resurrec-

tion? of which St. Paul does not speak in a spiritual sense, but in a most realistic sense of an absolute rising from the tomb of the man Christ, whose death had been officially recognized by the Roman governor Pilate, and who had appeared to the apostles. I. Cor., xv. 3–8, St. Paul writes: "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures: he was buried: he rose again the third day: he was seen by Cephas, after that by the eleven; then by more than five hundred brethren at once; after that by James; then by all the apostles; last of all also by me, as by one born out of time." How, with such words before him, with the other numerous passages of the Bible that refer to the fact, Prof. Green could have done away with the real bodily Resurrection of Christ, can be explained only by the firmness of his conviction of its impossibilty, equaled only by the strength of his desire to preserve all the beautiful effects of that Resurrection which constitute the Christian life—Christianity. His mental condition is very instructive; it reveals to us the mystery of self-deception, against which even honesty, it would seem, is impotent. It should make us more and more fearful of ourselves, and thankful that there is, notwithstanding, the authority of the Christian religion to guide us in what St. Peter calls "the dark place" of this world.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XVII.

THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE.

(*The Catholic World, November*, 1889.)

THERE is a logical sequence in events and a very inexorable one. If we make a mistake, we must take the consequences; if we willfully do wrong, we shall suffer for it. The principle is one of universal application, and the question just now is whether the Masonic conspiracy, which compassed the downfall of the Temporal Power, and brought it about in September, 1889, did not make a very colossal mistake, and is not at this very moment hurrying downward in the logical course which will make it fall over the precipice. We are of the opinion that this is so. The campaign of Cavour and his abettors and allies, Mazzini and the Masons of Italy, was entered on with reliance on "moral force"—*La forza morale.* This moral force was to sweep away opposition. It was to consist in the force of public opinion, which was to be sedulously, cautiously and with great tact, directed against the pope's temporal dominion and against the church to the cry: *Una chiesa libera in uno stato libero*—"A free church in a free state." The press and the telegraph were secured, and misrepresentation was the order

of the day; so that public opinion was manufactured and presented daily for the complacent assent of all whose early education taught them to look on Rome as the symbol of oppression in religious belief.

The Italians have a saying: *La bugia ha le gambe corte*—"A lie has short legs"—and a very true saying it turned out to be in this case. This misrepresentation of the real state of things in Rome has been trying to keep ahead; but in these days of pedestrianism the truth is catching up, and the moral force of the world and of public opinion seems to be taking a direction that will bring retribution on those who despoiled Pope Pius IX. of his lawful authority. The great mistake the revolutionists made was in thinking their "moral force" would meet with no opposition; they thought from their reliance on freemasonry that they would have the support of the world, freemasonry having spread so widely, and controlling not only cabinets and monarchs, but the press, the great power of the nineteenth century. What could the pope do against this? When to moral force were added the wily diplomacy of Cavour and Ratazzi, the plots and intrigues of Mazzini, the acquiescence of Napoleon, the free corps of Garibaldi, and the cannon of Cadorno and Bixio, success was certain; and once gained, Rome could easily be held. And so, when they got into the city of the popes, gazing on the trophies of antiquity and art of the most famous city of the world and delighted with the sight, they complacently sat down and exclaimed: *Hic manebimus optime*. But they reckoned without their host; they were in the pope's house. They did not think of *his* "moral force," which has two

elements that make it well-nigh omnipotent: first, the truth, and, secondly, the opportunity to make the truth known. It was a tremendous mistake on their part; so we must not be surprised to see the subsequent career of the despoilers of the pope marked by unmistakable signs of that folly which leads to ruin. To enumerate these signs would be to go over the whole history of Rome since its capture by the Italian army.

There is one thing to be said in favor of the royal house of Savoy: the father of the present king went to Rome against his will and better judgment, and the present king is not responsible for being there; for he did not create the circumstances by which he has been surrounded, and, as a constitutional ruler, he is powerless to alter the condition of things without the consent of the legislative bodies who, through the ministers, govern the land. Both he and his father have always tried to have public order preserved, and the safety of the sovereign pontiff secured. But this said, pretty much all is said that can be urged in extenuation of the presence of the king in the city of the popes. The course of the parliament has been marked always by the spirit of undying hatred of the Church of God which characterizes freemasonry in Europe, and more or less its affiliations everywhere. Suppression of religious orders; seizure of monasteries and ecclesiastical revenues; forced sale of church property—the price not paid in cash, but by public securities at five per cent., *with an income tax of* $13\frac{20}{100}$ *per cent.*;—these and kindred acts ending lately in the Draconian Penal Code against the clergy, which is to go into effect on January 1, 1890, have marked the delirium of enmity

to the church from which the legislators of the Italian kingdom have suffered.

As an illustration of their deep scheme of persecution, and of their throttling of freedom of speech, we give the following extracts from the code just named:

Art. 182 says: "The minister of worship who, in the exercise of his functions, publicly blames or belittles the institutions, the laws of the state, or the acts of authority, is punished with imprisonment not longer than a year, and by fine not exceeding one thousand francs." Art. 183: "The minister of worship who, making use of his position, excites others to contemn the institutions, the laws, the dispositions of authority, or to disobey the laws, the dispositions of authority, or to neglect duties inherent in a public office, is punished with imprisonment from three months to two years, by a fine of from five hundred to three thousand francs, and by perpetual or temporary privation of his ecclesiastical revenues. If the fact take place publicly, he may be imprisoned three years." "The same penalty may be inflicted on a minister of worship who, making use of his position, compels or induces any one to acts or declarations contrary to the laws, or prejudicial to the rights acquired under these laws." Art. 104: "Whoever commits an act directed to the placing of the state or *a part of it* under the dominion of a foreigner, or to diminishing its independence, or to breaking up its unity, is punished with imprisonment."

The fear of the movement going on in Italy for the restoration of the temporal power has driven the lawgivers of the kingdom to enact these tyrannical laws to punish the priest or bishop who, in the discharge of his duty, is bound to condemn laws that are anti-Christian, and public acts which violate the sacred rights and liberty of the successor of St. Peter, or destroy the influence over his people of him whom all Catholics regard and believe to be the Vicar of Christ.

These laws are an answer to the demonstrations which were evoked by the wonderful Jubilee of Pope Leo XIII., in which, we may say, all the sovereigns and peoples of the earth joined. The moral force of the Papacy has at last caught up with the "moral force" of the Revolution, and these laws show that spirit of desperation which confesses the imminence of defeat.

But of all events which have occurred to show the hatred and fear of the power of the pope, not only as a claimant of the temporal power but as head of the Catholic Church, the late apotheosis of the pantheist Giordano Bruno, in Rome, as a counter demonstration against the Pope's Jubilee, and against revealed religion, towers above all for the manner in which the whole infidel world was invited to take part in it, and by the way it did so by subscriptions to pay for the statue and by the actual presence of representatives. It finds its parallel only in the so-called Feast of Reason in the French Revolution, when a courtesan, as Goddess of Reason, was installed in the cathedral of Notre Dame, in Paris. This public worship of Giordano Bruno has served to arouse the attention of Catholics the world over, and make them realize that the battle going on in Rome is between freemasonry and the religion of Christ, and see that the time has come to raise their voice against this state of things, and claim for the Pope his temporal power, of which he has been wrongfully despoiled, and which alone can save him and the Church of Rome from the present deplorable condition of things. Let us hear what the Holy Father himself has to say on this demonstration of his enemies. In his allocution, pronounced to the cardinals on the

30th of June last, he tells what occurred, facts which have already been made known through the press.

The Holy Father begins by saying that after the taking of Rome by the present government, our holy religion and the Apostolic See have been subjected to a long series of acts of injustice, but that the secret societies intend shortly to do worse things which hitherto they were not able to accomplish. They have obstinately determined to impose upon the chief city of Catholicity a rule of distinctively profane character and one of impiety, directing against this citadel of the faith the hatred of the world. He then illustrates this by the fact of the erection of the statue to Giordano Bruno in Rome. "Of a truth," he says, "as if they had not brought about ruin enough during these past years, see how they try to outdo themselves in audacity, and on one of the holiest days in the Christian year they erect in public a monument by which a spirit of contumacy towards the church is commended to posterity; and assert their will to wage a decisive war with the Catholic faith." "They honor a man twice a fugitive, judicially convicted of heresy, whose pertinacity against the church ended only with his last breath. In fact it was exactly for this that they gave him distinction." "He had no remarkable knowledge; for his writings show him to have been a pantheist and materialist entangled in common errors, and not seldom in contradiction with himself." "He was not a virtuous man, but a very bad one; a man of no public merit, but deceitful, mendacious, selfish, intolerant of others, a flatterer, of abject mind and evil disposition. The scope of these honors to such a man, the language

describing them is this: life is to be led without regard to revelation, and the minds of men are to be entirely emancipated from the power of Jesus Christ This aim of those who honored Bruno is the same as that of the secret societies which are striving to alienate whole peoples from God, and fight with infinite hate and unceasing strife against the church and the Roman pontificate." "That this insult might be the more marked and its cause more widely known, they resolved to celebrate the dedication with great pomp and with a great concourse of people. During those days Rome saw within her walls a multitude of no mean proportions called hither from everywhere; banners most hostile to religion impudently carried about; and, what is especially revolting, there were not wanting some with figures of the evil one, who refused to be subject to the Most High in heaven, the prince of the seditious and the instigator of all rebellions. To this wicked crime was added the insolence of the speeches delivered and of the articles in the press, in which the holiness of what is most sacred was made a jest of without shame and without measure, while that lawless freedom of thought was vehemently extolled which is the fertile source of evil opinions, and which shakes the foundation of discipline and of civil order while striking at Christian morality. This sad work was allowed to be prepared long before, and perfected, those who are in authority not only knowing it, but continually and openly giving it favor and incitement. It is a sad thing to say, and like unto a portent, that the praise of reason rebelling against God should be heralded from this fostering city of the faith in which

God has placed his vicar to dwell; and, whence the whole world is wont to seek the uncorrupted precepts of the Gospel and counsels of salvation, there, by an evil change, foul errors and heresy itself are consecrated with monuments. To this have the times led that we should see *the abomination of desolation in the holy place.*"

We do not wish to detract from the eloquence and power of the representation of the Holy Father in this remarkable allocution by any comment of ours. What is here said shows unmistakably the state of things and the nature of the "hostile domination" under which the pope lives. For Catholics everywhere the contest is for their home—*pro aris et focis.* The determined foe is there, and he must be put out. The sovereign pontiff claims his liberty and independence through the temporal power, and more than once the voices of the episcopate and of the noble-hearted Catholic laity have re-echoed his words. Our duty is to aid him as we may, and since it may not be possible for us to help in any other way, we should contribute to strengthen by our prayers, our sympathy, and our words of loyalty that moral force which is rising like a tidal wave, in its own moment to do the augean work of cleansing the chosen citadel of the faith of what now defiles it.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XVIII.

ARE CATHOLICS RIGHT?

(*American Catholic Quarterly Review, July*, 1890.)

THE above question it is opportune to ask regarding the position of Catholics on the ever-important subject of discussion, the schools. It is especially opportune at this time, in view of the very strong feeling against Catholics in certain quarters, and of the virulent attacks made on them, with more force of words than wealth of wisdom. Hardly a day goes by without our being treated to some unfavorable criticism, in which Catholics are accused of being disloyal, and hostile to the best interests of our country, because they do not send their children to the public schools, and persist in building their own school-houses, and in educating their children as they conscientiously believe they ought to. Who is right, our critics or we? This is the question we propose to answer.

Before we answer it, let us not be misunderstood. We admire exceedingly the zeal for education everywhere manifested amid our people; for education is the process by which man's mind is to acquire the truth—its connatural object and food—and by which the heart is to be directed to the attainment of all that is good, which it seeks by the tendency placed in it by the

Creator. This zeal is everywhere to be met with; in the village, in the large city, and in important meetings of educators, in which able teachers compare their views, the proceedings of which we not only read with interest but often find valuable suggestions.

We are in sympathy with all these workers in the great cause. It is often a source of great pleasure to us when we find, as we have more than once, these clever people coming so closely to the systems our Catholic forefathers approved, and advocating, after long experience, the methods which have made the great and learned scholars of the past. Among these we may note the condemnation of putting any strain upon the intellect of tender childhood; the cultivation of the memory; simplicity in early instruction; the moderation to be observed in the number of studies, and in the amount; the explanation by the teacher of what is difficult before the child is made to learn it; the inculcation of the importance of not letting the pupil pass further on till he thoroughly knows what he is engaged on; the importance of following nature, and of not requiring what is above capacity; the grading of classes, and other like measures which an experienced teacher finds suggested to him by the circumstances of the case. In all such investigations the friends of education will find Catholic educators interested co-workers; and we doubt whether any of them could write as learnedly and as correctly on the subject as the distinguished member of the Order of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, Brother Azarias, in his recent article in the *Ecclesiastical Record*, of Philadelphia. We feel especially indebted to him for what he says of Blessed de

la Salle, the founder of that Order; and of St. Joseph Calasanctius, the founder of the Order of the Fathers of the Pious Schools. The former of these two illustrious and saintly educators of the children of the people, flourished in the latter part of the seventeenth century; the latter antedated him by fifty years. Before Raikes had begun his Sunday schools, these had been doing far better; and with a century and a half start of him, certainly the Catholic Church is ahead of other churches in this race; and, strange as it may sound to prejudiced ears, is ahead in higher education; though we willingly grant that the United States has outstripped all other nations in the general, ordinary education of the child, defective though it be in the most important point; but of this presently.

To make our answer more intelligible, we must call attention to the state of the educational problem at the present time. Owing to a condition of things which the present generation did not bring about but must accept as it is, there exists a very wide-spread difference of opinion on all points, especially that of religion, in meeting the general need of education. This conflict of ideas has led the majority in this country to look upon a school system from which religious education must be excluded as an absolute necessity. We think it but fair to attribute this to honest conviction, however much we regard it as a mistake. There are other and subtle influences at work to make this idea more far reaching and permanent, and of these we shall speak.

The feature to which we first call attention, is the tendency which the system displays to supersede the

duty of parents, to usurp their rights, to make the state the supreme disposer, if not owner, of the child. Herein lies a most serious and fatal error. What the state is for is not to supersede individual right, but to safeguard right, and never to hold rights in abeyance unless the public good call for such action. Rights are sacred things, especially those natural rights which the genius of our American institutions teaches us to regard as inalienable. All government, legitimately instituted on a foundation of justice, has its authority from God, who gave those natural rights. It must, therefore, represent Him, and, representing Him, must not contradict Him by depriving the citizen or subject of the rights the Creator implanted in man's nature. Hence the proper object of all legislation is to protect right, and the decisions of the Supreme Court look to the rights of individuals and of the States as defined by the limitations of the Constitution, and thus safeguard liberty. In the logical order right comes first, because inherent in man; while a state becomes possible only by an aggregation of men. This makes evident the gross error those commit who worship the state, make it everything, and, like Hegel, exclaim, "The state is the really present God." Making a god of the state is the death of liberty; and against any such assumption it becomes American manhood to rise in just indignation. We, of all others, knowing that our liberty rests, and must rest, on justice, should be ready to give willing obedience to the authority which God has bestowed on men, and as ready to resist the abuse of authority, and oppose the hurtful measures of shortsighted or malicious men proposed in the name of authority.

Among these inherent rights is most assuredly the right of the parent to his child; a natural right, for it has its foundation in the fact of birth. The parent, therefore, is the owner of his child, and this ownership, when rightfully exercised, has no limit but the right of the Creator. This right involves the right of the parent to educate his child in his duties to his Creator, and to do so is an obligation inherent in the parent, who must discharge it according to his conscience. Any interference with this is a violation of the rights of conscience. It may be answered that there is no intention to do this, to interfere with such sacred natural right of the parent in having a state system of education. But, when the system is, practically, godless, and rears a generation without knowledge of God and of Christian morality—which cannot be taught apart from religion—it is idle to disclaim any such intention; the result is too patent, and shows the mistake. Parents who are religious, whether Catholic, Lutheran, Episcopalian, or Methodist, are justified in agitating in favor of religious training, and, because they cannot have it in the public school, are fully justified in establishing schools of their own. They are simply exercising their own God-given right, and protesting against a violation of it.

But there are equally grave, if not graver, reasons for the action which looks to the vindication of this parental right. It requires no great foresight to understand that whoever can control the education of the child will have him in his maturer years; who has the child will have the man. This is so well appreciated that it forms part of the programme of

naturalism which, in Europe, seeks to destroy the idea of revealed religion. Recently, a very bold and impudent move in this direction has been set on foot by the freemasons of Italy, and a circular has been sent out by them through the length and breadth of the land, commanding their followers to seize on and hold possession of *elementary education*, and supporting this command by the presentation of the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the affiliation of freemasonry in the United States with that of Europe, is it idle to suppose a common purpose, and a word of order passed from mouth to mouth to cripple and destroy the influence of divine revelation in the school? Some of the men who took part in the Giordano Bruno celebration are prominent in their hostility to religious training in the public school, and the German "Turners" have lately thrown their weight in the balance in favor of the Republican scheme to interfere with the German parochial schools of Wisconsin. It will repay the trouble of watching the utterances of the masonic press of the country; we do not think we risk anything in saying that the masonic press will be found to a unit in favor of what has been termed "the Godless system of elementary education."

It seems to us that a further insight into the details of the system of public-school education in this country will throw additional light on this subject. At the head of the Bureau of Education, at Washington, has been placed a gentleman of ability, but of well-known pantheistic ideas, Prof. W. T. Harris, A.M., LL.D., of the Concord School. This gentleman was in the habit

of lecturing on philosophic subjects at Indianapolis and at Terre Haute, Indiana. Having, it would seem, no one to counteract his hurtful opinions, he spread them widely, so that the Indianapolis *Journal* called attention to the fact that the normal schools of these two cities were saturated with pantheistic teachings. Prof. Harris went to the well-springs and poisoned them. He perverted the teachers, and the children confided to them will be poisoned too. Latterly the professor, active in his work and "wise in his generation," has made use of the influence of the position which political favor has given him, and has edited the "International Educational Series," one of which, Rosencranz's "Philosophy of Education," with a preface by him, and also a commentary on the whole, which is designed for the work of instructing teachers, is before us.

In this work, Prof. Harris informs us of "the stubborn individuality of the martyrs" (p. 249). On page 250 he tells us: "All external authority should be cancelled in the self-rule of spirit, which is a law unto itself. The divine authority of the truth of the individual will is to be recognized, but at the same time freed from its estrangement toward itself. While Christ was a Jew, and obedient to the divine law, he knew himself as the universal man who determines to himself his own destiny; and although distinguishing God, as subject, from himself, yet holds fast to the unity of man and God. The system of humanitarian education began to unfold from this principle, which no longer accords the highest place to the natural unity of national individuality, nor to abstract obedience to the command of God, but to that freedom of soul which

knows itself to be unconditioned by aught in time or space."

Page 254 he tells us Protestantism is "a necessary element of Christianity," and "Monachism (the religious life of the monk) has a defect as measured by the entire scope of Christianity; it re-named the world instead of conquering it"; it was, he says, "the mechanism of a thoughtless subjection to rule."

Page 255–6, Prof. Harris declares: "Christian monachism resembles in many of its forms that of Buddhism. Their vows, poverty, chastity and obedience, indicate the attitude towards the secular world. The three chief secular institutions: (a) the family is attacked by the second vow, which aims at celibacy; (b) civil society, or the institution for the production and distribution of property, is attacked by the first vow, which renounces property; (c) the state is attacked by the third vow, which renounces allegiance to any but its religious superiors."

We close our citations from this book by the following language at the expense of the Jesuit educators: "The most deliberate hypocrisy and pleasure in intrigue merely for the sake of intrigue, this subtlest poison of moral corruption were the result. Jesuitism had not only an interest in the material profit which, when it had corrupted souls, fell to its share, but it also had an interest in the educative process of corruption. With absolute indifference as to the idea of morality, and absolute indifference to the moral quality of the means used to attain its end, it rejoiced in the efficacy of secrecy and the accomplished and calculating understanding, and deceiving the credulous by means of its

graceful, seemingly scrupulous moral language." "Penitence and contrition were transformed into a perfect materialism of outward actions, and hence arose the punishments of the Order, in which fasting, scourging, imprisonment, mortification and death were formed into a mechanical artificial system."

We will not tire the reader with matter of this nature further. It shows sufficiently what kind of influence is at the helm of the public elementary education of the United States.

There was placed in our hands some time ago a list of questions to be answered at a "teachers' institute" in Southern Indiana. They were mostly taken from Carlyle's "Heroes and Hero-worship." No one will deny the rugged sincerity of Carlyle nor his ability. But are his views on subjects vital to us to be taken as matter of examination on which Catholic teachers are to answer, and which the teachers in general are to have held up to them as their principles in educating Catholic youth? Luther he lauds as *humble* and *peaceable;* Tetzel "plies a *scandalous trade* in Indulgences," in consequence of which Luther's penitents tell him in the confessional that "they had already got their sins pardoned;" while Leo X. "*seems to have been a pagan.*" "Popehood has become untrue The thing is untrue; we were traitors against the Giver of all truth, if we durst pretend to think it true." Swinton's book can take its place alongside of this. The Boston Committee of One Hundred must be happy. It is all about as reliable as what they put forth. One of their latest publications is by the Rev. Mr. Dunn, in which he makes an onslaught upon the church, and quotes

"Schouppe's Manual," as claiming for her a power of dispensing from the laws of the state. On looking at Schouppe's words we find he is speaking of dispensation from *ecclesiastical* law, and cites degrees of Councils to show this, as is perfectly proper. Thus we see continual misrepresentation at work among those holding power to injure the Catholic Church, warp the mind of American youth, and destroy the respect of Catholics for their faith.

Is it strange, then, that we say most positively that Catholics are right in their attitude as respects the public schools? It would be passing wonderful if they took any other; it would be a mark of moral decay, of waning vitality, did they not protest in the vigorous way in which they do, and will continue to do, claiming unhesitatingly and persistently their just rights.

But let us say a word to strengthen our position, and not content ourselves merely with a denial of the assumptions of our adversaries, or with rejecting their schemes.

It is well known that the Catholic prelates in the United States have recognized the need of Catholic schools, and have passed decrees to bring about everywhere the erection of parish schools. The principle upon which they acted we find very ably proclaimed by the distinguished Archbishop of Dublin, Most Rev. Dr. Walsh, in a discourse on the 7th of last November, at the Medical School of the Catholic University. There is not enough difference in the state of things in Ireland and in America to make what the Most Rev. Archbishop says inapplicable in any way to our case here. We quote copiously, that there may be

no danger of misunderstanding the position of his Grace.

"When Trinity College was, in a sense, secularized in 1873, the position of Catholics in reference to the three Queen's colleges then existing in Ireland was thoroughly well understood. The fundamental principle of the system of education embodied in those colleges was one that made it impossible to regard them as a provision for university education, available in any practical sense, for the Catholics of Ireland. Save in some special and exceptional circumstances, it could not be considered open to Catholics. I speak now, of course, of Catholics who are sufficiently instructed in the nature of the obligations to which they are subject as Catholics, and who are also conscientiously desirous of fulfilling these obligations. Of such Catholics, I say, it could not be considered really open to them to make use of the advantages which the state, through these well-endowed colleges, placed fully and freely within the reach of the members of every Protestant denomination in Ireland. The reason of this is obvious. To us Catholics it comes as a matter of fixed principle that every such institution, embodying that which is known as the 'mixed' system, is from the nature of that system, a source of danger to Catholic students, if they frequent it: a source of danger, in the first place, to the vigor and even to the integrity of their faith; a source of danger also to their constancy in the full and faithful observance of the practical duties by which they are bound as Catholics. That is what we mean by the expression dangerous to faith and morals. That is what the church has always meant, as often as she has, under that severe censure, condemned as places of education for Catholics, institutions such as the Queen's colleges, whether existing in Ireland or in any other portion of the universal church.

"Even if no such condemnation had been issued, common sense would have sufficed to warn us of the danger. Let me quote to you a noteworthy expression of a former venerated member of our Irish Episcopacy—Dr. Moriarty, formerly Bishop of Kerry. In a letter to one of the numerous commissioners that from time to time have sat in Ireland to examine and report upon our public educational institutions, Dr. Moriarty wrote as follows of the official

Training College of the National Board in Marlborough Street. His severe strictures upon that college as a place of 'mixed' education for our school-teachers are, as you will observe, quite applicable to the case of 'mixed' colleges of university education. Dr. Moriarty, in fact, himself remarks that this is so. Here is what he wrote: 'The condemnation of the Queen's colleges by the highest authority in the church necessitated the condemnation of the Training College by the bishops. The cases are perfectly parallel.'"

Then he goes on to explain that the case is different from that of a school attended by children who are engaged in learning merely the rudiments of knowledge, such as reading, writing and arithmetic, especially as they meet only for a few hours of the day at school, and for the rest of their time are under parental control. In their case he says, "the dangers of the mixed system may be comparatively remote." You will observe he does not say that even in such a case these dangers disappear. He says merely that they may in such cases be comparatively remote; "but," he goes on to say, speaking of colleges of higher education:

"there is danger of that suppression of truth, and of that concealment of religious profession and observance, which necessarily lead to religious indifference. *The danger is manifestly greatest for those who believe most.* If Anglicans were associated under such circumstances with Unitarians or Socinians, the necessity of avoiding topics of discussion would bring them down to the lower level. *The shortest rule of faith would become the common denominator.*"

The Archbishop goes on to speak of the system as "intrinsically" dangerous: "The danger exists altogether independently of any conscious effort at perversion. It is a danger inherent in the very nature of

the 'mixed' system as worked out among youth in such a place of education. And this is what the Catholic Church means when she condemns that system as 'intrinsically' dangerous to faith and to fidelity in the fulfillment of Catholic duty." (p. 21.) Elsewhere Archbishop Walsh remarks that education under such auspices "takes the edge off a man's Catholicity." We heartily re-echo the expression; the Archbishop tells a great truth in those words.

These passages apply with equal, if not with greater force, to the state of education in this country; and this for various reasons. We have ostensibly no discrimination against Catholics. In reality there are and always have been, the atmosphere, the teachers and the books—all Protestant or un-Catholic. We say teachers, too, because until lately the proportion of Catholic teachers has been very small, and we greatly fear, except in rare cases, "the edge was taken off *their* Catholicity" before they were allowed to teach secular science; but nothing Catholic. In one of the schools of this diocese the Catholic teacher was told by the petty county supervisor she was not to mention the name of God in the school. In another school the Catholic teacher was told to take the crucifix out of the school-room. We suppose this is strictly in accordance with "non-sectarianism;" which makes it all the more objectionable to Catholics.

A further danger from this kind of teacher is that public-school teachers are simply required to stand the examination, and prove their title to a good character. But this is not enough for one who is to take the place of a parent and watch over the chil-

dren. Here is a vital point. The teacher will consider his work done when he has taught; but the recreation and the recess, and absence from the schoolroom, frequently unavoidable, give the children a freedom too often fatal. Then there is the further insuperable objection and fatal error of the education of children, in which the theory is, that the gentleness of the girl softens the ruggedness of the boy—but at the expense of both. Any expert physician can give you an interesting lecture on the physical effects of such a system. Besides the indisputable physical effects of acts against the moral code, there have been frequent exposures of moral disorders in these schools. Look at the recent Cleveland sensation in this respect; it is not the most recent known to us, however. It has been said that the standard of female virtue has been greatly lowered. We are afraid this is so, and it is not going to improve under the prevailing system of public education. We know perfectly well that experience shows absolute prevention of vice among children to be impossible; but it can and ought to be reduced to the least amount. The public school system, however, will not effect this. Add to this the perverted system of morality taught; perverted because divorced from religion, and falling back on æsthetic ideas. A teacher with whom we were conversing some time ago remarked: "This teaching children to avoid evil because not beautiful, but ugly, deformed; this making beauty a standard of good, has the effect on me of causing me to lose sight of distinctions between good and evil as taught by religion." It is a fact that a confessor has to

fight against a tendency, in those who come in contact with the public school influence, to look on certain sins against nature, Malthusian theories and secret indulgence, as no harm at all. A very brief experience in any large city will prove this. It is the reason why so many non-Catholics send their children to the schools taught by the religious orders and by Catholic lay teachers under the surveillance of the priest.

On the other hand we are fully convinced that many upright and earnest teachers are teaching in the public schools, and many pupils attending them are of exemplary life, and with the modesty they learned under the parents' roof. But everything is handicapped by the want of the restraining influence of religion, and secret immorality is on the increase.

To sum up then the grounds of our answer, we say that Catholics are right in their attitude on the school question; in asserting the necessity of denominational schools, and in claiming as due to Catholics, in justice, a corresponding portion of the school fund, or, what is equivalent to that, exemption from taxation for schools; because of the intrinsic defect of a system that excludes religion; because of the hurtful anti-religious and anti-Catholic influence at the helm, both in the normal school and in the institute; because of the influence of freemasonry against religion, and of its scheme to possess itself of elementary education; because of the judgment of the church, as expressed by able bishops, and by councils, declaring such a system intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals, which cannot be taught and maintained apart from religion; because

even expert physicians tell us of the evils of the system of co-education of children of different sexes—apart from acts of immorality; because of the well-known frequency of scandals among the children; and lastly, because the moral ideas of Catholic children become perverted, so that they come to look on sins against nature as no harm.

These grounds are more than enough to justify and strengthen Catholics in standing firmly to their principles. We say this all the more emphatically because we are persuaded that our American people wish for the best; and did they believe what we have written above, would undoubtedly take the movement for denominational education under the patronage of their good will, and carry it through triumphantly; at least for all who want denominational education; and we venture to say that every American parent who knows the world, on opening his eyes to the real state of things, *would* want it. More than once we have been obliged reluctantly to decline to receive the children of non-Catholic parents in our Catholic schools for want of room or for other reasons that made the decisions imperative. For it has happened, not seldom, that as a last resort, a non-Catholic parent, in his desperation, has put his child, ruined by the freedom of the public school, in some Catholic institution or parochial school, placing his last hope in the influence of Catholic education

Of a truth, that influence is wholesome. The child comes from home bright and cheerful, sure to meet a smiling, motherly face. A few moments of play under the watchful eye of the teacher, whose highest motive

is to help save that soul and form a useful member of society and of God's household, here and hereafter. The bell summons to Mass; the day's work is begun by prayer, the greatest of all, the Holy Sacrifice, which appeals to the faith and love of the child. Prayer to the Holy Mother of God directs the thought to her who is the model of womanhood, the lily of God's garden. The school opens with the brief lesson in catechism, carefully explained and well illustrated, teaching duties to God, to the state, to one's fellow-men, respect for authority, obedience to law, charity to all, the excellence of virtue, and especially the duty of holy purity of life, which is sullied by one deliberate foul thought. The crucifix is on the wall, and the pierced hands and the bleeding body tell of the frightful expiation of the immorality of man by Him who said: "Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God." The picture of Mary is prominent, and her mild, pure eyes beaming on her children make them love her beautiful life, and lure them on by the odor of her virtues, to run after her in the ways in which she walked. To please her and her Divine Son the Catholic child labors willingly, and tries to overcome himself in moments of weariness or distraction from his other studies, so that in this, as in other things, is it verified that "piety is useful." When faults are committed, Christian charity, quick to see, presides over the correction, using gentleness of manner, even when administering a well-merited chastisement; dwelling more on the offence to God than on the displeasure to the teacher or the harm to the pupil himself. Then come the rewards, adminis-

tered with discrimination, directing the mind to one's spiritual well-being. Then the joyous feasts that come in the year tell of the consoling truths of the faith, the life of which is the charity which makes one love God, and obey Him, by loving one's neighbor, his kindred, his fellow-men, the state, in whose patriotic, festive days all take part with a loyalty second to none.

Thus the foundation of a useful life is laid. Is it not a good one? Does it not give hope of a good and useful citizen? Does it not afford ground to believe that should any one, as will now and then happen, forget himself and fall away, he will remember his early training and more easily return? Only just now we come from receiving back a poor girl, whose conscience recalled to her the lessons she had learned from the Sisters, and the elevating influences she had once experienced. Such is the frequent happening in the life of every priest engaged in the active ministry. He knows and appreciates how salutary is the early Christian training. When it is wanting, how blank is everything; dreary, hopeless!

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XIX.

HUMAN CERTITUDE AND DIVINE FAITH.

(*The Catholic World*, *April*, 1892.)

IT may not be amiss, in this period of widespread doubt and uncertainty in matters of religion, to direct our thoughts to the question of belief; to ask ourselves, What is belief? and how far is it to extend —what is its domain? To be able to respond we must first be able to give a satisfactory answer to a fundamental question, to wit: is there such a thing as certainty? For belief and certainty may be said to be correlative terms in religious matters; the one implies the other. To give heed to some of the most prominent men of the day, there is no such thing as certainty. If so, there can be no such thing as belief. Yet Rev. Dr. Patton is reported as having said there is no such thing as metaphysical certainty. If this be so, we may bid good-by to certainty of any kind, and accept the system of universal doubt, and adopt probability as the practical principle of action.

How destructive this system is of all real knowledge, it is not difficult to understand. Had the learned gentleman referred to confined himself to saying that certainty could not be demonstrated, he would not

have been wide of the mark; for demonstration means the showing of a truth from prior and better known truth. But there can be nothing prior to certainty or better known than it is, and therefore it cannot be *demonstrated*. On the other hand, every science demands a first truth to which nothing is prior, for it is the cause of what follows, which is the effect; science being systematized knowledge, it must have a solid foundation of primal truth to rest upon. Certainty is an intellectual intuition of a truth, and that truth is, that I exist and know I am not deceived in my ability to apprehend without danger of error some facts. It is a postulate of our intellectual nature, of reason. It goes before anything else, and therefore cannot be demonstrated unless we choose to look upon the application of the principle of contradiction as a species of demonstration, that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time. But we must be certain of this before we apply it; and this interferes with the demonstration. It is, therefore, necessary to regard certainty as an intuition and call it the sight of the soul, as much needed for it as sight is for the body. And just as a man sees a thing, and asks no one to prove it to him, so the soul sees the truth which is connatural to it at a glance; and the first truth it does see is that it can and does know what is. To say this does not belong to metaphysics, when it is the very first truth that science demands, seems to us, at least, strange; for it is usual to speak of knowledge of being and of its attributes as metaphysics, though they are in fact physical realities, thought out systematically by the mind.

There is besides this the moral persuasion of the human race that there is such a thing as certainty, and the whole of our social economy rests on that basis. It may be said this is *a posteriori* and in reality begs the question. But it is a fact that shows beyond doubt the existence of the fact of certainty. The universal testimony of the human mind cannot be gainsaid without assailing its Author, and bidding adieu to reason.

If certainty is a necessity in the order of natural truth, still more is it necessary in the order of that which is above nature, the region or domain of revealed truth. Catholics understand this; the introduction of private judgment as the ultimate tribunal of religious truth has had the effect of blunting the sensitiveness of those outside the church with regard to this necessity; with the result of causing them to be unable, it would seem, to understand it. Recently the *Evening Post* of New York (Aug. 30, 1891) published the answer of three foremost preachers—the Rev. Lyman Abbott, the Rev. B. H. Conwell, and the Rev. (or Professor) David Swing, of Chicago—to the questions: "Do you believe absolutely that the miracles recorded in the Bible were actually performed, or do you think the people of those times only believed they witnessed miracles?" And, "If we reject any part of the Scriptures as literal truth, must we not reject all?"

To say these were crucial questions for the reverend gentlemen, and that they evaded answering directly, is only what was to have been expected. Dr. Abbott does not even touch the miracles with a tongs, but deftly glides off to speak of the foundation of belief as afforded by Christ himself. Yet Christ says: "If

you do not believe me, believe the works I do. They give testimony of me" (St. John, v. 36).

Rev. Mr. Conwell falls back at once on his lines of defense—good sense and the beauty of the Bible.

Professor Swing lets the miracles go. That nut is too hard for him to crack. And then he falls back on his line, and says: "There is nothing essential except a devotion to the Divine Founder of our religion"—a very vague utterance, each one understanding it in his own way. He goes still farther in his hazy system, and subjoins, "An ethical religion is gradually displacing the religion of simple belief"—which is simply a fact outside the Catholic Church. So we see what it has all come to: uncertainty in everything, certainty about nothing. This is the ultimate word of Protestantism.

This result and the nature of the case itself lead us to see clearly that unless we bid adieu to reason there must be and is such a thing as certainty, and that we can have certainty in the order in which we are. Philosophers usually class certainty according to the manner in which it is acquired; they speak of metaphysical, physical, and moral certainty. With metaphysical certainty and physical we need not occupy ourselves in this connection. Moral certainty, which is based on the laws which govern man's free will, is that which is the ground of natural belief. These laws lead us to accept truth on the authority of others, historic truth, and the events of every day of which we have not been witnesses. It is akin to the certainty which leads us to accept religious truth. Such truth is pre-eminently received on the authority of another. "Faith," says St.

Paul, "cometh by hearing." Religious beliefs, or faith, may be defined to be the acceptance of the truths of revelation through the divinely appointed teacher, the church God has established on earth; a church he instituted through his prophets, and, lastly, through his Divine Son, who came on earth to found it, and by means of miracles convinced men of his right to teach in the name of God, and led them to accept what he taught. The church of Christ, then, is the teacher. Once we are sure of that our duty is clear; we are to believe all the truths she believes and teaches because God has revealed them, and because she teaches by the authority of God, and by his assistance: "Go, teach all nations;" "I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." The motive of faith is, therefore, much superior to that of human belief; this gives certainty, that a certainty more intense, as God its source is so far above nature, on the laws of which, as we have said, human certainty is based.

There are certain results and consequences of this system of Christianity which it is well for us to consider.

If it is God who speaks to us through the church, then we must accept what the church authoritatively teaches; otherwise we are "as the heathen and the publican." While all Catholics are agreed on this point, there comes up the question, What rule is to be followed in matters in which there is no official declaration, or dogmatic decision on the part of the church; where councils have not spoken nor supreme pontiffs given *ex cathedrâ* decrees? This is a very important matter, especially in its influence on Catholic life, and for this reason we wish to dwell on it at some length.

Outside of the dogmatic decrees of councils and of the *ex cathedrâ* decisions of popes, there is the mass of Catholic tradition, which has come down to us from the beginning, and of which also God is the author. This is the truth which permeates Catholic life and makes the members of the church think alike, no matter where they may be. This atmosphere of truth is the medium in which the church lives. Through it she is active; where, on the contrary, it is clouded, where this truth is obscured, there is languor, decay, death. Just as a living body has instincts which make it act spontaneously with regard to what is necessary for it, as air, food, drink, and self-preservation, so there is an instinct in the believer to accept all revealed truth, and to think, speak, and act, in what vitally affects his belief, this disposition having been formed in him by the environment of faith, its atmosphere, its teachings, its language, its common habit of thought, akin to the training of the ear, which, without trouble and unerringly, detects the discordant note of music. Just as one who would show himself indisposed as regards what is necessary for the maintenance of his natural life would give good ground to doubt of his healthy condition, so one who would be careless with reference to propositions that affect unfavorably the faith would justify the conclusion that he was not sound in it. Therefore it is that we find in all, as a gift from the Holy Spirit, a spiritual instinct which leads us to believe; to regard the church as an ever-active teacher aided by the Holy Ghost, and directing our minds to accept with the utmost docility what she says, without waiting to critically examine the manner

in which she speaks, or to look for unanimity. This pious disposition to believe has been dwelt on by theologians and councils, and by them it is spoken of as a gift of God.

The second Council of Orange, held A.D. 529, in its fifth chapter, thus speaks: "If any one says that as the increase of faith so also the beginning of it, *the very pious disposition to believe—ipsum credulitatis affectum*—by which we believe in Him who justifies the impious, and come to the generation of sacred baptism, is in us, not by the gift of grace, that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from infidelity to faith, from impiety to piety, but is in us naturally, he is proven to be an adversary of the apostolic dogmas." In this most important decree of this council, received in the church with all the authority of a dogmatic decree, we call attention to this phrase — *credulitatis affectus* — a pious disposition to believe, which is declared to be a gift of grace, an inspiration of the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost, like nature, is never wanting in what is necessary; and, therefore, this most necessary tendency to believe he implants in every one to whom the gift of faith is vouchsafed. Where, then, this gift is vigorous, sound, healthy, there its first manifestation is to be seen in the docility to the teaching power, the pious disposition to believe. Where it is not vigorous, nor sound, nor healthy, there such a disposition will not show itself; but, on the contrary, a restless, resisting, critical spirit will be seen. Therefore, too, where we see such indisposition, where we see one on his guard against the church's voice, and jealous of his independence,

we are not uncharitable in drawing the conclusion that the faith has become weak.

It may be said that this is going too far; that as there are superstitious people, who accept as of faith what is not, there may be those who may not be ready to take everything without first ascertaining by approved ways what is to be held. The former may be called *maximizers;* the latter, wishing to preserve their liberty, accept the least, but in doing so, in the trust they put in their own lights, are apt to reject what is essential, and are known as *minimizers.* A good while ago Cardinal Newman made the remark: "A people's religion is a corrupt religion"—meaning thereby that individuals without instruction are apt to be too credulous and take up what there is no authority to uphold. This certainly may be; but there will be a mark about this excess which will make it easy to recognize it as spurious, it will be wanting in universality; and, depending on individual weakness, will follow its phases. Studying the whole people, though, the theologian will see the work of the Holy Spirit pervading them, making them dwell together of one mind, *unius moris in domo.* It would have been well with the minimizers of some years back had they made that study more profoundly. It is not characteristic of the minimizer that he does this. His is a work of thought evolved from his own mind, weighing the doctrines by his own standard, an individual one, determined largely by the influences that surround him, education and habit of thought. We do not mean to say that he is not learned; on the contrary, very often he is most learned. It seems to us that the trust in

his own equipment very often breeds this spirit of judgment; while the simplicity of the less learned leads them to put their trust in the great body of the faithful, in whom pre-eminently the Holy Spirit dwells, and to look up instinctively to the teaching authority which that same Spirit has given the church and through which he directs it; and, lastly, to the tradition of the church, of which the fathers are the witnesses. We may illustrate by a fact which appears to present this phase of the mind of one who does not minimize Whenever the cardinal-vicar of Rome publishes one of his *Inviti Sacri*, or brief pastorals, the Roman theologians are on the lookout to know how the people receive it, and what comments they make. And this not for the purpose of judging whether it is acceptable, but because they appreciate the instinct of faith in the people, which would make them detect at once any word not in keeping with the faith; and, on the contrary, appreciate expressions which adequately convey to them the teaching of their belief.

As we write, there comes to us on the wings of electricity the news that a great light has gone out in Israel; that one who has been a bright example in the church is no more; that the great Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, Henry Edward Manning, has been called from the scene of his earthly labors. No longer will that voice, with its strong yet gentle note, be heard; that tongue, musical in its beauty of language and charm of expression, is stilled. A hush comes over the audience he held spellbound, as widely-spread as are the regions of the earth; for the sound of his words went from pole to pole, and from the

rising of the sun to its setting. All who felt the genial influence of his teachings of charity, and of his example, sing his praise, pay their tribute of respectful admiration, and offer for him, in a grateful spirit, their prayers to God. But though he is no longer with us in the flesh, his teachings abide, teachings that re-echo the spirit of his Master, who said: *Misereor super turbam*—"I have pity upon the people"; teachings that breathe the spirit of his Master, who said: "It is my food to do the will of my Father"; teachings and examples that fulfill the command of his Master, who bade all hear the church: "He who hears you hears me"; "He who will not hear the church let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican." Had we sought for one whose words and life were an illustration of the docility to the authority of the church of which we are treating, no one more excelling in this regard could we have found than Cardinal Manning. Now that he is no more, we can speak freely of him and of his career. It was our good fortune and privilege to have known him for nearly thirty years, and to have been an admirer of the man, and a grateful recipient of spiritual aid from his life and words. During the eventful period of the Vatican Council, the days that preceded it, the time of its duration and the days that followed it, we were living in the city of Rome, and in relation sometimes with him personally, and with those of his own nation through whom we could always have correct information. His discourses, too, and his writings were in our hands as soon as they came from the press, read with an appreciation that came of a mutual interest in the triumph of the truth.

In England before the Vatican Council there had existed the controversy regarding the decisions of the Roman congregations; and those who were contending against a well-meant but undue valuation of them as sharing the infallibility of the Roman pontiff, and who, carried away by a spirit of opposition, incidentally in other matters fell short of what would be expected of a genuine Catholic, were named by Mr. Ward, of the Dublin *Review*, minimizers. Without going to the opposite extreme, Cardinal Manning contended always for a docility of spirit towards the teaching authority of the church. He advocated the view that our feelings even should be with the church, and in this he was most commendable and deserved well of Catholics everywhere. What, in fact, is more unfilial than that a son should be continually on his guard against the authority of his father, requiring to be fully persuaded of the right before he obeys. All will censure such a spirit. But it is worse for a Catholic to have such a disposition in regard to the sovereign pontiff and the church; for it argues weakness of faith, an ignoring of the fact that Christ her founder, and the Holy Ghost her spouse, are ever with the church, and giving her prudence from above. Remotely it savors of the spirit of the world, of an anti-Christian spirit. Of this anti-Christian spirit, Cardinal Manning wrote, in his lectures on the *Four Great Evils of the Day* (lect. iv. § 5):

"There is one person upon whom this anti-Christian spirit concentrates itself, as the lightning upon the conductor. There is one person upon earth who is the pinnacle of the temple, which is always the first to be struck. It is the Vicar of Jesus Christ; and

that for the most obvious of reasons. There is no man on earth so near to Jesus Christ as his own vicar. Two hundred and fifty-seven links, and we arrive at the person of the Son of God. Two hundred and fifty-seven pontiffs, and we are in the presence of the Master whom his vicar represents. That chain runs through the ages of Christian history, and connects us with the day, when, on the coasts of Decapolis, Jesus said to Peter: 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.' . . . To Peter were given the two great prerogatives which constitute the plenitude of his master's office. To him first and to him alone, before all others, though in the presence of the others, was given the power of the keys. To him, and to him alone, and in the presence of the others, was given also the charge of the universal flock: 'Feed my sheep.' To him, and to him alone exclusively, were spoken the words: 'Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he might sift you as wheat (that is, all the Apostles): but I have prayed for thee'—(in the singular number: for thee, Peter)—'that thy faith fail not; and thou being once converted, confirm thy brethren' (St. Luke xxii., 31, 32): and therefore the plenitude of jurisdiction, and the plenitude of truth, with the promise of the divine assistance to preserve him in that truth, was given to Peter, and in Peter to his successors."

Further on the cardinal uses these beautiful words:

"Poor Ireland! What preserved it three hundred years ago and during three hundred years of persecution? Fidelity to the Vicar of Jesus Christ, fidelity to Rome, fidelity to the changeless See of Peter. The arch of the faith is kept fast by that keystone, which the world would fain strike out if it could, but never has prevailed to do so, and Ireland has been sustained by it; and to this day among the nations of the Christian world there is not to be found a people so instinct with faith, and so governed by Christian morality, as the people of Ireland."

But the following passage from lect. i. of this series is more to the purpose for which we write. Page 26 (edition 1871) he says:

"Before the Vatican Council there was growing up in the minds of some men a disposition which, I am happy to say, is nearly cast out again, to diminish and to explain away, to understate and reduce to a minimum that which Catholics ought to believe and practice. This spirit began in Germany. It says: 'I believe everything which the church has *defined*. I believe all dogmas: everything which has been defined by a general council.' This sounds a large and generous profession of faith; but they forget that whatsoever was revealed on the day of Pentecost to the Apostles, and by the Apostles preached to the nations of the world, and has descended in the full stream of universal unbelief and constant tradition, though it has never been defined, is still matter of Divine faith. Thus, there are truths of faith which have never been defined; and they have never been defined because they have never been contradicted. They have not been defined because they have not been denied. The definition of the truth is the fortification of the church against the assaults of unbelief. Some of the greatest truths of revelation are to this day undefined. The infallibility of the church has never been defined. The infallibility of the head of the church was only defined the other day. But the infallibility of the church, for which every Catholic would lay down his life, has never been defined until now; the infallibility of the church is at this moment where the infallibility of the pope was this time last year: an undefined point of Christian revelation, believed by the Christian world, but not yet put in the form of a definition. When, therefore, men said they would only believe dogmas and definitions by general councils, they implied, without knowing it, that they would not believe in the infallibility of the church. But the whole tradition of Christianity comes down to us on the universal testimony and the infallibility of the Church of God, which, whether defined or not, is a matter of Divine faith."

In all the actions of this illustrious prince of the church, not even excepting his remarkable influence over the London strikes at the docks, which surprised the English and led them captive—of all his actions

nothing impresses us so strongly as the docility of spirit he manifested in believing and in conforming to the teaching and thought of the church. It was like unto the spirit of a saint who in early childhood drank in the faith at his mother's breast. It argues a great gift of faith that is the especial and generous work of the Holy Ghost in his soul, and for this reason it demands our admiration and calls for our imitation. When God vouchsafes to bestow a gift above nature on a man, this requires of him most respectful gratitude and faithful co-operation. This gift of faith we have received, and it calls upon us to foster it and make it bear the fruit of good works. It is the talent which is given that we may labor till the Giver comes. It is certain that he will demand an account of the use we shall have made of it. What a misfortune if any one shall have "wrapped it up in a napkin" and put it aside! And this those do who, ashamed of their birthright, are on their guard against accepting too much and remain in a state of inactivity. Of such one hardly errs in saying, with St. James: "Faith without works is dead." Not so did the saints, for their prayer has ever been what the Apostles offered up to their Divine Master: "Lord, increase our faith."

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XX.

TOTAL ABSTINENCE.

(FIRST ARTICLE.)

(*American Ecclesiastical Review, August*, 1892.)

IF there is any one question more likely than another to affect deeply and widely the people of this country, it is, we venture to say, what is commonly known as the "Temperance Question." It is not necessary to go largely into the matter to prove this. The enthusiasm which ever attends on the temperance meeting—the crowded halls, the eloquence of the speakers, the sympathy all feel with sincere workers for it; the existence, too, of the Prohibition Party; the laws introduced to prohibit the traffic in spirits, or to moderate it, through high license—all go to show how deeply seated is the feeling in its favor. It is not a thing of yesterday; it has been agitated among English-speaking people for wellnigh a century. The fame of Father Mathew endures. His friends style him the Apostle of Temperance, and in truth, whatever may be said of his system or method, he deserves the gratitude of immense multitudes rescued by him from excess in drinking and its direful consequences.

There are those who advocate total abstinence as a reaction in their own case; there are others who

do so through a noble motive of aiding their brethren; both are to be commended; but no one will deny that a far greater meed of praise is due to him who, having no need to do so, by word and example enforces the observance of it. There is something in this both noble and heroic. But precisely because there is in it the noble and the heroic, it is likely that those who will do so will not be very numerous, in proportion to the community. For a perpetuated movement of this kind there must be some powerful evil to avert, a great good to be obtained, and hence total abstinence is more likely to be sustained and advocated as a remedial measure, preventive of a vast amount of evil, moral and social. As it therefore more properly has the nature or character of a protest against the abuse of spirituous drinks, it is to be expected that those who have suffered from such abuse will most loudly and feelingly advocate it. But when excitement and feeling come into play, there is likely to be excess, showing itself in arguments pushed too far, or lacking in soundness, and in measures which reason cannot always approve. Thus, for example, the moderate use of alcoholic beverages is cried down, and even condemned as sinful; those dealing in them are spoken of as guilty of sin, and measures are introduced which take away individual rights, to prevent a comparatively small number, (for drunkards are the exception in any community,) from doing harm by excess in drinking—and that with little success, for those addicted to excess always manage to find a "hole in the wall." It seems to us, the best way to help the cause is to preserve it from its erring friends; for what is based on truth is sure

to commend itself to the thoughtful, and the prevention of mistakes guarantees success. It is for this reason that, having been requested to write these articles, we propose to give the correct view on this subject of total abstinence, and on what relates to it; and this all the more, because there are not lacking the best of reasons for keeping it up.

We have said that total abstinence is a remedial measure; its purpose is to remedy an abuse. An abuse means or implies a use which is not in itself bad, in other words good, in which there is no moral evil. A long time ago St. Augustine laid down the principle: "Evil is the result of enjoyment of those things which should only be used; *velle utendis frui.*" St. Thomas of Aquin too, lays down the rule: *agere cum delectatione non est peccatum; agere propter delectationem peccatum est.* "To do what it is lawful to do, *with pleasure,* is no sin; but to do the same thing *for the pleasure of it only* is a sin." These rules may be said more properly to apply to the gratification of sense, as for example eating and drinking. The evil, therefore, which total abstinence wars against, intemperance, consists in abuse; it is the enjoyment of drinking for the sake of the pleasure, and the excess of that enjoyment. The use of the same beverage because needed, useful, wholesome, medicinal, is not sinful. Hence the reasonable and moderate use of wine or alcoholic drinks is prohibited by no law, and if enjoyed, while used for a proper purpose, as refreshment, is in no wise sinful. It might be said that the supposition of the use of alcoholic drink being ever wholesome, useful, or necessary, is untenable. But

this is not so. The testimony, experience, and practice of the human race is against any such absolute assertion. What is to be said then of the charts scientific men have prepared, which are in use in schools, demonstrating the effects of alcohol on the liver and on the stomach?

The answer is simple. These effects are the result of excess; a moderate rational use of wine and spirits produces no such effects.

But we have known such effects in the case of persons who never were intoxicated; what then? That may be; but a person has not to become intoxicated before drinking to excess. He is guilty of excess when he drinks more than he needs, or more frequently than necessary. The secret tippler may be in a continual state of sin, though externally he may give no indication of his habit; and in all probability will have a hob-nailed liver, or a chronic inflamed condition of the coats of his stomach, before the man who drinks openly, and now and then only gets drunk.

St. Thomas of Aquin treats this matter of drinking very clearly, as is his wont. Question 149, 2a, 2æ, he says sobriety is a special virtue which keeps away the special impediment to reason which comes from the fumes of strong drink, and he goes on to ask whether the use of wine is in itself wholly unlawful; and he answers no: just as no food or drink except accidentally; as for example, if wine do not agree with one, or he exceed his measure, or act against a vow, or give scandal. As will be seen, this enumeration of exceptional cases which render the use of wine unlawful, only goes to strengthen his proposition, that the

use of wine, in itself, is not unlawful: *Bibere vinum, secundum se loquendo, non est illicitum.* With these principles clearly understood, there is no impediment to the establishment of societies which more or less control or exclude the use of wine or liquors, such as for instance, the Society of the Sacred Thirst, which had its origin in Armagh, and requires its members to say certain prayers in honor of the thirst of our Lord on the cross, and especially to abstain from the use of wine and spirituous drinks on Friday; other societies which permit wine and beer, but rigidly exclude alcoholic drinks; and, finally, the Total Abstinence Society, which has the approbation of the Holy See, and has done so great and widespread good. These societies are all governed by sound Catholic principle and do not admit of the fanaticism which condemns as criminal any who do not follow their practices. It is this which recommends to the approval of the country the action of Catholics in this important matter, and which caused one of the most prominent statesmen of our day to remark to the writer: "I like the position of the Catholic Church with regard to temperance; it is temperance without fanaticism."

What has been a source of detriment to the movement favoring total abstinence, has been this fanaticism in the past, now in great part done away with. The excitement with which it was deemed necessary to introduce and keep up the movement, as it was important to arrest attention and make men think, had the effect as always happens, of putting under a ban those who would not take the pledge. This pledge

was given by Father Mathew, with such an accompaniment of religious rite, as to impress with its solemnity, and lead those taking it to regard those who did not as wanting in their duty, and to consider the breaking of the pledge as the violation of a vow. This thing was kept up for many years after the death of Father Mathew, and perhaps even now obtains. The writer has frequently met with those who had this false idea, and who really from a false conscience did commit a mortal sin by "breaking the pledge." Such a sin could be committed only on the supposition that the pledge was a vow, a solemn promise made to God to do a good thing. As we understand it, those who introduced and perpetuated the practice of taking the pledge never intended it should be looked on as a vow; they would have done wrong had they so intended it, and made those taking it so understand. In itself the privation is a serious one and so onerous that it has not unfrequently been broken, besides being a source of infinite scruple. Now no one has a right to increase the chances of sin; that is folly. It is wisdom to diminish such chances. At most the pledge could be considered merely a solemn resolution to abstain, as a matter of good to oneself and to one's neighbor. The use of wine and spirituous liquors not being in itself wrong, no human enactment, such as the pledge, could make it so; for a sin is something in thought, or in word, or in deed, against the law of God. The law of man derives its authority from the law of God, upon which we must fall back when we wish to show a thing sinful. To break the pledge, therefore, is to break one's

resolution, to act dishonorably, as one is believed to keep it, and on that account enjoys honor and certain privileges. On the other hand this pledge, rightly understood, is very useful, and helps greatly a life of sobriety. It seems to us that besides the impression made upon the pledge-taker, it protects him from temptation, and especially from conviviality, from the frequenting of places and company dangerous to himself, from invitations to drink; while on the other hand, it brings him in contact with those disposed as he is, whose sober, and regular, and industrious life is a safeguard to him, and an encouragement. This of itself is enough to authorize the perpetuation of the right use of the pledge, in spreading the practice of total abstinence.

An objection might be made to what has just been said regarding the breaking of the pledge. Is not the assertion that the breaking of the pledge is not sinful too sweeping? Is it not sometimes sinful? We answer: it is; but that is as the phrase goes, *per accidens*, and not from the nature of the pledge. It may happen that a man who takes the pledge is so weak that he cannot resist temptation; his appetite for drink is so strong, that if he takes one glass, he will take another and another, and so drink to excess. In this case most certainly the man sins, not precisely by breaking the pledge, but in doing so he puts himself in the proximate occasion of becoming intoxicated; and for this reason his first glass is, or is likely to be, a mortal sin; we say likely to be, because some especial reason might make it only venially sinful, or in some rare case not sinful at all.

A further objection might be urged on the ground of a contract with a temperance society entered into by the one taking the pledge. The society agrees to give him aid and the enjoyment of certain privileges it can bestow, and that on condition of the pledge as a *sine qua non.* Is not the breaking of the pledge a violation of the contract, and does it not constitute a sin against justice? It seems to us that several things must be considered. Does this man pay his dues? Does he also perform other duties imposed upon him by the society? If he does, he makes the return upon which the obligation to render him aid rests, and he does not sin against justice in breaking the pledge. If this man is entitled to aid and enjoys privileges simply on account of having taken the pledge, and for no other reason, should he break the pledge and continue to enjoy his privileges and have pecuniary aid in sickness, he sins against commutative justice; not however if, after having broken the pledge, he honorably withdraws from the society. The best thing he can do, however, is to go to his chief director, acknowledge his fault, and renew his pledge: for there is none so ready to be indulgent to human weakness and to condone a moment of forgetfulness as the guides whose experience in directing souls is apt to make them considerate; and that all the more, the greater such experience is.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XXI.

TOTAL ABSTINENCE.

(SECOND ARTICLE.)

(*American Ecclesiastical Review, September*, 1892.)

IN the preceding article we have endeavored to lay down the principle on which the cause of total abstinence should rest, and be guided. We propose in the present paper to give some of the reasons which favor it, natural, moral and social, as well as to guard it against some dangers which lie in its way.

Leaving to others to treat this subject in a declamatory and pathetic manner, we study it as a means beneficial to many and useful to all.

From the standpoint of a view of the natural effects of the use of intoxicants, the rule is, the less of them the better. They have their use; so have opium, strychnine and aconite. The danger in the use of these latter is well known; yet duly used they are very useful. Alcoholic drinks, as we have said, have their use, and such moderate use cannot be condemned as sinful. Their nature regulates their use. But there is undoubtedly a very great danger in the unguarded and immoderate use of them, from the pleasure which accompanies such use, and which most frequently is the reason of the use of them. Of late it has become fash-

ionable to describe the result of frequent drinking as a species of insanity, "dipsomania" being the term usually adopted to designate this condition. To such an extent has this gone that we see it openly advocated by those who extol the Keeley cure, that this craving for alcoholic stimulants is simply a disease like any other, often inherited, and the tendency is to look on it as having been, we may say, innocently contracted; with the result of removing from drunkenness the shame which naturally should attach to it. People have been surprised to find clubs formed by those cured through the Keeley process, as if they had done nothing deserving of condemnation in bringing about the need of such a cure.

Looking at the matter physiologically, it is impossible to admit such a theory. Undoubtedly there are those who have a greater appetite for stimulants than others, or a greater need. But the appetite for food and drink can be cultivated, excited, or controlled. The French have a saying: c'est le premier pas qui coûte; it is the first step that is the dangerous one, which costs. And it is the neglect to use prudence and moderation in the beginning that produces the so-called dipsomaniac. Constantly stimulating the nerves of taste, he brings about such a state of chronic excitement, that the slightest occasion will cause a paroxysm of craving; even the thought, when one is striving to correct himself will, by the mysterious action of the mind on the body, produce it. For some, who find themselves tending early in this direction, total abstinence is the only safeguard, and therefore necessary for them. This neces-

sity becomes all the more apparent from the evil results of excessive drinking on the organs of the body, especially the liver and stomach. What the English call the "hob-nailed liver" is a terrible and incurable condition brought about by excess of alcoholic stimulants. It consists in a chronic inflammation of the membrane of the liver which dips into the organ everywhere and holds its small lobes together. The inflamed condition caused by alcohol causes it to contract, to squeeze the lobes, to interfere with their action, and the result is that what should pass through the liver, naturally, is impeded, and dropsy incurable is the result, the early stage of which is the bloated condition of the features, the later pronounced dropsy, especially of the heart, resulting in death. This of itself, it seems to us, should be enough to put one on his guard in the use of intoxicants; while it should be the reason for not a few to enter a total abstinence society. Certainly there is nothing more deplorable than to witness such effects in a man whose future, but for his folly, would have been so different. How many, in the very midst of a brilliant career, have gone down to a drunkard's grave in this way!

Leaving this fertile field of natural causes that call for moderation, we come to the still more important one of morality. Here we are on a higher plane. St. Leo the Great says: this is the man's natural (moral) dignity, if he copy in himself as in a mirror the image of the divine goodness. Among the things that mar this reflection, that tarnish this mirror, is excess in the use of stimulants. It clouds the mind, brutifies the appetites, and so excluding from the mind

the truth and beauty which is in God, and for which it was made, drinking debases, and stimulates the lower passions, and makes of a man a mere animal, even sinking him below the level of the brute. Not only, therefore, is his natural dignity sacrificed, but he becomes a slave. He seems to have lost his birthright, liberty, so powerful is the influence to which he is subject. He will see his degradation, may loathe his boon companions, he may detest his surroundings, but in the midst of these he remains, till, becoming callous to everything, every sense of delicacy blunted, he is an object despised by himself and despised by his associates. In this condition what moral sense is left? He is simply in a condition to be a prey to the first temptation, and the perpetrator of every enormity. The laws are lenient to a man when guilty of a misdeed in a state of intoxication, and in some cases it is well it should be so. But too often men know their evil tendencies, and notwithstanding this indulge to excess, and they commit those dastardly crimes which shock the community, too often perpetrated to the destruction of those nature herself bids man care for. If to this we couple the threats of Scripture, and the words of the Apostle telling us that drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of heaven, the moral misery of this man is complete; there is no hope for him in time or in eternity. Yet total abstinence has raised such up once more, and made them conscious of their moral dignity and saved them for this world and for the next.

While such personal reasons conciliate the good will of the individual towards the cause of total abstinence,

there are most powerful arguments that should induce society at large to foster it, within the bounds of discretion and justice. Every man is a member of society, and has his part to fulfill. When each one does that part the others benefit by it, and the whole is perfected thereby. The neglect of duties, resulting from drinking, is one of the most serious drawbacks to society. It fills the prisons, workhouses, and asylums. It taxes the masses for their support. It is the cause of the greater cost imposed upon a community for the protection of its members. Besides this, there is the influence of example; the associations which breed evil and crime are met with as excessive drinking increases; families are left destitute; the children grow up in neglect and in evil, to be the criminals of the future, and pauperism, with its degradation, goes on increasing. In self-defense, therefore, society must extend its protection to the cause of total abstinence, and it is well it does. Every indulgence and encouragement should be given it. Society will be amply repaid for whatever it may do in favor of the movement. Even if it determine to adopt measures to help on total abstinence and, on the other hand, to repress without unreasonably restricting individual liberty,—which is so vitally opposed to it—it need have no fear; for besides the support of the thoughtful and prudent, it will derive benefit from such steps in better civil order and the improved moral condition of the people. It is not our purpose to suggest means by which the state can and should further the efforts to suppress intemperance; but we cannot refrain from referring to two measures which in our judgment should

be put in practice universally. The first of these is high license, which will have the effect of diminishing the number of saloons, and in all probability of limiting the dispensing of spirituous stimulants to a more responsible class of people, whose interest it is to prevent excess in drinking. To prohibit would be neither wise nor just to the community; not wise, because it would be nugatory, and meet with the fate such measures have met with everywhere. Evasion and hypocrisy, and secret drinking on a large scale, have been the result of such compulsory measures. It would be unjust to the community, because the moderate use of stimulants, as we have shown, is not wrong, but, on the contrary, useful, wholesome, and at times necessary. To attempt to prohibit a few at the expense of the many is not wise legislation; as we have said, those who indulge to excess in drinking are comparatively few; and besides they will get what they want. All that can be done is to limit the traffic to prevent, as far as possible, abuse.

The second measure is the prevention of minors from frequenting saloons, and the abolishing of the "wine-room" feature in the saloon. In many places the law which prevents minors frequenting saloons is in force; whether it is well enforced is not so easy to say. The wine room is an abomination; there is no greater occasion of evil to our young women than this. No saloon should be licensed which would have one of these appendages, whether the saloon be great or small. It is an unfortunate thing that any woman should frequent a saloon; but if she does, whatever is taken should be taken in public, and the protection of

publicity should be assured her. This is what generally is done in the restaurants and gardens of Europe, and though we are well aware that the evilly disposed find ways of following their inclinations, it is undoubtedly the fact that publicity prevents a great deal of evil, and tends to make people stop short of excess. There is another powerful reason that prompts favoring the movement against intemperance and the fostering of the observance of total abstinence. The unit of society is the family; and the condition of this initial element of society vitally affects it. The enemy of domestic happiness, of domestic virtue, of the welfare of the child, perhaps most to be feared, is intemperance. This matter need only be referred to; all of us have seen the house of the drunkard, and the house of the sober man; here all order, cleanliness, propriety, and happiness; there disorder, squalor, indecency and misery. No other argument against intemperance and in favor of total abstinence carries greater weight with it than the condition of the family, and we who are in the midst of the people and see the brutal ways of men towards their wives, the consequent separations, the neglect of the children, their absolute abandonment by their parents brutified by excess, would invoke any influence that could put a stop to such a state of things, and therefore it is that we are all glad to encourage those who try to gain over to the wholesome laws of sobriety or total abstinence any of the slaves of excess. But enactments and stringent measures are of little use unless the will be under the influence of religion, and of this influence we shall treat in our following article.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XXII.

TOTAL ABSTINENCE.

(THIRD ARTICLE.)

(*American Ecclesiastical Review, October*, 1892.)

NOT only has the total abstinence movement physical, moral, and social reasons to commend it; it has also positive approbation on the part of the Holy See, and, what emphasizes this the more, indulgences granted to those who, under the guidance of religion, enroll themselves in the society. This is a very important point, and we propose to speak of it at some length. The date of the brief to which we refer is May 10, 1879.

It is as follows:

LEO, P. P. XIII.

BELOVED SONS, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION:

The devotedness so tenderly manifested in your letter we have received with that feeling of fatherly affection that best corresponds to your expression of filial love. The nature of your union, and the zeal with which you strive to provide for the lasting utility and well-being of your fellow-citizens, by earnest prayer, by good works and the practice of Christian piety, have made this devotedness of yours

the more grateful to us. Especially pleasing to us is that noble determination of yours to oppose and uproot the baneful vice of drunkenness, and to keep far from yourselves and those united with you all incentive to it; for, in the words of the wise man, "It goeth in pleasantly, but in the end it will bite like a snake, and will spread abroad poison like a basilisk."

Wherefore, with all our heart, we desire that your example and zeal may benefit others, in order to the destroying, or, at least, lessening of the evils which we understand you so properly lament and dread.

For this same reason have we listened favorably to the prayer you offered, expressing the desire of gaining those spiritual blessings which, to other pious associations of a like nature in England and Ireland, this Apostolic See has granted. Therefore it is that we transmit to you the accompanying letter, in the form of a brief, from which you will learn the manner in which we have yielded to your desire.

In conclusion, we beg God to guide your counsels, and keep among you harmony and unity of soul, for the purpose of fostering and strengthening which you have banded together. As an earnest of Heaven's favor, and an evidence of our fatherly well-wishing upon you and our other beloved sons united with you in this pious covenant, we bestow, most lovingly, our Apostolic Benediction.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, this 10th day of May, 1879, in the second year of our Pontificate.

LEO, P. P. XIII.

To Our Beloved Sons of the Committee on Address and others of the Convention of the Catholic Total Abstinence Union of America, assembled in the City of Indianapolis, in the State of Indiana, United States of America:

REV. JAMES E. MULHOLLAND,
" GEORGE L. WILLARD,
" LEWIS DEYNOTT,
" J. D. BOWLES,
" JAMES MCGOLRICK,
" H. R. O'DONNELL,
DANIEL B. DONOVAN,
HENRY CASSIDY,
} *Committee on Address.*

The concession of indulgence bears date June 10, 1879; we subjoin a copy of it.

LEO, P. P. XIII.

FOR A PERPETUAL MEMORY OF THE THING.

Since, as we have lately learned, in the city of Indianapolis, in the United States of North America, a Catholic Total Abstinence Society or Pious Union, has been lawfully convened, we, in order that the Union which has proposed to itself an end so commendable and so salutary, may, with God's blessing, day by day be farther extended and more widely propagated, trusting in the mercy of the omnipotent God, and relying upon the authority of the Holy Apostles, Peter and Paul, grant, on the first day of their entrance, a Plenary Indulgence and remission of all their sins to all and each of the faithful who in future shall be enrolled as members in the above said Society or Pious Union, if truly penitent and having confessed, they shall have received the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist.

At the moment of death, we grant, also a Plenary Indulgence, as well of the present each and all members as of those that may in future become members of the said Society or Union, if, in like manner, they be truly penitent, having confessed their sins, and receive Holy Communion: or, when this cannot be done, if they shall, with sentiments of contrition, call devoutly at least upon the name of Jesus with the lips, or if this cannot be done, in the heart.

In like manner, we mercifully grant in the Lord, a Plenary Indulgence to the same present members; and to all hereafter to be numbered in the said Society or Union, if truly penitent and having received the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist, they shall each year, on the principal feast day of the same Union, to be chosen once for all by the above named members, and approved of by the Bishop, visit with devotion their respective parish churches any time from the first Vespers to sunset of their feast day, and shall there piously pray for the harmony of Christian Princes, for the uprooting of heresies

and conversion of sinners, and the exaltation of Holy Mother Church.

Moreover, in favor of the present and future members of the said Union, who, at least, with contrite hearts, shall, on four days of the year, festival or otherwise, to be designated once for all by the Ordinary, visit each his own parish church, and there pray as above stated, we grant, in the accustomed form of the Church, an indulgence of seven years, and as many quarantines from the penance enjoined upon them or otherwise in whatsoever manner by them due, each day that they shall have fulfilled these conditions.

All and each of these indulgences, absolutions from sins, remission of penances, we allow to be applied, by way of suffrage, to the souls of the faithful who have departed this life in the friendship of God, all things whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding. We wish these presents to remain in force henceforth forever.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, under the ring of the Fisherman, June X, MDCCCLXXIX, in the second year of our Pontificate.

For Card. CARAFA DE TRAETTO,
D. JACOBINI, *Substitute.*

In the letter of the Holy Father, we call attention to the fact that he expresses his gratification at the reception of the address of the Total Abstinence Society, due especially to the circumstance that earnest prayer, good works and the practice of Christian piety are to be the solid foundation upon which the cause is to rest, which aims at opposing and uprooting the baneful vice of drunkenness, and keeping far removed all incentive to it from those whose sentiments in particular the address expresses. He adds that he cordially desires that their example and zeal may benefit others, so as to destroy or lessen the evils which they justly lament and dread. All this is very significant and

weighty. It removes the total abstinence movement from the category of experiments, or Temperance Utopian schemes, of which there are so many, and places the Society among the approved societies of the Catholic Church; a result first brought about chiefly, if we mistake not, in England, by the zealous charity of his Eminence the late Cardinal Manning, and of the present Archbishop of Westminster, Most Rev. Dr. Vaughan.

The Indulgences granted, as we see, are abundant and prove the interest the Holy Father takes in the Total Abstinence Society. They are first, a Plenary Indulgence on the day of joining the Society; second, a Plenary Indulgence at the hour of death; third, a Plenary Indulgence once a year on the feast day of the Society; fourth, a Partial Indulgence on four days in the year. No fuller recognition and approbation on the part of the Head of the church could be given, and for this reason, if for no other, it would be unlawful to speak in disparaging terms of the Total Abstinence Society, whereas, those who are docile to the voice of their chief Pastor will unite in praising the noble end this society has in view, and in furthering it as far as it may be in their power.

It is not enough, however, to rest in the mere fact of such high and sacred approval. Movements of a practical character like this, require constant activity to keep them up. The members fail in their duty unless they appreciate this and unremittingly labor for the purpose aforesaid.

They must first be honorable and faithful observers of this obligation. They receive honor and considera-

tion, and enjoy privileges as having promised to keep the pledge and totally abstain; they must even avoid the appearance of evil in this respect, and not frequent that company or those places where any suspicion might attach to them. They must avoid dangerous occasions, and not esteem themselves too strong to yield; for it is written: he who loveth the danger shall perish therein.

Secondly. This will be more effectually brought about if the members encourage total abstinence by social amusement as a feature of their union. If they can be brought together to partake of rational and improving entertainments, in which all exaggeration is avoided, and literary and artistic taste cultivated, they will, as they have done in the past, experience the benefit resulting from mutual example and encouragement. They will keep each other up; they will improve themselves; they will protect themselves against similar allurements elsewhere, the end of which is not laudable.

Thirdly. They should keep themselves thoroughly occupied. This is a far more important point than that of amusement. Idleness teaches much evil; no amount of resolution will hold out against this. On the other hand the active employment of one's mind and members, in those who are wise enough to so devote themselves, is good for soul and body, developing a love for it that is almost enough to live for, itself alone. With it comes self-respect, respect of others, contributing to the happiness of those we love, the habit of economy, gradual accumulation of a competency, and an honored old age.

To these, fourthly, is to be added the faithful fre-

quenting of the Sacraments. Here is the most important feature of all, without which, too, no one will be likely to persevere. This has been well understood by all zealous clergymen who have furthered the total abstinence movement. The mantle of religion was thrown around it, and members were advised "to go to their duties." But in too many cases it was not urged upon them to go frequently, and in this, we are persuaded, is to be found the principal cause of a large number of failures to keep inviolate the pledge of total abstinence. Frequent Communion is not for religious only; it is for the laity as well. "He that eateth Me, the same shall live by Me," was said of all; the strength which comes from this practice can be known to those only who have faithfully tried it. In our days men and women of the world go often to the Sacraments, and find this does not interfere with their usefulness, their cheerfulness, nor with their proper recreation; on the contrary, it gives them the peace, the happiness, the fortitude which is not of earth, and which means perseverance.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XXIII.

THE BRUTE-SOUL.

(*The Catholic World, July*, 1893.)

ANY one who will attentively study matter and its properties will often see many wonderful things. Some of these will astonish him, and perhaps overthrow all his preconceived notions. They will set him to theorizing, make him think that after all matter is not inert; that inertness is an idea and nothing more. He will perhaps throw over the atomic conception of matter, and regard material substance as a collection of simple essences with power to act—a force. Yet whatever theory one may adopt as most fitting in his view to explain phenomena which, after all, cannot be adequately explained, there are certain things he cannot ignore, which are fixed facts, and laws that induction has made known to us from the study of the facts. These facts and laws are: first, that matter does not *move* unless a force moves it; "if matter moves," says Professor Tyndall, "it is force that moves it"; second, that chemical action produces movement in particles and new combinations; third, that in these changes heat, and electricity and light sometimes also, are evolved; fourth, that endosmosis and exosmosis, ab-

sorption and exhalation, are constantly going on and in a regular manner, with fixed law; fifth, that the same can be said of expansion and contraction; sixth, that all these movements "may be reduced to a push or a pull in a straight line" (Tyndall, *Familiar Science*); and, should there be an apparent contradiction from objects moving in a curve, this is, as we all know, from a contrast of forces, the resultant being the diagonal. Whatever, therefore, be our theory of matter, it cannot be said to enter practically into our consideration of it, for we have to do with its constant and unvarying manifestations, to which all experience bears witness; such, for example, as inability to move of itself—inertness, impenetrability, gravitation, etc.

In the lower order of matter, in what is inorganic, we notice most markedly the existence of these facts and laws; even in crystallization, so beautiful and so wonderful, we can to some extent explain what occurs to bring about these delicate formations.

WHAT IS THIS SOMETHING?

But when we come to organic matter, then we begin to find what passes our comprehension; we recognize the existence and the application of the laws of matter, under which we can class the greater part of the phenomena. But there is something more than that. There is peculiar development of matter which is not chemical action; there is something back of matter which gives rise to new combination and development; there is something which moves matter, and is a principle of movement. It exists in the vegetable, in the

animal, in man; it is self-moving. What is this something? It is not matter, for it shows a tendency to act of itself with a purpose, avoiding what is hurtful and seeking what is beneficial—to act, as we may say, intelligently. This is seen even in plants; it is observed yet more markedly in the lower forms of life; it is evident in the higher forms of the brute creation. We therefore exclude from the idea of it all notion of matter; we conceive of it as free from all composition, as being a simple essence, which, not being matter, is bound down to matter and has its sphere limited to matter, taking it up, appropriating and developing it, according to the tendency given by its Author.

Does this imply that such simple essence is in any sense material? The question is not an idle one. One comes across every now and then the proposition: "The brute-soul is material." St. Thomas Aquinas and others who follow him have this phrase, or the equivalent of it. We must see, however, what they mean by it; for unless we understand the mode of speech of these writers and theologians, we shall undoubtedly be led astray. Fortunately St. Thomas is very clear in telling us what he means. San Severino, who explains this wording of St. Thomas, quotes him as saying: "Everything whose being is in matter must be material." Hence, as the soul of the brute has its being in matter, he styles it material; moreover, as its actions show what it is, and those actions are material, it is material too. Again, as it owes its being to matter as condition, and ceases to exist when the matter of the body is destroyed, it follows that it is material. Yet in speaking in this way St. Thomas does

not intend to teach that the soul of the brute is composed of matter. On the contrary, he says it is not. San Severino shows this very pointedly (p. 374, vol. ii.), and that it is indivisible, or simple; and he quotes St. Thomas as saying that the soul of the brute can, in some manner, be called a spirit, as that word signifies an invisible substance with power to move. He holds, however, to the idea of material in the sense, first, of the soul of the brute being educed from the potentiality or possibility of matter; second, of its action being bound down to matter and inseparable from it; third, of its ceasing to be when the body it animated is destroyed.

HOW DOES IT COME OUT OF MATTER?

According, therefore, to St. Thomas, the brute-soul is simple and cannot be perceived by the senses, but comes out of matter, and ceases to be when the matter is destroyed. How does it come out of matter? What is to be understood by the phrase "it is educed from the potentiality of matter?" This is an interesting question, and suggests others. Let us see whither our thoughts will lead us. To understand the above phrase, or proposition, it is well to recall the definition of creation given by the scholastics: it is an act by which something comes into being from nothing of itself, something is made out of nothing, nor did the subject, in which it is, previously exist—*ex nihilo sui et subjecti.* This, of course, requires direct actual exercise of Divine Power, and is called properly creation. But where the subject, in which the soul is to be, previously exists,

i.e, matter, determining the action of the soul which comes into being only for it, the act, by which this brute-soul is, has not the name of creation. We confess that this way of looking at the manner in which the soul of the brute, of everything that moves itself, comes into being does not claim our unconditional acceptance.* The brute-soul is acknowledged to have simplicity, and, in a certain sense, the nature of a spirit. It would appear that the only part matter could have in the existence of the vivifying principle, the soul, is that it is in a fit condition to receive it and be developed into a composite substance, body and soul. The reason is that matter cannot give what it has not—simplicity, self-movement, life; it is inert. Therefore, if anything exists having simplicity, movement, life, or power to produce a living organism, it must come from the act of the Creator, willing its existence. That act was one in the beginning, entitatively, as the metaphysicians say; but its multifold effects are in time, and are conditioned on the state of matter; terminatively the act is multifold—but still the direct act of the Creator.

This view is more or less held, as those familiar with this matter know, by a number of able metaphysicians. In the manner in which we have here put it, it seems to us to lead the way to reconciling the conflicting thoughts of those who do not believe in evolution and those Christian writers who do believe in it. Although we are not of those who agree with the latter, but hold, with Agassiz and Virchow, that not only is

* Why should this be predicated of the brute-soul and not of the human soul? Is not the mode of production the same?

Darwin's theory not proven, not only that the missing link is wanting, but that the theory itself of man's evolution from other lower animal life is unsound; in our judgment it is possible to conceive a mode of coming into existence which to some extent justifies a Christian in holding to the theory of evolution in a modified sense; the manner in which it is understood by Darwin and the materialistic and pantheistic schools of to-day being excluded. We therefore here endeavor to explain evolution in a Christian sense; as coming, that is, by the will of an omnipotent Creator —God. St. Augustine, in treating of the six days of creation, advances his theory of the potentiality of matter. In the beginning God created heaven and earth; that is—as the Council of the Vatican has it—the spiritual and the material. That act, as the African doctor explains it, gave to matter a power to develop the germs of everything that is material. All this was contained in this initial act. In process of time the different orders of beings were to come into existence. This theory we can admit. But the theory does not explain how this potentiality of matter becomes actual. Is it by an inherent efficacy of matter, or is it by the placing in relation with matter a principle which causes matter to take on peculiar development? We feel persuaded that, had St. Augustine lived at this day, he would have answered: matter cannot produce or cause spirit to exist; for it cannot give what it has not. But, he would go on to say, matter by general laws having by successive stages reached certain conditions adapted to animal life—the anima, the spirit, or the soul, by the antecedent act

of the Creator calling spirit into being from the beginning, sprang into existence from nothing to act in matter, to take it up, to develop it, to be its form, the substantial form by which it is what it is—an insect, a reptile, a fish, a bird, or a man—each requiring its own substantial form, distinct and differing from the rest.

THE FORM IS NOT OF MATTER.

This form is not of matter. There is a possibility of its existence in matter; and if it is to be only sentient and not spiritual or intellectual, it will be in a certain sense material, inasmuch as its operations are limited to matter. We go further: we think St. Thomas would, did he live in these days, change his wording so as to remove the danger of his words being taken in a material sense, and say that the soul of the brute is educed from matter as a subject by divine power. That he meant it is clear to us, as we have shown above. In this sense, then, can the assertion that the theory of evolution is true be tolerated, namely: God having brought matter to such perfection as to render animal life possible, directly calls into being the soul which can take up and develop this perfected matter, so that the existence of such form or soul seems to depend on and follow from the condition of matter, while in reality antecedently it was directly willed by God and called into being by him from nothing, *ex nihilo sui.*

It will be seen at a glance that this theory, or explanation, denies the passage of one species into an-

other. Such a thing has never been proved. If it appear otherwise, this comes from a want of knowledge of the possibilities of the form. The form which animates the larva of the gnat has a possibility of developing matter in the various stages of its existence; in like manner the form of the butterfly has its threefold possibility of development. But such forms remain material in the sense of being bound down to matter. Being material they do not and cannot pass to the intellectual order of being; and therefore, as Professor Dana has said, when it comes to man it is necessary for God to call into being a special existence, man's form, his spiritual soul, which, if we understand eduction from matter to be the possibility of matter being made to form the human body, might be said to be educed from the potentiality of matter, in the sense explained above. This, however, by no means excludes the absolute act of the Creator, without which the soul even of the brute could not exist, for the very simple reason that matter has no such qualities as simplicity and self-movement to impart. While, therefore, we would not quarrel with the Christian who explains evolution in this way, we feel it is much the safer, as the hypothesis of evolution has not been proven, to say that no species ever passes into another, even in such a way, but that every species is a separate creation of God, willed in the beginning and in time called into being by the direct act of God giving existence to the form which did not exist before, but which God now makes take hold of the matter He has prepared for it. When evolutionists succeed in proving that one species passes into another, then it will be time to take up

the question, and show that a higher form has been added to the simian body to make it the body of a human being. Such a passing of species they have not proven, nor, in our humble opinion, will they ever be able to prove it.

OCCASIONAL ESSAYS.

XXIV.

BRAHMANISM DOES NOT ANTEDATE THE MOSAIC WRITINGS.

(*The Catholic World*, *February*, 1894.)

THE period in which we are is generally considered to be one of transition, and those who go by the name of "advanced thinkers" are pronounced in their views and are in a hurry to throw aside the past. While it is true the world is always changing, it seems to us that, in studying these changes, we do well to remember that human nature does not change, and that the temptations to evil and to error do not change; and that therefore it is wise to look to the experience of the past and to the canons of sound reasoning to guard against both evil and error. We wish to invoke these in the remarks we subjoin; for we are desirous of putting before the public what may tend to stay the downward course of many minds that are throwing aside Christianity and deceiving themselves with the idea that they have found a source of enlightenment in the ancient religious teaching of the Hindus. While we are striving to do this, we feel sure that what we shall say, or rather present from weighty sources, will confirm the believer in Christianity in his faith and

in his conviction that he has nothing to fear from the most learned opposition.

A HINDUPHILE AUTHORITY.

The principal source whence we present the reasons which will serve our purpose is a work written not long ago by a zealous and learned missionary bishop, Monseigneur Laouënan, Vicar-Apostolic of Pondichery, India, printed at the Press of the Catholic Mission in Pondichery, in 1884. The author of this most interesting book, which met with such approval that it was honored by a public act of the Academy of France, or, as it is technically said, "*couronné*," was born in Brittany. He studied for the priesthood in the house of the "Missions Étrangères" in Paris, and went as a missionary priest to India. During his studies he had been impressed with the force of the arguments against Christianity derived from the traditions and sacred books of the Hindus, although not to the extent of causing him to waver in that faith which rests upon the Resurrection of Christ. He had read Cardinal Wiseman's lectures on the relation between Science and Revealed Religion. He had admired the manner in which the great cardinal laid bare the pretensions to excessive antiquity put forward by those who were carried away by their enthusiasm for everything Hindu; citing the labors of astronomers, for example, to show that the state of the heavens described in the epic poem, "The Ramayana," as accompanying the birth of Rama, could only have taken place nine hundred and sixty-one years before Christ, and not in fabled antiq-

uity; or that the birth of Krishna or Kristna, the pretended prototype of Christ, at which the position of the planets is given in his *Janampatra*, could only have occurred August 7, A D. 600. (Lect. VII.)

The young priest resolved to consecrate himself to the work of still further examination into the claims of Hindu theology, or rather mythology, and to study it on the spot. This resolution was carried out, and the result is the book we have before us, with the title *Brahmanism and its Relations.* In writing it he spent thirty-five years, availing himself of the researches of the most successful writers of all nationalities on the Sacred Books of India. Such a work is valuable from the information it gives, and is rendered more so by the temperate manner in which the author of it speaks. For he lets us understand that he does not pretend to have cleared up all the obscure points of Indian chronology.

VAGUENESS OF INDIAN LITERATURE.

In his introduction he says:

"We do not flatter ourselves with the idea that we have entirely succeeded. The special characteristic of all Indian literature is that it has almost absolutely no chronology; so all who have written on ancient India up to the Mohammedan invasion in the eleventh century are reduced to conjectures more or less risky. Our condition is the same. Certain facts, however, seem to us indubitable; among others, the successive transformations in the Brahmanical doctrine and worship, the last of which is only a few centuries back: whence it fol-

lows that Brahmanism in its present form is relatively modern, subsequent not only to Judaism, but also to Christianity. Now, it is especially in the books which have been inspired by the present, actual form of Brahmanism, or have been created by it, that are to be found the traditions and doctrines relating to Christianity. In like manner it is principally in the laws of Manu that are contained the traditions and the institutions which resemble the recitals and the prescriptions of the Pentateuch, and it is to-day established that the *Mánava-Dharma-Sastra* is much after the time of Moses." (p. ix.)

Before going further into the matter of this book, it will be useful to hear what others have to say regarding the time in which the sacred writings of the Hindus were written, and with reference to the books themselves.

Professor Julius Eggeling, Ph.D. and Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in the University of Edinburgh, in his article on Brahmanism in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, may be said to give an opinion representing the conclusion of scholars on the subject. This is what he says:

"The Hindu scriptures consist of four separate collections, or *Sanhitas*, of sacred texts or *Mantras*, including hymns, incantations, and sacrificial forms of prayer; viz., the *Rich* or *Rig-veda*, the *Saman* or *Sama-veda*, the *Yajush* or *Yajur-veda*, and the *Atharvan* or *Atharva-veda*. Each of these four text-books has attached to it a body of prose writings, called *Brahmanas*, which presuppose the *Sanhitas*, purporting as they do to explain chiefly the ceremonial application

of the texts, and the origin and import of the sacrificial rites for which these were supposed to have been composed. Besides the *Brahmanas* proper, these theological works, and in a few isolated cases some of the *Sanhitas*, include two kinds of appendages, the *Aranyakas* and *Upanishads*, both of which and especially the latter, by their language and contents, generally betray a more modern origin than the works to which they are annexed."

The *Aranyakas*, like the *Brahmanas*, explain the text and "give somewhat more prominence to the mystical sense of the rites of worship." The *Upanishads* "are taken up to a great extent with speculations on the problems of the universe, and the religious aims of man." "The hymns of the *Rig-veda* constitute the earliest lyrical effusions of the Aryan settlers in India which have been handed down to posterity. They are certainly not all equally old: on the contrary, they evidently represent the literary activity of many generations of bards, though their relative age cannot as yet be determined with anything like certainty. The tenth and last book of the collection, however, at any rate has all the characteristics of a later appendage, and in language and spirit many of its hymns approach very nearly to the level of the contents of the *Atharvan*." "Several important works, the original composition of which has probably to be assigned to the early days of Brahmanism, such as the Institutes of Manu, and the two great epics, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, in the form in which they have been handed down to us, show manifest traces of a more modern redaction."

We have here first the *Sanhitas* or sacred books, next the *Brahmanas*, then appendages, the *Aranyakas* and the *Upanishads*. The most ancient of all is the *Rig-veda*, which was the work of many generations of bards; the relative age of its hymns cannot be determined with anything like certainty. The Institutes of Manu, and the epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, as handed down to us, manifest traces of a more modern redaction, or editorial compilation. It will be well to bear these statements in mind as we proceed.

MAX MÜLLER'S OPINION.

Professor Max Müller, in his *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 145 (ed. 1879, Scribner), says: "I ascribe the collection and the systematic arrangement of the Vedic hymns and formulas, which we find in four books or the *Samhitas* of the *Rig-veda*, the *Yagur-veda*, the *Sama-veda*, and the *Atharva-veda*, to the Mantra Period, from the year 800 B. C. to the year 1100." "The *Brahmanas* belong to a period from 600 to 800 B. C." "The *Sutras*, treatises on phonetics, etymology, exegesis, metre, customs, laws, geometry, astronomy, and philosophy, are of a period subsequent to these, B. C. 500." "It is therefore before 1000 B. C. that we must place the spontaneous growth of Vedic poetry, such as we find in the *Rig-veda*, and in the *Rig-veda* only. . . . How far back that period, the so-called Khandas period, extended, who can tell? Some scholars extend it to two or three thousand years before our era, but it is far better to show the different layers of thought that produced the Vedic

religion, and thus to gain an idea of its long growth, than to attempt to measure it by years or centuries, *which can never be more than guesswork*" (italics ours). "One thing is certain: there is nothing more ancient and primitive, not only in India, but in the whole Aryan world, than the hymns of the *Rig-veda*." He tells us that these hymns were handed down by memory entirely, as likewise all the sacred books, the *Brahmanas* and the *Sutras*, for "few Sanskrit MSS. in India are older than the year 1000 after Christ; nor is there any evidence that the art of writing was known in India much before the beginning of Buddhism, or the very end of the Vedic literature."

A DEFINITE LANDMARK.

The mention of Buddhism brings us to an interesting period. Here we are no longer in the dark as to time. History comes to our aid. We are able to fix dates, at least approximately, and surely. At the time of Alexander the Great, Professor Müller tells us, "the whole drama of the ancient literature of the Brahmans had been acted. The old language had changed, the old religion, *after passing through many phases* (italics ours), had been superseded by a new faith." Alexander in his invasion of India, an. 325 before Christ, after the defeat of Bessus, received into his service an Indian chief by name Sisycottus, according to Thirlwall (ed. of 1845, Harper & Brothers, p. 232). This chief, whom he made commander of the important post of Aornus, on the right bank of the Indus, not far above the junction of the Cophen,

seems to be the same as the Sandrocottus or Kandragrupta mentioned by Professor Max Müller and by Monseigneur Laouënan, who afterwards became the founder of a dynasty at Magadha. The grandson of this potentate, Asoka, held the great council of the Buddhists in the seventeenth year of his reign, or in the year 245 or 242 B. C. (p. 130), and "162 years were supposed to have passed between Buddha's death and Kandragrupta's accession in the year 315; therefore 315+162=477 B. C. is the date of Buddha's death." Again, "218 years were supposed to have passed between Buddha's death and Asoka's inauguration in the year 259; 259+218=477 is the year of Buddha's death." "Further confirmation of this hypothesis has been lately added by two inscriptions discovered by General Cunningham, and published by Dr. Bühler in the *Indian Antiquary*." All fabled assertions of antiquity on the part of Buddhists we see by these citations are out of the question, for we are now in certain historic periods.

THE QUESTION OF INSPIRED WRITING.

Before leaving Professor Müller's book it is interesting to note what he says about the inspiration of the *Rig-veda* and other books. Page 132 he writes: "At what time the claim of being divinely revealed, and therefore infallible, was first set up by the Brahmans in favor of the Veda, is difficult to determine. This claim, like other claims of the same kind, seems to have grown up gradually, till at last it was formulated into a theory of inspirations as artificial as any known

to us from other religions. As it is not our purpose to detain the reader with more lengthy extracts from the learned and distinguished professor's work, we refer him to the proofs given of this. We simply sum up here what has been quoted: The compilation of the *Rig-veda* from spontaneously developed hymns and from traditions he deems is not to be assigned to an earlier date than the year 1000 B. C. When they were first uttered he cannot tell; to measure the growth of the Vedic religion by years "*can never be more than guesswork.*" All these hymns and compositions, and all the books, down to about the year 500 were handed down purely by memory; writing being, as far as evidence goes, unknown in India before that time. Again, Sanskrit MSS. as a rule are not to be found before 1000 years after Christ. Moreover, the Vedic religion passed through many phases by the year 500 B. C. As for inspiration, it was an afterthought.

BRAHMANISM COMPARATIVELY MODERN.

Let us now go back to Monseigneur Laouënan's book, and see how he treats of the subject we are considering. In search of the information he needed, he tells us, he lived in close relations with Indians of every class; that he was able to visit the whole of India from Cape Comorin and Ceylon to the Himalayas; from the Malabar coast and Bombay to Chittagong in Bengal and Rangoon in Birmania. He studied attentively every thing he saw, read everything treating of the people and their religions. As a result he says:

"What I gathered by observation on the subject of

Brahmanism made me see that this form of religion has not been as immovable as is pretended and believed; that it has undergone transformation, modifications many and profound, of which some are modern; in fact, that the Hindu cult, as it exists to-day, is, with its books and sacred monuments, of an origin relatively recent. I found that these transformations are all after the time of Moses, and that the last occurred parallel with the preaching of Christianity in India." (Preface, p. vii.)

"My observations led me to another result less expected: the non-Aryan races of India have exerted a considerable influence on the changes of the Brahmanic doctrines and worship. Thus we see the Brahmans borrow their human sacrifices from the Dasyus, and unclean practices from the Saktas; from the Chamitic tribes the worship of demons and of the Phallus; from the Scythic races the worship of the serpent; from the aborigines the modern characters of Siva and of Vishnu; from Iranian philosophers, or more probably from the Jews scattered about in Asia, the notion of the one God, the Creator, the knowledge of the history of the creation and of the deluge and so many primordial traditions; from the Christians finally what is most pure and most elevated in their doctrines and institutions." (*ibid.*)

ABSENCE OF CHRONOLOGY IN INDIA.

"I owe the reader," he goes on to say, "another very important explanation. He will not find dates in my book, or he will find but few, which fix in a pre-

cise way the epochs to which belong personages, events, and periods mentioned. India has no history, or rather it possesses no chronology; historical facts abound, but they have no dates; so that it is by confronting them with events in the history of other peoples who had relations with it, that it is possible to determine in an approximative manner the time when the persons existed or the events took place." And he gives the following instance. I may state that a Brahman in a discourse published in the *Madras Mail* of May 23, 1884, quoted by our author, says: "The Hindu religion was established in India, several thousand years ago, in the place of the old Buddhist worship, the followers of which, after their defeat, had emigrated into the neighboring countries of Thibet and China." Mark how Monseigneur Laouënan meets this boast of antiquity based on the antiquity of Buddhism.

"In the historical portion of the Vishnu-Purâna, which is, by the acknowledgment of all Indian scholars, the most trustworthy of the Indian works, there is a list of the kings of Magadha of which here is the abridgment: First appears the dynasty of Vrihâdratha, composed of eighteen princes who reigned one thousand years; which would give to each one a mean reign of fifty-five years, a thing not very probable. To the dynasty of Vrihâdratha succeeded that of Pradyota, which counts five kings and held sway one hundred and thirty-eight years; then came that of the Sêsha-nagas, who ruled three hundred and sixty-two; then that of the Nandas, who retained the crown only one hundred years. After these came the Mauryas, to the number of ten, who reigned one hundred and

thirty-seven years; the Sungas, who reigned one hundred and twelve years; after the Sungas the dynasty of the Kanwas, who governed forty-five years; finally that of the Andhras, numbering thirty-three princes, and held the supreme power four hundred and fifty-six years. That is all the historian gives, except the names of the kings. How are we to fix the dates of these dynasties? The history of Alexander the Great and of his expedition into India furnishes us the means.

ALEXANDER'S CONQUESTS IN INDIA.

"The historians of Alexander make mention of an Indian adventurer, a guide, by name Sandrocyptus or Sandracottus, who had relations with the prince. After he left India Sandracottus became king of Magadha and of nearly all northern India; Seleucus Nicator, one of the generals and successors of Alexander, made a treaty with him and sent to him, as ambassador, Megasthenes, who resided several years at Palibothra (Patoliputra or Patha), his capital. The expedition of Alexander into India took place 327–325 B. C.; the treaty between Seleucus and Sandracottus was concluded about 312 B. C.; Megasthenes resided at Palibothra from the year 306 to the year 298 B. C.

"It remains now to find this Sandracottus mentioned here, who was sovereign of Magadha. He has been identified with certainty as Chandragrupta, head of the dynasty of Mauryas, who furnished ten kings to Magadha. It follows that Chandragrupta reigned between the year 320 and the year 290 B. C. This chronological point once established has served to fix

several others, and among others the date of Buddha's death. This reformer was a contemporary of Vidmisara or Bimbisara, and of Ajata-satru, who were converted to his teachings and who belonged to the Sêsha-nagas dynasty mentioned above. Between this dynasty and Chandragrupta was the dynasty of the Nandas, who were in power one hundred years. The Sêsha-nagas had reigned three hundred and sixty-two years, which gives a mean of thirty-six years to each member of the dynasty. Between Bimbisara and the first of the Nandas there were five kings, whose combined reigns would give us, 36 years x 5=180 years. If now we add the 100 years of the Nandas to the 180 of the five kings of the Sêsha-nagas, we have 280; to this add 320 A. C., the approximative year of Chandragrupta's accession, we get the year 600 B. C. as the date of Buddha's death. But as Buddha died in the eighth year of Ajata-satru we must deduct eight from this figure, which gives us the year 592 B. C. as the year approximatively of Buddha's death. We shall see farther on that others, taking different calculations, fix the death of Buddha some in 543, others in 477, and even in 472 B. C." (p. xi.)

THE AGE OF THE RIG-VEDA.

This is a very instructive piece of calculation, for it shows us how difficult, even with so certain a date to start from as that of Alexander's expedition into India, how conjectural everything in Indian chronology must necessarily be. As Professor Max Müller has said, there is much guesswork. The calculation, however, is

quite enough to leave the Madras Brahman in an embarrassing position. Not only this, it has an element of certainty about it, and if the Vishnu-Purâna is really reliable, as it is looked on to be by the Brahmans, we are on a sure road to determine much that regards the Rig-veda and its antiquity with historic correctness. Our author shows this as follows: "The hymns of the Rig-veda often cite the name of a king of Benares or Casi, by name Divodasa, whose sons Pratardana and Parutshepa are the authors of several of these hymns. On the other hand the Brahmanic legends agree unanimously in saying that this Divodasa was converted by Buddha. He was then a contemporary of Buddha, and lived in the sixth, or even in the fifth, century before our era. It follows from this logically that the hymns of the Rig-veda which speak of him and those which were composed by his sons are subsequent to that time, and cannot be assigned to the fourteenth century, as is generally done.

"Likewise, Prasenajit, king of Sravasti, was instructed by Buddha and embraced Buddhism. Now this Prasenajit was the father of Renuka, who was the mother of the famous Parasu-Râma. This personage was therefore a contemporary of Buddha. Prasenajit was the brother of Druvasandhi, king of Ayodhya, the sixteenth descendant and successor of Ikohwaku, founder of that city. From Druvasandhi descended the divine hero Rama-Chandra. According to a list of the kings of Ayodhya, Rama-Chandra was the twenty-third successor of Druvasandhi; according to another list, he was the twelfth; however that is, he was much posterior to Buddha and to the sixth century before

Christ; consequently the Ramayana, which sings his exploits, cannot have been composed at an epoch as far back as pretended."

Reading this categoric statement of facts as they are given in the Rig-veda and other books of India, one cannot help thinking that those who put faith in the assertion that these sources of religious information are the earliest the human race has, are not only running a great risk, not only taking a leap in the dark, but really go against the first dictates of common sense.

THE ARYAN AVATAR.

After a minute and careful weighing and examination of the opinion of the most reliable Indian scholars, often widely differing, Monseigneur Laouënan gives his conclusions, with regard to the descent of the Aryans into India, and then with reference to the earliest epoch to which the Rig-veda is to be assigned.

"We think that without fear the fifteenth or the sixteenth century before Christ can be adopted as the epoch at which the royal families of the Aryan race permanently established themselves in the north of India; and the eighteenth or the nineteenth century as that in which this people descended from the high plateaux of Asia into the fertile plains watered by the Indus and its affluents. We are thus nearly in agreement with William Jones Colebrooke, P. A. Dubois, and Heeren, whose authority is so weighty in this matter. Three chief considerations confirm us in this opinion.

"(*a*) We have seen elsewhere (part ii., c. iii., *Of the Aryans*) that according to the data of the Rig-veda itself, the Aryan nation was for a long time without kings, probably all the time they dwelt in the Sapta Scindhu (at the affluents of the Indus). Would it be excessive to put that period as three hundred years?

"(*b*) The commencement of the so-called solar and lunar races (when the kingdoms were founded) dates from the establishment of the Aryans on the banks of the Yamuna and of the Ganges. We have seen (*Ancient Geography of India*) that the most ancient of the cities where the kings reigned do not appear to reach beyond the fourteenth century before Christ.

"(*c*) We have said (part ii., c. ii., *The Turanian Races*) that as a result of the obstinate struggles on the high plateaux of Asia between the Iranians and the Turanians, the one and the other, according to the vicissitudes of the strife, sought peace in India. These wars reach as high as the fifteenth and even the eighteenth century before the Christian era. We can therefore fix on one of these dates as that of the immigration of the Aryans into India."

Having given these conclusions Monseigneur Laouënan goes on to show, by citations from Indian scholars, that the greater part of the hymns of the Rig-veda were composed on the plains of the Sapta Scindhu. His final conclusion with reference to the time to which the Rig-veda is to be assigned are as follows:

"1st. The doctrines taught by the Vedas on the existence of God and on his nature, on the creation of the world, on the soul of man, its immortality and existence in a future life, doctrines on the other hand,

without form or certainty, offer absolutely nothing that is beyond the not-well-defined circle of the traditions found among all peoples and even among savages; whence it follows that, even if they were anterior to the books of Moses, they could not have furnished him with the data so precise, so sublime, which shine out at every line of the Pentateuch.

"2d. If the Vedas, certainly ancient in part, reach a high antiquity, we have no historic proof of their real age; the calculations, or rather the most favorable conjectures, do not place them in a period beyond the seventeenth or eighteenth century before Christ—that is, the time when Moses lived and wrote.

"3d. Several hymns of the Rig, Sama, Yadjur, and Atharva-veda are after that date and even after the sixth century before Christ; and it is generally agreed on that the hymns of the Rig-veda which treat of the Supreme Being or Spirit, of creation, of man's soul, of the future life, belong to this latter period, are subsequent to the sixth century before Christ.

"4th. It is recognized that the Vedas, and especially the hymns of the Rig, have undergone several successive compilations or arrangements, the dates of which are unknown; and it is extremely probable, not to say certain, that the Vyâsa (or compiler) who was the last to arrange them, lived in the eleventh century of the Christian era.

"5th. If therefore we meet with some analogies with the doctrines of Judaism and of Christianity and there has been borrowing, we have the right to assert that it is the Vedas that have borrowed from the Bible, and not the Bible from the Vedas."

THE LAWS OF MANU.

This sketch of the learned labors of this zealous prelate, little as it does justice to his great work, would be entirely wanting in completeness did we omit reference to what he says about the Laws of Manu, and of the social, commercial, and diplomatic relations Asia has had with Europe.

The Laws of Manu is only another name for the *Manava-Dharma-Sastra*, which book is a treatise on justice, virtue, and the duties of man. *Manu* means not so much a person as the intelligent thinking principle. This collection of books is made up by a compiler who has drawn pretty much from every source of Hindu learning, even from Buddhism, and is therefore of a period subsequent to the latter. Monseigneur Laouënan tells us (p. 341, vol. i.): "It is to-day generally admitted that the compilation of the *Manava-Dharma-Sastra* could not have been begun before the fifth century before Christ, and that it was finished towards the seventh century of our era—that is, after Christ, and perhaps later." After giving the various opinions regarding the origin of this collection of laws, our author sums up: "None of these opinions, even the most favorable to its antiquity, assigns the composition of it to a period as far back as the time of Moses. It is therefore impossible that the Legislator of the Hebrews copied anything from it." It is a very curious thing to examine the text of the citations from the *Laws of Manu*, and see how they are like to the words of the Pentateuch. In the work we are reviewing the texts from both are side by side, and

the resemblance is more than striking; the copying of the Bible is evident. Thus, for example, the Bible tells us of the ten patriarchs, from Adam to Noe, including them: *Manu* "Desiring to give birth to the human race, I produced ten eminent lords of creatures." "There were giants in those days" we find thus in *Manu:* "Giants, vampires, titans, dragons." The first men, according to Genesis, lived several hundred years; *Manu* says: "Men exempt from disease obtained the accomplishment of all their desires, and lived four hundred years in the first age." Again, God, the Bible tells us, shortened the period of man's life, and *Manu* tells us, "in subsequent ages man's span of life was shortened." When the observances of the ceremonial law and of the prescriptions of legal purity are examined, one sees what has all the appearance of identically the same expression. Thus ch. xxv., v. 5:

"DEUTERONOMY.	"MANU
"When brethren dwell together, and one of them dieth without children, the wife of the deceased shall not marry to another; but his brother shall take her and raise up seed for his brother. 6. And the first son he shall have of her he shall call by his name, that his name may not be abolished in Israel."	"When the husband of a young woman happens to die after they had been affianced, the brother of the deceased shall take her to wife."

Our author gives many such citations, the effect of which is a demonstration that the compilers of some of the sacred books of India made copious use of the Bible.

ANTIQUITY OF INDO-EUROPEAN COMMERCE.

The account our author gives of the commercial relations of Asia with Europe is based on historic facts. The city of Tadmor or Palmyra was built by Solomon, in the desert, to protect the caravans which came from India by way of the Euphrates to Palestine. He quotes Strabo telling of the exports from Ceylon to the Indian continent of ivory, tortoise-shells, and merchandise, which reached Europe by way of Cabul, Ariana, Hyrcania, the Caspian Sea, the Cyrus and the Black Sea. Strabo also speaks of the *Arsi* of the Caspian coasts, who transported on camels the products of India and of Babylon. The usual way from India was by Candahar, where the caravans from India and from Persia were wont to meet. He mentions, too, the fact of the commerce between Alexandria in Egypt and India by way of the Nile to Coptos, thence by camels to Myoshormos on the Red Sea, and by vessels to India, and states that he saw one hundred vessels going from Myoshormos to India. He says that this commerce had existed for a long time, and was perfectly organized; it had benefited greatly Alexandria, and under the Romans had increased a hundred-fold. Monseigneur Laouënan also quotes Pliny (book i., vi., 26), showing the commerce between Egypt and India, and says that India every year got from the Romans about $21,000,000.

We shall not trespass on the reader with the account given by Monseigneur Laouënan of the embassies to Augustus and Claudius, and of the presence of Indians in Europe. We judge it best to close these remarks by a brief reference to the relations of Jews and of Christians with India. Our author cites the fact of the deportation of the people of Israel into Media, by Salmanasar, in the year 719 before Christ, and of the people of Judæa by Nabuchodonosor, in 606 and 588, into the various parts of his vast empire. The colony of black Jews at Cochin dates from this epoch. Claude Buchanan says that the black Jews in the interior of Malayala have a copy of the Pentateuch, written on a roll of leather, patched where worn with parchment, and that the Jews in China have several on soft flexible leather of a red color. Also, Artaxerxes (B. C. 464–424) styles himself "the great king who rules from India to Ethiopia," and Darius the Mede orders all the empire "to fear and respect the God of Daniel." It is not strange, therefore, that the ideas and even practices of the Jews should have been adopted by the Asiatics, not only in the countries mentioned but elsewhere, for ideas follow commerce and immigration. As for the relations of Christians with Asia, there are many documents existing to show that, as is most fully made evident in the book before us.

THE RELIGIOUS SYSTEM OF THIBET.

Perhaps most capital is made against us of Lamaism in Thibet, its close resemblance to the organization of the Roman Catholic Church, in the temporal power of

the Grand Lama, and in its monastic institutions, and its manner of chanting and its ceremonies. Let us see what history tells us. In 1176 the Grand Khan of the Tartars, Thogruel-Ung-Khan, who was a Christian, wrote to Pope Alexander III., and the Pope answered on the 28th of September, 1177. Gengis-Khan (A. D. 1203) had Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans at his court. In 1245 Pope Innocent IV. sent Dominican and Franciscan missioners to Tartary. St. Louis, A.D. 1249, received an embassy from that country, and he sent, both in that year and in 1253, embassies of Dominicans and of Franciscans to the Khans. After the death of Mangou-Khan, Kublai-Khan, or Tchi-Tsou, succeeded him. Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids, LL.D. (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. "Lamaism"), tells us that he "became a convert to the Buddhism of the Thibetan Lamas. He granted to the abbot of the Sakya monastery in southern Thibet the title of tributary sovereign of the country, head of the Buddhist church, and overlord over the numerous barons and abbots, and in return was officially crowned by the abbot as ruler over the extensive domain of the Mongol empire." Of this Monseigneur Laouënan thus speaks: "After the death of Mangou-Khan, Koublai, or Tchi-Tsou, succeeded, A.D. 1260. This prince added to his empire southern China, Tong-king, Cochin China, Pegu, and Thibet. It was he who raised to the royal dignity the *Bodidharma*, or living Buddha; and as the one who was living then was a Thibetan, Koublai assigned him a principality in Thibet, with the title of *Dalai-Lama*, or supreme Lama." He then quotes Rohrbacher (*Hist. Church*, vol. xix., p. 123) "to show

that in the countries contiguous to Thibet at that time Christians were numerous, and that the ceremonies, altars, ornaments, and paintings of the Catholic Church were in use among them. It is no wonder, then, that just as the Mithraic worship of Rome copied the Christian rites, the Buddhists of Thibet and elsewhere made use of what they saw among their Christian neighbors.

We have given here but a meagre account of the valuable work of the Vicar-Apostolic of Pondicherry. We cannot praise it too highly; nor will he be flattered by the praise, for he has gone to Him whose religion he valiantly and ably defended in this skeptical age. We recommend the careful study of the book to our young men, and hope that soon a translation will put it within the reach of those who do not understand French. May it serve to stimulate some able and thoroughly equipped missioners of India to form an association for the further and yet more complete study of the writings of the Hindus, that God's truth may dispel the clouds which still remain, and shine forth with all the brilliancy of the noon-day sun!

THE END.

NAZARETH COLLEGE OF ROCHESTER
3 2769 00 759 602